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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is about the struggle of one generation of men in the Greek diaspora to come to 
terms with––and act within––political genealogies that had shaped their everyday lives since 
childhood and with which they remain in an ongoing relation of (dis)identification today. The 
Greek civil war (1946-1949) had bestowed upon these men an inheritance of polarized 
associations: nationalism, religiosity, order, on the one hand; anti-Greek communism, on the 
other. Their childhood and adolescence in the post-civil war years were shaped by state practices 
that polarized the Left from the Right. By the time of the dictatorship in 1967, which was the 
catalyst for many to leave, families in Greece had experienced decades of institutionalized 
marginalization. The focus here is on the intersection of this legacy with the political activities 
and sensibilities of those who arrived in Toronto and mobilized themselves against the Greek 
regime.  
 While the anti-dictatorship movement they created was originally heterogeneous, it became 
concentrically organized around the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) and the leadership 
of Toronto-based professor Andreas Papandreou. After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, PAK 
became the foundation for a new political party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 
with Andreas Papandreou as leader once again. Emerging as the hegemonic articulation of the 
left, PASOK became the first socialist party to govern Greece in 1981. Practically speaking, this 
meant that those anti-junta activists returning to Greece from Canada after the fall of the 
dictatorship found themselves navigating opportunities and trajectories that would have been 
inconceivable just a few years prior.  
 The problem to be investigated in this dissertation is twofold: First, to what extent does the 
civil war have a legacy in the narratives of men who migrated to Canada in the 1960s and 1970s 
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and how is this expressed? Second, how are political subjectivities constructed in these accounts 
from the vantage point of the ambiguous present-as-crisis?  These questions are approached 
through ethnographic observations and interviews with those who were involved in the anti-
dictatorship movement and either stayed in Toronto or returned to Greece after the fall of the 
military junta. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Athens 
Oct 10, 2012 
 
I'm sitting with Yannis in his small second-hand store. He's smoking at his desk—stacked with 
old newspapers, books, papers. We've been speaking for hours and I can see he's tired, 
depressed. We've discussed his plans to return to Canada for a visit. He hasn't been back to 
Toronto since '84 and he's hesitant, worrying that the changes would be too much. Just as he's 
explaining to me that the best decision he made was to get a Canadian passport for his son, we 
hear yelling and crying outside. He stands and motions for me to stay seated. Out of nowhere, it 
seems, a young migrant man tumbles in front of the store—a meter away from the entrance—and 
is surrounded by policemen. Five or six. They are beating him. He's screaming, "Yiati, Yiati?" 
(Why? Why?) Yannis approaches the police officers and tries to calm them down. He somehow 
gets between them and [...] he's saying, "This man is in your protection. If you have arrested 
him, he is in your protection, do you hear me?" He's repeating this again and again. A crowd 
has gathered...two men are egging the police on, encouraging them. "He is a thief," another 
yells. All of this as the man continues screaming just one word: "Yiati." Yannis raises his voice 
when the beatings continue: "I will be a witness for this man in court." Another man in his 70s 
says the same and the beatings subside. An officer calls for the supervisor, the man is picked up 
and taken away. I have watched all of this from the entrance of the store. Yannis comes back in 
and we sit quietly at his desk for a moment. I curse under my breath and he does the same. He 
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lights another cigarette, takes a long slow puff, his hand shaking visibly. Silence. I am thinking 
about the scene: Yannis—an old leftist, an old man—unsteady on his feet and trying to subdue 
these young officers, stamped with the authority of the state. And then he speaks: "That's an 
everyday scene now, Katherine. And it's only normal because when people have nothing to eat, 
no place to sleep, nothing, they will do something." He adds, "It is very dangerous too because if 
you say something—if you try to intervene—you can have problems yourself. You know, I don't 
want to mark this store. They could burn this place in 10 minutes flat..." 
1. The Project 
 
This dissertation was written during the years of what came to be termed the "Greek Crisis" (and 
soon after the "European Crisis").1 Its earliest conceptualization began during my visit to Athens 
in June 2009, at which time the international media had not yet become alarmed by the state of 
Greece's finances and the country's credit rating was still an impressive A. Athens had been 
making headlines, however, just six months prior as the site of "youth riots." The police shooting 
of 15-year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos on December 6th, 2008, led to three weeks of 
widespread youth protests and confrontations with the police. Images of hooded youth throwing 
stones and gasoline bombs, streets of fire and tear gas, and heavy-booted riot police with plastic 
shields and helmets flooded online media. While sparked by the murder, these protests expressed 
a profound and long-standing discontent with the education system, youth unemployment and 
political corruption.2 Snap elections were eventually called in October 2009, the conservative 
                                               
1 "Greek Crisis" begins to circulate in international media in December 2009 and "European Crisis" in 
February 2010.  
2 I highly recommend director Christos Georgiou's 2011 documentary, Children of the Riots, which 
explores the impact of these weeks almost three years later through the stories and reflections of seven 
young protagonists. It is especially good at bringing to voice the diverse experience of becoming 
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government (New Democracy) was replaced by the social democrats (PASOK) and the 
announcement was made, a few weeks later, that Greece's finances were in big trouble.3   
 Most of the volatility that preceded my visit in the summer of 2009 eluded me. The city 
had calmed and there was no immediate evidence, in my eyes, of either the winter protests or the 
political and economic crisis that was just on the horizon. Of course, by the time I was 
interviewing Yannis and witnessing the police beatings that I describe above, "i krisi" (the crisis) 
had fully implicated itself in my research. By then, Greece had been subjected to more than two 
years of brutal austerity measures and many small-business owners like Yannis had closed up 
shop and were living on meagre pensions or dwindling life savings––a situation Yannis 
described as his "bitter lemon."  
 It was not Greece's contemporary troubles that had initially brought me to Yannis' small 
store in the fall of 2012, but his involvement in a political movement against the Greek 
dictatorship, waged nearly four decades prior in Toronto. Yannis was among the many thousands 
of young Greeks who had left for foreign lands during the years of the military dictatorship 
(1967-1974). Official figures from Athens show that 328,977 Greeks emigrated abroad through 
legal means between 1961 and 1976 (Gavaki 1991: 73). Canada formally received 46,271 of 
those people between 1967 and 1973 (77). And yet, these figures do not capture the diversity of 
migrations: Some left urgently, others through prepared departures; some left with papers and 
passports bought on the black market, others through "legitimate" means and with interventions 
from the "right" people; some jumped ship as young sailors at various North American ports, 
                                                                                                                                                       
politicized and the ongoing negotiation of aspirations and disappointments under austerity. One young 
woman states of the protests, "It was my baptism of fire [...] it was then that I realized what injustice and 
violence are. To have your future and your life taken from you." 
3 In October 2009, George Papaconstantinou (finance minister in Greece’s socialist government) revealed 
that the country's deficit was double that predicted by the previous government. Fitch began to downgrade 
Greece's credit rating in the same month, first to A- and eventually to CCC in July of 2011. 
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eventually finding their way to Toronto, while others were sponsored by family members already 
residing in Canada. What they shared was the experience of leaving their country at a moment 
when democracy was a crippled dream, censorship was the rule, state violence was no stranger 
and the marginalization of a whole sector of the Greek population––those deemed "Left"––had 
been legally instituted. 
 This dissertation is about the struggle of one generation of men in the Greek diaspora to 
come to terms with––and act within––political genealogies that had shaped their everyday lives 
since childhood and with which they remain in an ongoing relation of (dis)identification today. 
The Greek civil war (1946-1949) had bestowed upon these men an inheritance of polarized 
associations: nationalism, religiosity, order, on the one hand, and anti-Greek communism, on the 
other. Their childhood and adolescence in the post-civil war years were shaped by state practices 
that polarized the Left from the Right and, in the words of one my interviewees, "separated the 
good Greeks from the bad." By the time of the dictatorship in 1967, which was the catalyst for 
many to leave, families in Greece had experienced decades of institutionalized marginalization.  
 The focus here is on the intersection of this legacy with the political activities and 
sensibilities of those who arrived in Toronto and mobilized themselves against the Greek regime.  
While the anti-dictatorship movement they created was originally heterogeneous, it became 
concentrically organized around the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) and the leadership 
of Toronto-based professor Andreas Papandreou. After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, PAK 
became the foundation for a new political party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 
with Andreas Papandreou as leader once again. Emerging as the hegemonic articulation of the 
left, PASOK became the first socialist party to govern Greece in 1981. Practically speaking, this 
meant that those anti-junta activists returning to Greece from Canada after the fall of the 
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dictatorship found themselves navigating opportunities and trajectories that would have been 
inconceivable just a few years prior.  
 The problem to be investigated in this dissertation is twofold: First, to what extent does the 
civil war have a legacy in the narratives of men who migrated to Canada in the 1960s and 1970s 
and how is this expressed? Second, how are political subjectivities constructed in these accounts 
from the vantage point of the ambiguous present-as-crisis? These questions are approached 
through ethnographic observations and interviews with those who were involved in the anti-
dictatorship movement and either stayed in Toronto or returned to Greece after the fall of the 
military junta. In answering these questions, a great emphasis is placed on what I call the "social 
life" of the political. In other words, while specific political structures, formations, parties and 
discourses are addressed throughout, they are somewhat in the "background"; questions of 
relationality, (mis)recognition, visibility and proximity constitute the "foreground." The sociality 
of the subject is of interest here, especially as he is represented in narratives: Here navigating the 
political file that institutionalized marginalization (chapter three), there organizing a resistance 
movement against the junta in the streets and basements of Toronto (chapter four) and later 
negotiating his "place" in post-dictatorship Greece (chapter five). 
  If Luisa Passerini (1996) is right that "memory speaks from today" (23), it remains true 
that "today" is itself an ambiguous and shifting point of articulation. This means that even when 
we speak of the "perspective" or "vantage point" of today (as I have just done), we can only do 
so in a tentative and hesitant way and with an awareness that such a phrasing offers us more an 
analytical device than a reflection of reality. This is especially true in Greece since 2010, where 
the present has been discursively produced in media accounts and commentaries as––at once––
paralyzed, on the verge of collapse, in free-fall, and pregnant with radical change. Undoubtedly, 
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Greece has been the site of an immense experiment in the art of neoliberal crisis management 
within the structure of the European Union. New laws stripping Greeks of their rights, property 
and security are passed through unconstitutional processes and, for a period of six months, the 
country was governed by unelected officials.4 The casualties of austerity measures set in place 
since 2010 by the coalition government (in collaboration with the Troika) are by now well 
known:5 An unemployment rate of 27.5% (58.3% for youth under 25) (Eurostat 2013);6 an 
estimated 30% decrease in wages and pensions (with another 15% anticipated over the next three 
years) (Gow 2012);7 a 22% cut to the minimum wage (International Labour Office 2012: 5); a 
25% increase in homelessness (Laskos & Tsakalotos 2013: 111); an enormous spike in suicides 
(for every 1% decrease in government spending, research shows a 0.43% rise in suicides among 
men) (Antonakakis & Collins 2014: 44); dramatic cuts in medical spending with poor health 
outcomes (Kentikelenis et al. 2011: 1457); greater reliance on soup kitchens and charitable 
medical services8; and widespread closures of businesses (one third of Athenian shops are 
estimated to have closed since the onset of austerity measures).9 This is precisely the social and 
                                               
4 Prime Minister George Papandreou (PASOK) resigned in November 2011, a coalition government was 
formed between PASOK (social democratic), ND (conservative) and LAOS (far-right), and economist 
Lucas Papademos was appointed Prime Minister without elections.  
5 The coalition government that was established after the summer elections in 2012 was comprised of the 
two ruling parties, PASOK and ND, as well as a third minority party, DIMAR. "The Troika" refers to the 
three financial bodies governing austerity: the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank. 
6  These are the 2013 figures released by the European Commission's statistics service, Eurostat. 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en (accessed July 1, 2014) 
7 David Gow, "Greeks face further wage cuts as price of latest bailout," The Guardian, February 21, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/business/businessspecial3/07cities.html (accessed March 14, 2012). 
8  Helena Smith, "Greece's food crisis: Families face going hungry during summer shutdown," The 
Guardian, August 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/06/greece-food-crisis-summer-
austerity (accessed August 8, 2013). 
9 This is according to the president of the National Confederation of Hellenic Commerce (ESEE) 
Vasilis Korkidis, quoted in the Reuter's article, "Crisis shuts a third of shops in Athens city center" (Sept 
24, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/24/us-greece-business-idUSBRE88N0NW20120924 
(accessed October 3, 2012) 
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political horizon in which Yannis lamented his "bitter lemon" as a small-business owner (in his 
70s) struggling to keep the doors open.  
  Widespread discontent and suffering brought on by austerity measures have transformed 
the political map of the country, challenging the essentially two-party system that has been in 
place since the fall of the Junta. Having been the governing party in 2009 (with 43% of the 
popular vote) PASOK has lost its legitimacy and social base in its handling of the crisis and is 
now reinventing itself under the cover of new political parties such as "The Olive" and "The 
River." European elections in May 2014 suggest that the traditional PASOK (winning 9% of 
votes) is no longer a viable political actor (although it remains the minority partner in a 
governing coalition with New Democracy) and that Greek citizens are in large part split between 
the party of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) (26.6%) and the conservative New Democracy (ND) 
(22.7), while others are supporting electorally the far-right Golden Dawn (XA) (9%), the 
Communist Party (KKE) (6%) and "The River" (6%). These figures are striking given the fact 
that neither SYRIZA nor Golden Dawn had achieved the 5% of popular support necessary for 
parliamentary representation back in the 2009 elections.  
 The implications of this period of party reconstruction for my research can not be 
overstressed: I was, after all, asking after the birth of a movement and a party––once celebrated 
as the great defender of social justice and reconciliation–– at the very moment its death had 
been heralded. Many of the men I interviewed had been active members (and in some cases 
"founding fathers") back in 1974 and returned to Greece after the fall of the junta to take part in 
the "socialist reconstruction" of their country. For both those who returned to Greece and those 
who stayed in Canada, the degraded place of the party today is a primary point of reference that 
narratives pivot around, even if discreetly. The current crisis announced itself in various––but 
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identifiable––ways: Sometimes it did so violently and suddenly (as I captured in my 
ethnographic notes above), other times it crept around in statements of regret. Some interviewees 
discussed the present as a period of vulnerability and others as a measure of the futility of past 
efforts and ideologies. Some framed the crisis as a form of punishment for "past sins," a rude 
awakening, or––in Yannis' words above––his "bitter lemon." And sometimes the implications 
were written on the wall: "EAT YOUR LOCAL PASOK POLITICIAN. HE ATE YOUR 
FUTURE AFTER ALL!" 
II. A Brief History of Marginalization 
 
It is always perilous for sociologists to claim a "historical background" against which they will 
present their work. We often introduce our analysis of a contemporary institution, discourse, or 
relation with a rather rapid treatment of what came before. In doing so, we can too easily be 
critiqued for making claims to an unproblematic and fully intelligible past. That history is not 
linear or teleological, but a constellation of memory, interests, repressions and denials––that it is 
more a field of contestation than a universal chronology or mapping of events––has been 
acknowledged and taken seriously within the discipline of history itself at least since Foucault's 
Nietzschean emphasis on ruptures and discontinuities entered scholarship. Nevertheless, much of 
the research we do within sociology often rests implicitly on historical recordings of events that 
have informed our research at its earliest stages. This reading can be essential for projects 
exploring events and records in their ambiguity or contradictions, in their interpretations and 
commemorations or their "construction" through collective and interpersonal memory.  
 As I began to narrow my own interest in the social dimensions of political inheritance, I 
read widely work (in English) on Greece during the Second World War, the Civil War, the post-
war years and the period of gradual "liberalization" of the 1960s, the Colonel's dictatorship, as 
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well as the years of the Metapolitefsi––works, I should add, that follow the tradition of plotting 
history according to key events, such as wars and changes to political parties and government 
regimes. Through this reading, I acquired an understanding of the political personalities and 
parties, geopolitical conflicts and foreign interventions, rural and urban developments and 
population exchanges that make up much of what is commonly called "Modern Greek Political 
History." This helped enormously in interviews, as I was able to keep up easily with accounts–-
peppered as they were with names, parties, and dates–– and I was able to bring back into focus 
the core themes of this dissertation, rather than getting lost in details. This project would have 
been quite impossible without these prior readings, and it would be rather disingenuous to 
minimize their importance in the conceptual framing of my core problematic. For example, had I 
not discovered the rather obscure reference about the Idionym Law of 1921, which set in place 
the legal apparatus for persecuting kin for crimes committed, perhaps I would not have 
incorporated into my interview a focus on the family as a political subject––a theme I explore in 
some detail in chapter three. 
 How might we present, in broad outline, those events, practices or institutional changes 
that have shaped the lives of those who enter our research but which we have not addressed 
directly in interviews or, oppositely, which we discuss in such detail that the wider significance 
may be lost? This remains an open question—one I have struggled with throughout this 
dissertation, as I attempt to reveal forces that have shaped the lives of those I interviewed in both 
significant and subtle ways. I want to highlight here specific historical developments that lie 
somewhat outside of the narrative frame I explore throughout this dissertation, but which are 
nonetheless crucial. The politico-legal practices that I outline effectively rendered "the left" 
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abject, constructed the family as a political unit and institutionalized marginalization across 
generations. 
 I'll begin in the not-so-distant past of the late 1980s: Through the historically 
unprecedented cooperation of the right-wing "New Democracy" and Communist parties in Greek 
government, a law was passed in 1989 "for the remedy of the consequences of the civil war." 
One article called for the destruction of citizen files and another called for the transformation of 
the civil war lexicon: Partisans would no longer be called "Communist gang fighters" but 
"Democratic Army of Greece fighters," and the war itself would no longer be called "bandit war" 
but "civil war".10 In these two "remedies" we may find our point of departure for the brief history 
I want to offer here. Because what follows in this dissertation is a consideration of identity and 
political subjectivity in relation to political genealogies that, from childhood, were marked by the 
tendency to "separate the good Greeks from the bad" and an institutionalized anti-communism 
that at once created and persecuted "left families," I wish to outline the politico-legal practices 
that generated continuity in relations between the state and those whom Panourgia (2009) has 
called "dangerous citizens" (7).  
 That state discourse prior to 1989 referred to the civil war as the "bandit war," of which 
"communist gang fighters" were the main provocateurs, is not surprising given that the very legal 
tools by which communists were punished had been created initially for "bandits" and thieves. 
Indeed, "The Law Concerning Brigands and the Prosecution of their Relatives," which was 
established in 1871, permitted the prosecution of anyone believed to have aided and abetted 
suspects, including family members (Panourgia 2009: 23). This practice of collective punishment 
would later be applied to people regarded as leftists and their families.  
                                               
10 Law 1863-1989 (Άρση των Συνεπειών των Εµφυλίου Πολέµου 1944-1949)   
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 From the earliest manifestations of worker organization and protests in Greece, it was not 
uncommon for workers to be punished for their participation. Prior to WWI, in 1913, a law was 
passed which permitted the suspension of constitutional civil rights under a declared "state of 
siege"—a measure that was used sporadically to control worker dissent and banish the first 
socialists and unionists and later deployed systematically during the dictatorship of Pangalos 
(1925-1926) (Voglis 2002b: 33). Pangalos formally outlawed the Communist Party (KKE) and 
sent members, trade unionists and their “fellow-travellers” into exile. Greek islands were 
refashioned as self-contained labour camps and prisons (41). 
 Worker unrest in 1927 and 1928––especially by those working in tobacco production, in 
bakeries and on the rails–– provided the pretext for the liberal government's 1929 "Idionym 
Law"11 It declared a penalty of prison or exile for "whoever aims at the implementation of ideas 
whose manifest purpose is the overthrow of the established social order by violent means or the 
detachment of part from the whole of the country, or proselytizes in favour of these ideas" 
(Voglis 2002b: 35). Preventing a communist takeover was the guise under which Metaxas' 
regime then came to power (in 1936), dissolving parliament, acquiring extraordinary powers 
through Emergency Law 117 and making full use of the Idionym Law to punish and speedily 
process dissenting individuals. Bypassing the courts and refusing the accused any possibility of 
appeal, the legal means were created for detaining and exiling thousands (Voglis 2002a: 527). 
This also laid the legal foundation for isolating an entire segment of the population on account of 
their ideas about social change (Kenna 2001: 16).  
 The Metaxas regime also created the legal category of “dangerous and suspicious person," 
which included people with infectious diseases, those suspected of left-wing sympathies, 
                                               
11 For a detailed overview of these legal measures, see Panourgia (2009): 23-26. 
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"declared" members of the communist party and their family members (Panourgia 2009: 9).  
Once a person was convicted, their voting rights were permanently revoked along with the 
possibility of employment in public office (Voglis 2009b: 40). Law 107 introduced new 
measures to the anticommunist state apparatus during the Metaxa dictatorship, including the 
"declaration of repentance" ("diloseis metaneias")––a statement renouncing the Communist party 
that was a condition for release––the "civic-mindedness certificate" (pistopoiitika koinonikon 
fronimaton")––an official document necessary for participation in public life, university 
attendance and work in many occupations––and the establishment of concentration camps 
(Panourgia 2009: 40). Statements of repentance obtained by people under immense physical and 
psychological pressure, along with the photographs and names of arrested communists, were 
published in newspapers and posted in public squares (71). With the enactment of a number of 
emergency laws, the publication and circulation of books deemed subversive were prohibited 
and all educational material came under the direct control of Metaxa (Petrakis 2011: 37). 
Metaxa's anticommunist state practices characterized the interwar period and would be deployed 
again in the post-civil war period.  
 During the Second World War, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) was the central 
organizer of mobilizations against the occupiers. As Mazower (2000) summarized, "British 
military and political interests tugged different ways. The war effort dictated supporting 
EAM/ELAS12 as it was providing the most effective guerilla opposition to the Axis; but longer-
range political concerns required [an] anticommunist counterweight" (5). As the war came to a 
close, the British transferred support from the communist-organized arm of resistance to one 
                                               
12 The National Liberation Front (EAM) was a broad resistance movement, albeit organized centrally by 
the (banned) Greek Communist Party (KKE). The Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS) was 
established in 1942 as the military wing of the KKE.  
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supportive of the conservative establishment (ibid). Given their enormous contribution to the 
Allied war effort, communists were justified in thinking that they would have a place in the post- 
war government. Instead, those who had actively supported EAM and ELAS found themselves 
screened out of army conscription in order to "build a state apparatus loyal to the regime" 
(Voglis 2002a: 531). In the year leading up to the civil war, the National Guard (backed by the 
British), along with newly formed right-wing paramilitaries, terrorized those villages that had 
supported the partisans. According to Tsoucalas (1969), 2,961 persons were given the death 
sentence, 500 were murdered and 20, 000 were arrested from 1945-1946 (94).  
 During the civil war, more than 50,000 people were imprisoned on political grounds. On 
the islands of Makronisos, Giaros, and Trikeri, "re-education" and work camps were established 
with the pronounced aim of "rehabilitating" the left into a nationally-conscious citizenry loyal to 
the existing government (Voglis 2002b: 34). While death penalties, physical and psychological 
torture, solitary confinement, hard labour, and general mistreatment were consistently imposed 
on imprisoned subjects, the possibility existed for some to be "pardoned" so long as they 
denounced the communist party and signed declarations of repentance (ibid). These were read in 
front of the local parish and broadcasted over the radio in order to publicly humiliate and to 
breed suspicion and judgment within the ranks of the party. 
 The period following the civil war was marked by a well-institutionalized, state-
administered system of anticommunism that targeted the defeated—one similar in many ways to 
American McCarthyism (Samatas 1986)13. According to Samatas, an institutional continuity had 
                                               
13 That anticommunism directly after the civil war was both geopolitically inscribed and supported by 
Liberal representatives is evidenced by the fact that it was a Liberal post-war government that announced: 
"None of the (political) prisoners detained in prisons and (concentration) camps will return home unless 
they repent and subjugate themselves to the way of life which we insist on establishing in Greece with the 
ample aid and assistance of our trans-Atlantic allies." (Quoted in Samatas 1986: 16). 
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been built into the bureaucratic practices of the state that would shape the lives of those on the 
left for decades: Since the late 1930s, Greeks required a certificate of “social convictions” ––a 
testament to holding "social beliefs" supportive of the government and thus to being one of the 
"nationally-minded citizens" (ethnicofrones) (12). By 1967, this certificate (re-named "certificate 
of civic-mindedness") was required for access to university, the acquisition of bank loans, 
driver’s license, passport, national identification card, and employment in the public sector 
(including transportation, administration, military, police, social services, medicine, education, 
utilities, merchant marines, banks, and the emerging corporations partially or fully owned by the 
state) (32). Being refused certification was socially and financially devastating for individuals 
and their family members (ibid).  
 I hope this short overview of institutional marginalization will give the reader a sense of i) 
the relatively long duration of practices of exclusion; ii) the specific legal tools that both center 
and right-wing governments used to subordinate dissent; and iii) the politico-legal process by 
which family members of different generations were institutionally tied together through their 
exclusion.  
III. From Dangerous Citizens to Political Migrants14? 
 
This political history has been largely ignored in the scholarly literature on the Greek diaspora. 
This is likely a reflection of the specific approach to migration that dominated the field in the 60s 
and 70s, when Greek migrants really caught the attention of academics and researchers in the 
social sciences. The extensive literature from this period—focusing principally on demographic 
                                               
14  "Dangerous citizens" is a term Panourgia (2009) uses in reference to Greek Leftists. 
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elements and "community" characteristics—influenced research for over four decades.15 Studies 
emerging out of this tradition are most useful for establishing a general sense of what was then 
called "waves of migration," patterns of settlement, religious affiliations and cultural 
developments, such as churches, Greek schools and regional associations (Glytsos 1997; 
Constantinou 2007; Schultz 1980). Others examined the central role of kin networks in small 
business production and other income-generation activities (Lovel-Troy 1979).  
 Taken together, these studies tend to draw upon the language—and indeed, "the 
problem"—of assimilation, integration, acculturation and adjustment and are primarily 
concerned (either explicitly or implicitly) with the extent to which Greeks represent a more or 
less "successful" immigrant group. Their success is measured variously in terms of language 
acquisition, involvement in host country associations, leisure time activities, achievements in 
education (Veglery 1988) and labour participation (Kourvetaris 1989), as well as the extent to 
which specific cultural forms and traditions, especially within "the Greek" or "the Greek-
Canadian" (or "Greek-American") family have undergone continuity or change (Tastsoglou and 
Stubos 1992; Tsemberis et al. 1999). Although, as Laliotou (2004) has pointed out, there is quite 
a bit of consensus about the cultural and social integration of Greek immigrants, the "process 
itself is not analyzed," with the effect that assimilation is taken to be "a natural event" (150). 
Significantly, the demographic and social scientific emphasis underpinning many of these 
studies—primarily oriented to fact gathering, social psychological categorizations and the 
demonstrated relations between structural variables (education, language, age, sex, income, 
occupation and family structure)—have the effect of depoliticizing the migrant by either ignoring 
                                               
15 In addition to a few broad historical overviews of Greek diasporas (Clogg 2000; Tziovas 2009), there 
are many nation-specific histories (for Canada, see Chimbos 1980; Tamis & Gavaki 2002; for Australia, 
see Tamis & Gavaki and for the US, see Moskos 1989; Soloutos 1964) and, especially in the context of 
Greek-American studies, there are countless studies of more local communities. 
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questions of the political or reducing them to a historical context (ie. Whatever happened in the 
"old country"), an attitude "held" by a more or less rational individual, or one "push factor" 
among others.  
 Others have considered questions of identity––and indeed, "identity crisis" (Kourvetaris 
1990)––with an interest in Greek immigrants' opinions and perceptions of the cultural practices 
of the "home country" as well as the "new" (See Chimbos (1971) on attitudes about inter-ethnic 
marriages; Constantinou (1985) on "ethnic" differences between generations; Karlis (1999) on 
changing ideas about recreation; and Karpathakis (1994) on religiosity). Studies of this kind have 
highlighted tensions within the Greek diasporas. For example, Schultz (1981) considered some 
of the intergenerational tensions existing between what she termed "newcomers" (those arriving 
to the US after the second world war) and the "oldertimers" (the offspring of immigrants arriving 
in the 1920s); while the former judged the latter to be "Americanized" and "inhospitable," the 
latter saw the former as "lazy," "selfish" and "entitled" (385-386). Similarly, an early 
anthropological study of the Greek "kafeneio" (men's coffee house) found that regulars 
maintained strong affective attachments to Greece, were "ambivalent" about American culture 
and were marginal from the more established Greek-American middle class (Patterson 1970: 
247). 
 Saloutos' (1964) The Greeks in The United States is widely acknowledged to have 
inaugurated the productive field of "Greek-American Studies." He demonstrated the social 
mobility of Greek labourers from the margins of American society to the middle class, a 
trajectory that Moskos (1989) also traces and gives the name "embourgeoisement" (55). It is 
within this field that the figure of the apolitical Greek migrant has been somewhat challenged. 
Karpathakis (1999) examined the participation of Greek immigrants in New York following the 
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Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974, exploring the strategic ways in which Greek 
Americans created formal relations with political parties at both the local and national level and 
then took specific steps––becoming naturalized American Citizens, contributing funds to 
campaigns, voting and even running for office at all three levels of government––to influence 
homeland politics (see also Kaloudis 2006). Peck (1998) has examined the initial obstacles to 
Greek-Americans' incorporation in the workers' movement, along with their gradual participation 
in labour unions and strike activities, while historians Dan Georgakas (1987 and 1991) and 
Karpozilos (forthcoming)16 have comprehensively traced their contributions to the workers' 
movements, especially through leadership positions in the Communist Party. Georgakas (1987) 
also provides an overview of the wide support (or silent acquiescence) given by Greek 
Americans to the Greek dictatorship in the 1960s and 70s, as well as the few suppressed attempts 
at protest by Greek American intellectuals and journalists during that time. Explaining the 
disparity between the early activities of Greek immigrants in the workers movements and the 
relatively accommodating response to the junta, Georgakas emphasizes the well-entrenched 
impact of McCarthyism: 
The majority of the [Greek American] community had supported the Communist-led 
EAM-ELAS, but the American government had determined that EAM-ELAS would have 
as small a post-war role as possible [...] Discussions of alternatives, proposals for 
compromise, and the formation of pressure groups was rendered impossible by the 
specter of McCarthyism. Any sentiment that could be interpreted as pro-Communist put a 
foreign-born Greek American in danger of deportation. For the native-born, there was the 
                                               
16 Karpozilos' doctoral research on "Greek American Radicals in America" (1900-1950), which will be 
published shortly with Crete University Press, provides the historical research for the excellent 
documentary, "Greek American Radicals: The Untold Story," (directed by Kostas Vakkas), first shown at 
the Thessaloniki Film Festival in 2013. 
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prospect of the blacklist. Support for American policy, which might have developed 
naturally, was brutally commandeered [...] As a consequence of this process, Greek 
America developed a kind of amnesia. It forgot its own turbulent history in America (43). 
The relatively "weak" position of the Greek-American Left is differently explained by Moskos in 
his response to Georgakas: "In brief, those immigrants who prospered in America, or at least 
made a decent living, were the most likely to establish families here. The class base of the Greek 
American Left [...] either returned to Greece or did not reproduce itself17" (1987: 59). Years 
later, however, he briefly describes a revival, primarily due to Greeks students and workers 
arriving during the junta and raising awareness of its brutality in the context of the emerging 
New Left––a movement which he claims also impacted a "scattering of second-generation 
academics" (Moskos 2014: 116). 
  The literature on the Greek diaspora in Canada is sparse and tends to deny both Greek 
migrants' political inheritance and their own political activities. That the Greek Junta both 
created a wave of progressive migrants to Canada and sparked a political movement against the 
regime has been overlooked. The power of the assimilationist or integrationist paradigm over 
research is strikingly evident in the case of Efrosini Gavaki's (1977) treatment of political 
antagonisms in the Greek diaspora. Reporting her findings from a questionnaire designed to 
assess immigrants' level of "powerlessness and, consequently, [their] level of cultural 
integration," Gavaki explains her discovery of a "bias" in her study. I quote Gavaki at length here 
in order to make my point : 
                                               
17 On the latter point, Moskos is speaking literally, as he notes (without revealing his sources) that 
"among the less economically successful of the immigrants who stayed in America, a disproportionate 
share never married" (59) 
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A parenthetical note [...] The interviewing process was progressing smoothly until the 
section of the powerlessness scale which deals with attitude towards governments and 
power structures was reached. At that point, the flow of the interviewing process was 
interrupted and the respondents (students and professionals excluded) hesitated in 
answering the questions. The most frequent reason given for that was that they did not 
want to get involved with politics. It took a lot of reassurance to persuade them to believe 
that they were guaranteed secrecy and anonymity. However, it was felt that respondent 
were giving the ["]least questioning the legitimacy of established order [" answer], rather 
that what they really felt. Thus a bias towards less powerlessness should be expected. The 
"undecided" category almost exclusively represents those who insisted on not giving an 
answer (20). 
Gavaki then tells the reader that there is presently a military dictatorship in Greece and considers 
how this may have affected her respondents: 
[...] the Greek community is broken into many factions supporting or opposing [the 
state]. The political orientations of most of the interviewers were relatively known in the 
community. Rumours and incidents of threat by the military government and its 
sympathizers and rumours of incidents of retaliation by its opponents were widespread 
among Greeks in Canada. Thus, fear for themselves and their relatives in Greece kept 
them from risking being personally identified with any political stand, whether related 
with Greece or not [...] Thus, the overall significance of this situation will be a deflated 
level of powerlessness, as most of the respondents concentrated their answers in the 
middle (ibid). 
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Many years later, Tamis and Gavaki (2002) co-edited a comparative history of the Greeks in 
Canada and Australia. Truly remarkable to me is the fact that Gavaki says nothing about the 
antagonistic relations that had previously "biased" her assessment scale. That the political 
emerges in her work as an external condition intervening on a measure that would otherwise be 
valid and then disappears completely in her discussion of the Greek diaspora can only be 
explained by the twin attachment to a positivist paradigm and a desire to represent the Greek 
diaspora in positive terms. The significance of this absence can not be overstated; after all, 
Gavaki is taken to be a major scholar of the Greek diaspora in Canada and there have been no 
studies on this generation of the Greek diaspora since her co-authored book. Thus, the only 
evidence that we have in the literature that an anti-dictatorship movement actually occurred is 
gleaned from the few pages Chimbos (1980) offers on various organizations and newspapers in 
his social history of the "Greeks in Canada."  
 Close to the spirit of this dissertation are those studies that disturb the representation of 
Greeks as a "model ethnic" and focus on questions of subjectivity. For example, Tastsoglou 
(2009) examines state archives from the 1950s and 60s to show how Greek women were 
portrayed as ideal domestic workers but also how migrants' identities were inherently gendered 
and classed, emerging out of daily practices of domestic and paid labour. Offering a "history of 
migrant subjectivities" in the first decades of the 20th century, Laliotou (2004) looks at practices 
of writing the self in memoires and letters of Greek migrants in the United states within the 
frame of transnational cultural production. She concludes that "the physical migration and 
dislocation of Greek populations" had the effect of "displac[ing] the nation-state [...] enacted 
difference and heterogeneity in Greek national culture (200). 
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 Importantly, Laliotou is writing about the experiences and constructions of Greek migrants 
to America in the first half of the twentieth century, while I am focusing on the generation of 
men who migrated to Canada in the 1960s and 70s. Many of those migrating to Canada at this 
time were familiar with practices of exclusion, degrading discourses and an ambivalent 
(dis)identication with the hegemonic articulation of the "nation" and "national culture." Said 
otherwise, state persecution and marginalization had already enacted "difference" in 
subjectivities long before the dislocating experience of migration.  
 Finally, Anagnostou's (2009) similar attempt to disrupt the figure of Greeks in America as 
a uniform ethnic group resonates with reflections in this dissertation. Anagnostou asks after the 
experiences, struggles and identities that are repressed and silenced in the making of a 
homogenous ethnic community and ethnic past. The last chapter of his book is particularly 
relevant, as it tracks those moments of political exposure in the memoires and popular 
ethnographies of migrants and their children in the United States. A few pages explore the ways 
in which state oppression during the McCarthy period created a "heritage of fear" for those 
Greek Americans who saw their left-wing immigrant parents (along with others) surveilled and 
intimidated by the state. 
IV. Chapter Breakdown 
 
In chapter two, I set out my methodological approach and clarify the theoretical concepts useful 
for thinking about political subjectivity, the social life of political categories and political 
genealogy in the narratives of those who migrated to Canada from Greece in the 1960s and 
1970s. I draw from ethnographic literatures on the state and kinship––two fields that are often 
not considered together—and work on subjectivity. I also discuss questions pertaining to the 
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archive, ethnographic methodologies and the narrative approach I took to interviewing and data 
analysis.  
 The point of departure for chapter three is the political file––"o fakelos"––that was used in 
the postwar years and up to 1974 to categorize Greek citizens based on their family's loyalty to 
the state. Approached symbolically, as that which renders one ontologically "left," and 
ethnographically, as a structuring experience that shapes daily life, I examine what it means for 
Greeks to have been "living in the file for generations." Above, I have provided a very cursory 
overview of some of the institutional arrangements that legally and politically legitimized the 
exclusion of an entire section of society over the course of many decades. In chapter three, I ask 
how one inhabits the file––that which has all the connotations of order, preservation, and 
authority. In whose name does the file speak? To what extent can the file be contested? And how 
do interviewees come to terms with their political inheritance? While the majority of these 
documents have been destroyed—and a few classified—I show that the file still speaks in the 
narratives of those I interviewed. The purpose of chapter three for the dissertation as a whole is 
threefold: i) to develop my problematic of political genealogy, which will be considered in each 
of the following chapters; ii) to demonstrate the very particular forms of sociality that underpin 
expressions of political subjectivity; and iii) to provide a detailed case of what I call the "social 
life of the political." Specifically, I am demonstrating the ways in which conceptualizations of 
the political pivot around an understanding of the family as a political actor.  
 Chapter four explores forms of sociality and constructions of political subjectivity in men's 
narratives of the anti-dictatorship movement established in Toronto. I ask: How did men 
negotiate, manage, and socialize along political lines in their new city? And, having carried the 
weight of the file's interpolations for many years––indeed having been told what they were and 
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what they were destined to be––what was it to actively participate in a movement and to act 
(often for the first time) politically? I argue that for men in their 20s and early 30s, differences of 
age, but also of culture and education forged a sense of being a marginalized and progressive 
generation in the Greek diaspora. I also show how specific forms of sociality––solidarity, but 
also antagonism and distrust––developed between different branches of the movement and 
between men and state authorities in Toronto. In other words, I examine precisely those 
antagonisms that Gavaki's research unintentionally discovers and then disappears. Importantly, I 
demonstrate that political genealogies remained animated in the streets of Toronto in three ways: 
first, in the struggle over "naming" the anti-dictatorship movement and the pressure placed on 
communists not to reveal their political identities in collective actions; second, in the 
intimidations of men by Greek authorities in Toronto and interviewees' fears that their activities 
would have consequences for relatives back in Greece; third, in the use of family background to 
(de)legitimize activists.  
 Chapter five journeys from Toronto to Greece, as many families did after the fall of the 
Junta in 1974. By 1981, the resistance movement discussed in chapter four had evolved into the 
first ever governing socialist party (PASOK). In this chapter, I locate men's accounts of return in 
a context in which a particular pronouncement of "the left" was ascending through the party and 
personality of Andreas Papandreou, gaining institutional legitimacy and opening up 
unprecedented opportunities for those who had been marginalized for many decades. What was it 
to move from a diasporic site––and a marginal one at that––to the "center" of the action in 
homeland politics? How were relations established in the diaspora reconfigured in the 
transforming political space of Athens? I argue that narrated returns are fraught with 
connotations of culpability, innocence, opportunism and integrity, both in the accounts of those 
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who remained in Canada and those who re-settled in Greece. In drawing on a nuanced set of 
tropes––of naming, visibility and proximity––men engage in precarious "appropriations" of 
moralities (Butler 2005: 7). A particular kind of normative political subjectivity emerges in these 
accounts, one which tends––albeit discretely––to promote withdrawal, marginality and failures 
over participation, success and "being at the center."  
 Chapter six  is by far the most open-ended of chapters, raising more questions than 
advancing arguments. The hesitancy of its ethnographic and theoretical statements is no doubt a 
reflection of the volatility of the present. I explore here manifestations of political genealogy––
expressed as movement, rupture, continuity, contradiction and suspension––in interviewees' 
attempts to come to terms with that cluster of economic and political events, discourses and 
institutional changes that constitute "the crisis"18. As they try to give discursive shape to "these 
troubled times" and to weave their own life account into the narrative, they tend to draw on 
identifiable "constellations of political genealogy. "The first narrates continuity. One way it does 
so is through an adamant adherence to the party line of the communist party (KKE). A second 
constellation holds a disillusioned relation to the present, in which a specific political genealogy 
may have had its merit in  the past, but provides no political or moral direction out of the 
                                               
18 I must note here that while I can sympathize with the reader who would appreciate an ethnographic 
account of the extent to which political genealogy is alive within accounts of young people in Greece 
today, this legitimate and interesting project lies outside of the scope of this dissertation. Too often, we 
tend to implicitly equate "today" with that of the young, as one interlocutor did when asking of my 
research: "Yes, but is this still relevant today?" But the today that I am examining is populated by an 
aging group and it is through their accounts that I am approaching the crisis. Moreover, one only has to 
look at the demographics of street protest in Athens to challenge the popular idea that austerity dissent is 
the domain of the young, whose futures will be influenced by the outcome of political decisions. 
Protesting pensioners and those close to retirement, as well as the older unemployed and activists have a 
very strong presence in strikes and protests and it is common to overhear laments that there are not more 
young people participating. I should also emphasize that it was also this demographic of Athenians (above 
65) that filled the lecture halls to discuss the future of left politics in Greece whenever such events were 
organized in 2012 and 2013. 
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contemporary crisis. A third is built around a reflexive identification with "the center" and what I 
tentatively call the "centric imaginary." While it breaks with genealogy in a similar way to that of 
the disillusioned figure, it is different in so far as it finds relief and inventiveness in the center as 
a sound moral and political project. A fourth constellation uses ambiguous auto-essentialist 
tropes that obscure the political and economic dimensions of the crisis through reference to a 
vague and homogeneous "the Greeks." I conclude with a final constellation––one that attempts a 
creative re-inhabiting of political genealogy. 
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Chapter 2 
From Anecdotes to Ethnography: Reflections on Method and 
Conceptual Clarifications 
 
Just as I was beginning to narrow my research topic in the winter of 2010, a colleague remarked, 
"I don't know where you find the patience. The problem with doing interviews with Greeks is 
that they end up telling you so much irrelevant stuff." But remarks on the triviality of all the 
"stuff" that is said to orbit and get in the way of politics must be interrogated. I became ever 
more convinced of the need for doing so after attending a workshop on the "Greek crisis," hosted 
by a socialist group in Toronto, in May 2012. In the context of a discussion on the rapidly 
changing political map of the country leading up to and after the first set of elections of that same 
month, I began to offer a few "stories from the field," pointing out that the Communist Party in 
Greece had spent more time critiquing the emerging Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 
than it had the governing parties that had brought the country into the course of austerity and 
debt packages. I was interrupted by one of the organizers of the event with the caution that what 
I was saying was "only anecdotal." Meanwhile, the Canadian professor who had returned from a 
few days in Athens (and had spoken with party leaders and representatives) was not once 
charged with having the same unscholarly perspective. 
 As Herzfeld (2001) has pointed out, the charge of "anecdotalism" is regularly encountered 
by those in––and outside of––the field (76). Tending not to carry statistics in hand ("hard facts") 
and privileging the everyday interactions of "ordinary folk" over the statements of spokespersons 
and representatives, ethnographers can easily be discounted as mere storytellers. This is 
especially true when they turn their attention to matters of "the political" or "the state." Like 
 27 
Herzfeld, however, I believe that it is precisely with "such 'triviality' that [ethnographers] play 
their strongest card" (ibid). As one of my interviewees advised, if I wanted to understand "what 
was going on in Greece today," or "what happened back then in Toronto," I'd have to pay 
attention to the "things that people don't take into consideration when they talk about politics [...] 
the everyday living details [...] Cultural stuff."   
I. Methodology 
 
Narratives of the Present, Ethnography of the Past? 
 
I initially became interested in the political life of the Greek diaspora through casual 
conversations with a former member of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK)––the anti-
dictatorship organization that had been established in 1968. It was September of 2010 and I had 
just arrived back to Toronto, having spent a month in Athens visiting relatives. In the course of 
chatting with my new acquaintance, Kostas, about what I had learned of Greece's political 
history during my stay, I discovered that he had left Athens in "the years of the Junta." In 
explaining that he had done this "like so many others," he inadvertently became my primary 
source and my first interviewee. The next time we met, he came with an electronic file of black 
and white photographs of the "PAK days." Here was a photo of Varsity Hall, packed full of 
people awaiting the speech of Andreas Papandreou. Here was another of the same event: Against 
the background of a sea of distracted faces, an old man sits, crutches in hand, staring directly into 
the camera. Tired, dignified, resolute. A third photo of suited men with finely combed hair, 
placards raised above their heads: "Don't Make Greece Another Vietnam"; "Dictatorship is 
Hell"; "We are Freedom Loving People." And here was a group of men standing huddled around 
Mr. Papandreou in the corner of a room postered with the Greek flag, a banner reading "Friends 
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of PAK" and a photo of..."Who's that?" I asked Kostas. "Ah, it's the old man, George 
Papandreou," he replied. In this way, my first impressions of the movement were born: black 
suits, cigarettes, smoke-filled rooms, placards, Papandreou the father, Papandreou the son.  
 As we sat in front of my laptop with the photos enlarged, Kostas squinted as he tried to 
make out familiar faces. He mulled over each one: "He’s dead, he’s dead, he just died, I don’t 
know this face, who the fuck is that? He was a malaka [idiot], dead. He lives in Crete...Yannis 
something, Yannis, Giorgos, they were brothers, had a restaurant on the Danforth...I forget their 
last names. Ah, there’s Portokalis, God rest his soul!" I had the sinking feeling that most of my 
potential interviewees were underground or scattered somewhere back in Greece, retired to 
villages with names that no one could remember. But very slowly, the research progressed; faces 
were remembered in the last moments of my initial interviews and phone numbers or addresses 
were recovered in small books that had not been opened for decades. This process proceeded in 
fits and starts and lasted for just over two years.  
 I completed semi-structured interviews with 37 participants of the anti-dictatorship 
movement. Of those I interviewed, 34 were men and 3 were women––a strongly weighted ratio 
that explains my use of the terms "men's stories" and "men's accounts" throughout this 
dissertation. Interviews in Canada typically lasted 3 to 6 hours and were conducted at the 
participants' home or in cafes in or around the GTA (Greater Toronto Area).19 Interviews were 
conducted in English and recorded with the consent of each interviewee. In Greece, due to the 
fact that interviewees had retired to different cities and villages throughout the country, I 
travelled extensively and was often invited to stay for full days with their families. Despite this 
                                               
19 Later in my research, I was given the names and numbers of "very active people" who were part of the 
movement against the dictatorship in Montreal. While my dissertation will not include stories from 
Montreal, I look forward to exploring these in subsequent research. 
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variability in residence, almost all of the men I interviewed in Greece had  "returned" in the 
1970s and 80s to settle in Athens. Two did so in Thessaloniki, the second largest city in Greece. 
With about half of my interviewees, I had second meetings and in rare cases, I had three or four.  
 If a reader is seeking from this dissertation a historical treatment of "what the Greeks did in 
Canada" and "what they did when they returned," she will be sorely disappointed. In fact, I 
imagine the same response from interviewees themselves, many of whom hoped that I was 
researching their activities in order to tell the story of the young Greek diaspora of the 1960s and 
1970s and the risks they took in defence of their homeland. I have expressed to others many 
times that I wished such a book existed, as it would have made my job much easier by providing 
a reference to key events, organizations and trajectories. My dissertation, however, is more about 
the travels of political categories in social life––about subjectivity and the difficult labour of 
narrating one's personal and political past––than the history of the Greek diaspora. That said, 
there is a chronological thread evoked by my interview guideline—as well as by men themselves 
in the telling of their stories—that is affirmed in the structure of this dissertation around a 
prototypical life course (from growing up in the post-civil war period to getting old in the 
present-framed-as-crisis).  
 This dissertation is ethnographic in the sense that it pulls from the anthropological 
literature on state, kin and subjectivity in the construction of its conceptual framework and relies 
on the methodological practices of ethnographic observation and extensive interviewing. But 
more specifically, it pivots around a defining feature of the "ethnographic": namely, "the  attempt 
[...] to understand another world using the self––as much as possible––as the instrument of 
knowing" (Ortner 1997: 42). Treating the accounts of interviewees not as pieces of a historical 
puzzle, but as sites of struggle over classification, recognition and exoneration, I show how men 
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are engaged in the double pursuit of making sense of instability and making themselves socially 
and morally intelligible in the process. 
 To the extent that matters of the political preoccupy these pages, an ethnographic approach 
"routes" them through "connections between persons" (Strathern 1995: 13). In practice, this 
meant reading interviews for the subtle dynamics and relations in which precarious social and 
political subjects set out, again and again, in new and difficult terrains. Striking in the accounts 
men offer is the ongoing interpretative labour required to keep in one another's company and the 
moments of becoming aware "of the ways they are connected and disconnected" (ibid). 
 My research is heavily dependent on the stories shared by my interviewees. Narratives, 
writes Trouillout, "are emplotted in a way that life is not" (Trouillot 1995: 6)––an interesting 
point of departure for considering those recurring and identifiable frames and terms (tropes) 
within which men give accounts of themselves and others. As I discuss at length below, 
interviewees draw in diverse ways upon tropes of proximity, visibility and voice in their 
narratives of "living in the file" in post-civil war Greece (chapter three),  politically organizing 
themselves in the Greek diaspora (chapter four) and returning to Greece in the post-junta 
"Metapolitefsi" (chapter five). My focus is consistently on how the story is told and the way it 
positions the teller, rather than the pursuit of the most valid and reliable version of events.     
 We know that oral narration does not provide windows into unmediated patterns of 
behaviour, intentions or consciousness (Passerini 1987). Within critical circles in social sciences, 
it is almost part of the course these days to distance oneself from what Trouillot (1995) calls the 
"storage model of memory-history" (14-15) and the idea that what an interviewee "knows" can 
be accessed and discussed "at will," as one opens a cabinet with the appropriate key (ie. a "good" 
interviewer"). Stoler and Strassler (2000) have referred to this as the "hydraulic model," in which 
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experiences are presumed to be "housed as discrete stories awaiting an audience" and then 
"tapped" by the researcher (168). And yet, this double-awareness—that there is a disconnect 
between lives lived and the narratives told about them ("emplotment") and that what we call 
"memory" is not a resource merely accessible (regardless of how skilled or experienced a 
researcher is)—leaves aside another fieldwork trouble. This is the problem of benevolently 
seeking to bring the village "back to life" and is expressed in a dissatisfaction with interviewees 
that "speak like a book" (Papailias 2005:133). In chapter six, I document my own discovery that 
one of my interviewees was working along the lines of a "script." While I was originally––and 
perhaps problematically––disappointed with this interview, I later rethought this discovery along 
the lines of abiding lexicons and their role in the reproduction of political genealogies.  
Ethnographic Reflections in the Archive 
 
Apart from the photos that Kostas generously shared with me, which became my primary "leads" 
for subsequent interviews but also evocative sites of ethnographic exposure throughout this 
dissertation, I also acquired Thanos' personal archive of Neos Kosmos, a democratic newspaper 
that was published weekly in Toronto during the early years of the Junta. I recall now, with great 
tenderness, the memory of Thanos, more than 80 years old, coming to meet me in downtown 
Toronto with a very heavy vintage suitcase, using his leg to absorb the weight with each step. I 
offered to help him; he refused. Thanos had collected every edition of the community newspaper 
and had neatly sorted them chronologically. As he handed them over to me at the end of our 
second meeting, he said simply, "You'll find everything you need to know in there." These 
papers became useful chronological indicators for framing stories that men often shared with me 
in an absent-minded manner. Some of those still living in Toronto, upon learning that I was in 
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possession of the beloved newspapers, often referred back to them: "It was the summer of 72...or 
was it spring? In any case, you will learn in the paper..." In this way, the presence of this 
particular archive allowed some of my interviewees to take a much looser relation to chronology 
in their accounts. Others even expressed that they probably had "little to add," given the fact that 
I had access to the newspapers––a concern that was probably genuine but seemed to pass quickly 
once the interview began. Thanos' newspapers were useful for revealing some of the discourses 
employed in protests and campaigns. These enter my analysis in chapter four. 
 More than a year into my research, I found myself pouring over the details of Yannis' 
collection "from the Toronto days" in his small Athenian shop. Yannis exemplified the spirit of a 
true conservationist, having dated and secured in plastic wrap stacks of newspapers and 
magazines now decades old. Our first meetings took place among piles of archival material, 
carefully framed political posters from Toronto and photos of his wife and son. After a few 
meetings, Yannis invited me to his family home in order to present what was, in his own words, 
"my archive." He even estimated how many hours it would take to go through the more than 15 
boxes of material that he had brought with him from Toronto when he returned to Athens in 
1984. We met two times every week for three successive weeks, slowly and deliberately working 
through newspaper clippings, photos and memorabilia from the community (such as tickets from 
annual dances and pamphlets from various organizations). Watching Yannis gingerly return 
documents to their "proper" place among the others, I understood quickly that each piece was felt 
to be precious. More than once, Yannis referred to his archive as "belonging to the Greeks of 
Toronto" and expressed a hope that it would eventually return to Canada. "Otherwise my son 
will burn it when I die," he said frankly. 
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 Against these deliberate archival encounters, were those that were fleeting and 
unannounced. Having completed an interview with Apostolos, I was offered "a quick tour" of his 
Athenian home. Passing up a flight of stairs, he stopped suddenly and pointed to the wall. "What 
do you see there?" he asked impishly. It was a strange, colourful piece; painted block cubes 
descending upon a line of male faces in profile, a single laurel wreath above their heads. After 
several seconds, I made out torn pieces of an old newspaper. "Eh, it's not my best piece," he said 
shrugging. And then he told me about the long nights he had spent, casting each letter of this 
"radical" student newspaper––a collective labour premised on raising awareness in Toronto 
about the plight of Greeks during the Junta. Here was the past literally deconstructed and 
rendered anew; archive fashioned as art and Apostolos' years in Toronto exposed for sons and 
visitors alike.20  
 Another fleeting archival encounter occurred after a second interview with Evangelos in a 
busy cafe in Toronto. Sitting together in his car and with the engine running—a subtle sign that 
my lingering was not a possibility––Evangelos took a set of photos out of a simple white 
envelope. "I knew you'd want to see these," he said, as he began flipping through one photograph 
after another with an obligatory air. He had taken these photos at the funeral of George 
Papandreou Sr. in November of 1968. With few words, he put the photos back in the envelope 
and then hesitated, perhaps contemplating if he should lend them to me. He placed them in the 
glove compartment and sighed. "On that day, we came across a cop from Patras," he said, "Let's 
leave it at that." The funeral of George Papandreou, who had been placed under house arrest by 
the military authorities, became the occasion for street protests against the Junta. These ended 
                                               
20 Stavros, who also contributed to this newspaper, recounted a much less dignified fate: "My father-in-
law lined the bird cage with it," he said, laughing. 
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brutally, with some interviewees implying that their experiences that day had inspired a quick 
departure from Athens.  
   
Figure 1: "What do you see there?" 
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State files, another manifestation of the archive in this dissertation, have only received 
ethnographic attention more recently. According to Hull (2012a), those studying state files have 
often tended towards polarized treatments: on the one hand, "realists" "assume records are 
unmediated traces [...] of people, places and things," while "social constructivists," tend to "see 
bureaucratic objects as the results of discursive positing" (246). "Neither," writes Hull, "give 
adequate attention to the mediations through which bureaucratic objects are enacted and 
consequently to the oblique relations documents have with that about which they speak" (ibid). 
"Oblique" relations are those that couldn't possibly be read straight off the page, but would only 
be detectable in ethnographic reflections on, say, the file in its contested interpretations and uses 
by various social actors, including bureaucrats, municipal authorities and community members. 
 In other ethnographic work on the state archive, emphasis is placed on its social 
construction in the more literal sense––as something that relies on a number of agents for its 
creation. Notes written in the margins, signatures, first and second drafts of letters, crossed out 
words and phrases, repetitions, the use of a pen versus a typewriter, along with the distribution 
and use of the file all become fascinating areas of research. Anne Stoler's (2010) work on the 
archive was ground-breaking in this regard, especially as it brought to light the precarity of the 
files construction: Even in the colonial archives of the Dutch government, we find that recording 
is a contested and unpredictable social process. Similarly, Katherine Verdery (2013a; 2013b) 
argues that the files of the Romanian Communist regime tell us less about the individuals filed 
by the secret police than the latter's attempts to fashion and make sense of the world. Turning the 
file into a veritable "ethnographic database," Verdery (2013a) sets out "to treat [the archive's] 
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2,780 pages as if they were someone’s field notes, attempting to reconstruct from them the 
worldview and practices of the officers and informers who produced them" (9).21  
 In chapter four, I draw on state files from the Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa), 
where I spent four weeks in 2011 pouring over diplomatic exchanges, remarks by political 
figures, parliamentary discussions and profiles of specific persons. At the time, I was searching 
for information about the Canadian government's position on the Greek dictatorship in 1967 and 
the extent to which it constructed Greeks in Canada as political persons of interests. As I show in 
chapters three and four, some activists involved in the anti-dictatorship struggle in Toronto had 
been regarded as dangerous by successive Greek governments before their migration; I was thus 
interested in the extent to which their family and political histories were of concern to the 
Canadian state. I discuss this material alongside accounts of interviewee's encounters with agents 
of the state.  
 I did not take the ethnographic perspective of Stoler and Verdery into consideration in my 
first readings of these files. It was at a much later stage in my research that I began to see its 
relevance. Canadian diplomats experienced their own difficult labours of interpretation as they 
danced around awkward social confrontations with representatives of the Junta, and in Ottawa, 
officials scrambled to find the appropriate terms with which to recognize the new regime. For 
example, upon the arrival of King Constantine to Canada in 1967, just months after the coup, 
Pearson's assistants struggled to discursively neutralize relations between Greece and Canada in 
the Prime Minister's welcoming speech. Scratched out sentences indicate precarious attempts to 
recognize the "longstanding" good relations between the countries, while avoiding any 
                                               
21 On the construction of worldviews among the Stasi of East Germany––what the author calls "political 
epistemics "––see Glaeser's (2010), Political epistemics: The secret police, the opposition, and the end of 
East German socialism, (especially part 3).  
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connotations of Canada's current position on the illegal regime. Other lines salute Greek sons 
who are settling in Canada, while repressing the political circumstances of their migration. These 
few examples suggest that a more in-depth ethnographic reading of Canadian state files is both 
warranted and fruitful.  
 The citizen files kept by the Greek state are analyzed ethnographically in chapter three, but 
not in the sense of having spent hours perusing them. The majority of these files were destroyed 
by government decision in 1989, while a few––those deemed to be of "historical importance"–– 
were kept and classified (as they remain today). Thus, my relation to these files is mediated 
entirely through the narratives of those I interviewed. As I demonstrate, the file has an 
ambivalent presence throughout this dissertation. It has, at once: a materiality (emerging in 
storied "encounters"); a spectral sense (no longer a physical object, but leaving profound traces); 
and a representational force (as an abiding metaphor for "being one of two" in a highly polarized 
political climate). 
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Figure 2: "...to pay tribute to a land which has sent so many of its sons..." 
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Situating the Researcher: A "Greek Daughter" comes home to Roost? 
 
I arrived for the first time to Greece in 2009, unable to communicate to the customs official. 
"You are Greek" he declared and then laughed, "a Greek who doesn’t speak Greek!" I explained, 
in English, that I was "hardly Greek at all"––which was probably a strange and awkward 
response. Nonetheless, he was insistent: "What is your father? What is his name?" I told him our  
last name and he concluded in victory: "Eisai Ellinida" ("You are Greek"). He smiled decisively 
and stamped my passport. This became something of a script between myself and customs 
officials marking the beginning of each of my 4 trips to Greece between 2011 and 2014, with the 
difference that each time my Greek was just a bit better. It never seemed to matter that my 
mother was British or that I was a Canadian citizen; if my father "was Greek" than so "was I." I 
struggle with my interpretation of these exchanges: On the one hand, I would not be the first to 
point to the patrilineal naming tradition in Greece nor the patriarchal aspects of the culture;22 on 
the other hand, perhaps this was a variant of hospitality, bringing me closer into the fold and 
welcoming me as though I belonged. 
 Although within a very different context of questions and dialogue, I confronted a similar 
mode of categorization during my interviews in both Greece and Canada. Even after explaining 
to those I interviewed that my father was raised in Canada and that he knew nothing about Greek 
political history, I was consoled on many occasions that "he was still Greek." Because I always 
                                               
22 Anthropologist Michael Herzfeld (1992) had a similar exchange, highlighting the father and the father's 
name in the last instance: 
 The patrilineal emphasis is never far away [...] In other words, the father is almost always the 
crucial link. When filling out a request for a residence permit some years ago, I expressed 
puzzlement about the categories of "nationality" [...] and "religion." In the rather literal-minded 
spirit of the encounter, I explained that I was a British-Jew: how should I incorporate that, if at 
all? "What is your father?" the official wanted to know. That was really all that mattered. Thus 
was my ethnic, religious, and personal identity established through paternal links (79). 
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answered questions about my family with the past tense designation for my father ("He was a 
truck driver," "He was raised in Canada," "He didn't teach me any Greek"), his death was often a 
kind of absent presence in these discussions. The men I interviewed sometimes noted some 
variant of, "It's a shame your father isn’t around. He could have helped you with your project"––
a comment that I found more than a little patronizing. Yet, comments like this were actually very 
revealing, confirming the sense I often had of being perceived as a little lost girl of the diaspora, 
coming home to explore ancestral roots. The fact that I had lost my father was in some cases 
known before I arrived at the interview, as information passed between contacts.23 In such cases, 
I felt rather exposed and found myself hurriedly trying to switch gears away from condolences 
and an interest in his death to the purpose of my research. But there is no doubt that many of my 
interactions with interviewees was clothed in a not-so-subtle benevolent paternalism––one which 
I came to accept as structurally determined by our gendered and age differences, as well as my 
personal story. 
Telling Masculine Stories: Ethnography & Male Protagonists  
 
I must concede and clarify at this point that my dissertation, as a qualitative and ethnographic 
exploration of political genealogy, is heavily shaped by male protagonists and a reoccurring 
theme in accounts is political patrilines. I would not have assumed such a conceptual trajectory 
                                               
23 Early on in my research, one participant was explaining the purpose of my research to a second 
participant, just as I was beginning my interview with the latter. While my Greek was not well enough 
developed to understand the conversation at the time, two years later I listened to the recording and 
discovered the following exchange: 
 Interviewee 1: This girl's father was a Greek [...] He's dead.  
 Interviewee 2: What was his name? 
 Interviewee 1: Pendakis. Pavlos, I think she said 
 Interviewee 2: I don't know it. 
 Interviewee 1: In any case, he's dead and somehow she got it into her head to tell our story, so you 
 must help the girl. 
 Interviewee 2: OK, OK...but I won't remember much! 
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in my second meeting with Kostas, having in my hands "documentary evidence" of women's 
participation in the anti-dictatorship struggle in Toronto. Against a series of photos of mostly 
male protagonists, one photograph stood out: Thirteen women, dressed in the classic, Hollywood 
version of the striped prisoner uniform, stood with placards hung around their necks, each 
marking a woman's name and a number. These women were protesting on behalf of female 
prisoners in Greece and the numbers represented the duration of the latter's prison sentence. 
Despite the fact that a few other photographs similarly reveal women's involvement in the anti-
dictatorship struggle, I didn’t succeed in my efforts to access and incorporate women's stories in 
the way I had hoped.  
 Women's "absence" became acutely apparent as my research progressed and I began 
addressing it repeatedly in interviews. I very often regretted doing so:  Asking one interviewee 
"where were all  the women" and whether he could recall the names of a few, I was told with a 
sly smile that "they were in the bedroom." Another supplied, "in the kitchen." Making an effort 
to help, one interviewee clarified, "well, there were the wives, but they weren't really involved." 
Kristos, who had a leadership role in PAK and was well connected to all the organizations 
involved in the Toronto movement, dismissed these comments as "rubbish." Yet, when I asked 
him to provide me with contacts, he had difficultly recalling more than three women by name. 
Two had passed away. I called the third and was very politely told, "the research sounds 
wonderful, but I'm tired, Katherine, and there are others who can tell the story better." In Toronto 
a few months earlier, I had approached Eirini, a communist still active in the community. She 
had declined in precisely the same way––"there are others who know more"––so I persisted a 
little, explaining that I hadn't had the opportunity to speak to women in the movement. Smiling, 
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she responded, "Honey, if you have the right politics, the sex doesn't matter!" And then she gave 
me the name of a male figurehead of the communist party. 
 By the time I began writing, I had managed to interview three women. Thalia was the first  
women I interviewed and by far the oldest of participants. In her early 90s, she was the only 
interviewee to have taken part in the partisan struggle during the civil war. I did not incorporate 
Thalia's account into the early chapters of this dissertation because, at the time of the interview, 
her daughter informed me that she was suffering from dementia. I didn't feel that I could do 
justice to her story without situating it within a careful consideration of memory and amnesia. 
During our conversation, Thalia repeated the same few stories again and again, within a very 
particular frame. In addition, and perhaps due to her illness, Thalia's narrative was fixed on the 
civil war years. She had trouble recalling her experiences in Toronto during the dictatorship and 
did not comment on the contemporary political situation in Greece. I remain convinced that 
Thalia's account requires special analytical treatment and that this dissertation is not the most 
suitable place for doing so. Nonetheless, Thalia makes a very brief appearance in my 
ethnographic notes in chapter six, where I discuss instances of the narrative reproduction of 
political genealogy.  
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Figure 3: "Honey, if you have the right politics, the sex doesn't matter!" 
 
 
My interview with Margarita  was conducted in her home and with her husband, Panos, by her 
side. While Panos was eager to share moments of their past and enthusiastically answered my 
questions, Margarita consistently cut answers short, stating that "we don't remember anything" or 
"we don't know anything." Sometimes she did so even as her husband was mid-sentence, 
creating a dynamic that was very difficult to navigate. It became quite clear that while Panos was 
seeking to stretch out our conversation, Margarita was eager to end it as soon as possible. I did 
not quote Margarita in this dissertation, primarily because her answers were more an enacted 
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refusal to engage. I didn't feel I could engage her few comments without tending towards a 
psychologizing language or implicit statements about the relationship she was performing with 
her husband. 
 Katerina was the third women who agreed to be interviewed. She had been recommended 
to me by another interviewee who had known her "fairly well" in the capacity of PAK activities 
in Toronto. Although Katerina had been enthusiastic when we spoke on the phone to arrange our 
meeting, she began our interview by saying that she didn't quite know "how useful" she could be. 
Within minutes, after responding to a few basic questions about where she grew up and the 
circumstances of her migration to Toronto, Katerina turned to the theme of her children and 
grandchildren. She described, at length, the degrees that her children had acquired and detailed 
the musical and language achievements of her young grandchildren. When I brought the 
conversation back to my interview questions, Katerina distanced herself from the events she had 
participated in through humour and claims to ignorance. She repeatedly told me that she had 
joined PAK with the single intention of finding a husband––a "democratic man". She concluded 
our interview rather abruptly with the offer to put me in contact with a few men who "knew 
more" and were "more involved." 
 In light of my thematic, there is nothing surprising about the responses of these women. 
When conducting interviews regarding "matters of the political," these kinds of refusals are not 
uncommon, nor is the tendency to be referred to male representatives of parties and movements 
(Aretxaga 1997: xi; Visweswaran 1994:96). This is particularly true when the context––here, the 
Greek diaspora in the late 1960s and 70s––is significant shaped by patriarchal social forms. As 
others have shown, these obstacles can often be circumvented through long-term ethnographic 
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research that fosters "conditions of intimacy" (Herzfeld 2005: 216) and participates in women's 
everyday lives.24  
The Failed Taxonomies of Research: "Political Migrants" in the Diaspora? 
 
It is not easy to bring together the men I interviewed in one encompassing category; neither 
"diaspora," "generation," "exile," or "immigrant" seem entirely appropriate. It is nevertheless 
worthwhile trying to isolate what it is that my research presumes they share; what they have in 
common as a distinguishing quality that merits a study of aspects of their lives, and not those of 
others. My analysis in chapter four throws into sharp relief the points of both connection and 
disconnection between those I interviewed and demonstrates why the notions of "diaspora" or 
"community" are especially fraught with limitations in this regard. 
 "Diaspora" is a vexed term, often used to describe a wide variety of groups having in 
common only the experience of mobility (personal or ancestral). Thus, expatriates, guest 
workers, exiles, refugees and immigrants (and their children) have been brought under the term 
in different analyses. Most broadly, the term has been used to refer to a group that has been 
deterritorialized or dispersed––in other words, it "has originated in a land other than that which it 
currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-
states" (Vertovec 1997: 277). There are at least three common ways of thinking about diaspora in 
the existing literature; namely, as a social form, a type of consciousness or a mode of cultural 
production (ibid: 278). As a social form, a diaspora is said to have a "triadic relationship" with: 
groups that are dispersed throughout the world but are "collectively self-identified"; "states and 
                                               
24 For a recent effort to think through this issue, see Ryan Flood and Gill's (2009) Secrecy and Silence in 
the research process: Feminist reflections. For excellent examples of intimately textured feminist 
ethnography, please see Seremetakis' (1991) Last word: Women, death and divination in Inner Mani,  
Povinelli's (1994) Labor's Lot and Ferme's (2001) The Underneath of Things.  
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contexts where such groups reside"; and "homeland states and contexts" from which they have 
originated (Vertovec 1999: 449). While such a categorization may be appropriate for those who 
remain in Canada today, it can only apply weakly to those who returned to Greece after the junta 
as a kind of temporary, structuring experience. Even if we use it in the Canadian context alone, 
we would have to deny the many subjective refusals of collective identification, which become 
so apparent in chapter three.   
 To the extent that those I interviewed recall and express sentiments "linking them 
simultaneously to more than one nation" (Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blan 1992: 11), we 
might accept that there is (for those remaining in Canada) and perhaps was (for those returning to 
Greece) a degree of shared "diasporic consciousness." My trepidation here is reconciling such a 
claim with, for example, the tendency of communist respondents to assert a "we" that is entirely 
politicized and denies an identification to nation states as a point of principle. With few 
exceptions, however, men do express a sense of having passed through two very different 
cultural and political spaces and having gained a different sensibility as a result. Even Apostolos' 
claim in chapter four that he "never passed with both feet" in Canada––suggesting a present 
indifference to his experiences in Toronto––can be troubled by his creative labour, nearly 30 
years later, to return to and write out those experiences in the form of a novel. In this way, I 
suppose Apostolos' preoccupation with the years he spent in Canada might be evidence of a kind 
of persisting dual consciousness. 
 Diaspora cast as a unique site of cultural production could be useful for thinking through 
the collective labours of those in Toronto (creating student newspapers, making music, 
establishing organizations) with the qualification that we frame culture as "the (politically 
inflected) schemas through which people see and act on the world" (Ortner 1997: 18) and that 
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antagonisms and points of disconnect are kept within the frame. Moreover, if we uproot 
"diaspora" from specific contemporary geographies (ie. narrowly confined to those in Toronto) 
and cast it more as a structuring experience, we might also be able to bring back into the fold 
those who returned to Greece after the Junta. From this angle, we might approach Apostolos' 
painting and novel—as well as Yannis' carefully coded archive—as material manifestations of 
precisely those schemas Ortner identifies.  
 While there is no basis for claiming the men I interviewed were "refugees" in the sense of 
collective forced migration and dispossession, I refer to the statement of one interviewee who 
left abruptly when the junta came to power: "My only bitterness is that I left my country like a 
refugee." Even here, there is a sense of an imperfect analogy ("as if"), rather than identification. 
Through a very unusual route and with the assistance of international organizations, one of the 
men I interviewed did claim refugee status, but he was quick to present his case as exceptional. 
Others occasionally drew on the language of "being in exile," especially when they recalled 
missing very significant moments due to being legally denied the right to return to Greece (or 
fearing the consequences of trying to do so). This sentiment was strongly pronounced when men 
described not being able to attend the funeral of a parent or to care for a sick family member.  
Exile, in the sense of an impossible return, was a painful obstacle to fulfilling their obligations as 
sons and to mourning a loss alongside their family. Interestingly, for others, "exile" was actually 
a term of disidentification; I heard variations of "we didn't suffer like the Chileans" or "we 
weren't all escaping for our life, like the Chileans." In this sense, "exile" stood for a particular 
kind of violent departure, which most of those I interviewed did not experience. This specific 
reference may also be an expression of the close ties forged by some of my interviewees with 
Chilean activists and musicians when the latter began arriving to Toronto after Pinochet's 1973 
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coup. Others drew on the language of exile to describe their decided position of struggle vis-a-vis 
the settled life achieved through Canadian immigration, echoing the idea that "what distinguishes 
political exiles from other diaspora members is not only the exiles’ continuous struggle to 
facilitate the conditions for their return, but also their determination not to establish life abroad as 
a comfortable option, even temporarily" (Shain and Ahram 2003: 663). 
 I collectively situate the men I interviewed as "migrants," a term general enough to absorb 
the specific nuances of narratives that I discuss throughout this dissertation. Glick Schiller's 
(1992) "transmigrant" comes close to the generality of experiences I document to the extent that, 
at least during the period of the dictatorship, my interviewees "[took] actions, [made] decisions, 
and [felt] within a field of social relations that link[ed] together their country of origin and their 
country or countries of settlement" (Glick-Schiller et al 1992: 1). Certainly the organizations in 
which men participated during the junta had statedly transnational goals: the acquisition of 
material support that would then be sent to families of imprisoned and exiled comrades; the 
placing of pressure on Ottawa to stop diplomatic relations with the Greek state; and the sharing 
of ideological texts, political developments and organizational strategies between Western 
Europe, Canada, the Soviet Union and Greece.  
 At the same time, I don't wish to overemphasize the transnational dimension in these 
accounts, as much of the "dark" years under the dictatorship involved a deeply felt immobility 
and even a lack of communication between loved ones. The belief that very little could be shared 
with parents and siblings, as letters or postcards from Canada could raise suspicion of local 
authorities, characterized the period as painfully muted––never mind that we are speaking about 
a world long before email, mobile phones, Facebook and Skype, where many homes did not yet 
even have landlines. Moreover, as I consider the accounts of men within larger biographical 
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narratives, it is important to stress that one is not a "migrant" or "transmigrant" to the same 
extent and at all periods of one's life. For example, Apostolos, who returned to Athens in 1981, 
admitted that his time in Canada felt like "suspension," that he had no remaining relations with 
anyone in Canada and that had never returned. In this sense, Apostolos narrates the transnational 
aspect of his life as short-lived, necessitated by circumstances and having very few social or 
material implications for his life today.  
 I find it most useful to think about those migrating to Canada in the years of the 
dictatorship loosely as a specific "generation" of the diaspora. In fact, those I interviewed were 
keen to associate themselves as a generation apart from the immigrants who had arrived in 
Canada prior. They often explicitly spoke about the realities of arriving to Toronto during the 
junta in terms of a "we" and an "us" who were immediately confronted with both the "older 
generation" of Greek immigrants and "their children," with whom they had very little in common 
despite their similar ages. Some of those I interviewed had been part of cultural youth 
organizations in Greece that were expressly working towards the liberalization of Greek society 
in the early 1960s and they were thus "shocked" at the "mentality" of those Greeks who had 
migrated between the two wars or directly after the second. The modern poems, music and 
literature that they had been accessing and sharing despite the regime's censorship in Athens 
were absent in Toronto, an allegedly "open" and "democratic" society. This gap in cultural 
references was discussed as a major point of disidentification with established Greeks and 
Greek-Canadians.  
 Importantly, while those I interviewed frequently used the general trope of generation in 
their narratives, they did not necessarily claim the same reference point in their generational 
identification. While most drew on the language of the generation of junta migrants in their 
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accounts of the Toronto years, when referring to their lives before the junta there was quite a bit 
of diversity. For example, Apostolos claimed he was of the generation of the "Lambrakis 
Youth," Stelios referred to the "Democratic Youth," and others cast themselves as the "postwar" 
generation. In other words, the structuring experience of migration to Toronto forced a set of 
confrontations that men drew upon in their constructions of themselves in generational terms. It 
is in this latter sense, the "problems of a generation" (Borneman 1992: 47) becomes especially 
relevant: It is not necessarily age or even cultural references alone that merit the categorization 
of "generation" but the shared experience of dislocation.  
II. Conceptual Clarifications 
The Sociality of the State  
The state is often taken to be a governing body that "sees," "perceives," or "constructs," 
reflecting "the almost unavoidable tendency to speak about the state as an 'it'" (Brown 1995: 
174). In the brief historical narrative I provided in the introduction of this dissertation, I 
portrayed the state along these lines; that is, a state implicitly stands behind the legal, military 
and political apparatus that was used to categorize, marginalize and punish an entire section of 
Greek society for many decades. I outlined a series of government-led initiatives, seemingly 
motivated by a consistent anti-communist ideology and backed by a monopoly of violence.  
 Yet, this construction needs to be qualified in light of the theoretical challenges that have 
been waged precisely against this manner of conceptualizing the state. Challenges to the thing-
like quality of the state have come from different perspectives within the social sciences. 
Bourdieu (1999) argues that such a framing obscures processes of state formation. Consequently, 
the state is essentialized as an obvious fact––something natural and necessary that has always 
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been at the center of modern societies. He urges, instead, to examine the state as a field of 
competing and contradictory strategies, discourses, and practices––as the "culmination of 
processes of concentration of different species of capital" (57). Following Foucault, Mitchell 
(1991) claims that the state "needs to be analyzed as a structural effect"; that is, "not as an actual 
structure, but as the powerful metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to 
exist" (94). Abrams (1988) points out that the Marxist tradition too has exposed the illusionary 
aspect of state power and calls for thinking about the state in terms of a mask, rather than a 
subject. Corrigan and Sayer (1985), drawing on Weber, argue that the state is better viewed as a 
claim to authority and that it is through perpetual iterative processes—whether as banal 
documentary practices or elaborate public ceremonies—that the effect of the state's singular and 
continuous presence is achieved. These theoretically diverse contributions evoke a key question: 
How does the state come to be regarded as real, independent, and a power standing apart from 
society? 
   I accept the primary challenge to my first approach to the state and explore how men both 
negotiate state effects in their everyday life and narratively construct the state as presence: 
whether this be in the form of a person of authority (chapters three and four), practices of  
bureaucratic exclusion (chapter three) or a mode of sociality sharing characteristics with the 
extended family (chapter five). Ethnographers, claims Gupta (1995) are of particular value in 
answering the  question of how the state is constructed because they most effectively track the 
"degree to which the state has become implicated in the minute texture of everyday life" (375). 
As Herzfeld (2008) argues, the promise of anthropologists in this regard is to observe the state's 
"real-ization [...] in moments of ethnographic encounter" and to "piece [its] substance together 
from the indirect evidence [they] glean of its operations and institutional structures" (87). In 
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other words, ethnographers of the state observe state effects from the position of the subject; they 
ask after the local and everyday practices through which subjects encounter, imagine, and 
construct the state (Das and Poole 2004; Navaro-Yashin 2002). The figure of the state thus 
emerges as a "repository of images, ideologies, fantasies, [and] ideas" (Aretxaga 2003: 395). 
 Especially important for my discussion of the political file (chapter three) are those studies 
of the place of documents as a crucial site for constructing both states and citizens. Navaro-
Yashin (2007) writes that "papers, especially written and official documentation bear the 
symbolism of permanence" and that "printed, handwritten, and/or signed documentation carries 
the image of proof, stability and durability" (84). The effect of practices of official 
documentation, and indeed encounters with the documents themselves, is that of a "state fetish" 
(ibid). Navaro-Yashin makes the further claim:  "If documents seem more benign than the police, 
I would argue that from the point of view of [...] those [...] from marginal positions, they are not" 
(83). Herzfeld (1992), whose work is very important for my discussion of men's accounts of the 
Metapolitefsi (in chapter five) has examined in detail the ways in which talk about bureaucracy 
emerges as a crucial site in which the relation between state and citizen is figured and the former 
is established as an authority. 
 Interviewees themselves, at times, speak of the state as a singular actor––as in "the 
Canadian state treated me like a gentlemen, while the Greek state treated me like a criminal"––
but their narratives also reveal other conceptualizations, both nuanced and complex. The 
ethnographic literature is thus important to the extent that it orients my analysis to the ways in 
which men narratively encounter and imagine the state in the post-civil war years (chapter three), 
their participation in the anti-junta movement in Toronto (chapter four), and their return to 
Greece in the post-junta period ("Metapolitefsi") (chapter five). Throughout, I explore men's 
 53 
constructions of state power in relation to forms of sociality and political subjectivity. I pay 
special attention to how men reflect on the political through their storied social interactions. 
Gestures, rumours, exposures, retreats, misrecognitions, petty and not so petty name-calling all 
have a place in my analysis.  
The Social Life of Political Categories 
 
In conversations with colleagues, I've often referred to my dissertation as an "ethnography of 
political categories." What do I mean by this? Political categories are of interest to this 
dissertation to the extent that they have a "social life." There is an aporia of sorts between many 
of the reflections I encountered in my fieldwork and the tendency to reduce "the Left" to the 
party. For example, Panourgia (2009) writes that the history of the Left in Greek politics "is to 
say, the story of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE)" (32). This reduction of political forces 
to political parties has had a long and ambivalent discursive life: It was central to the ideology 
and practices of the repressive Greek state (as in: if you resist or if you have subversive thoughts, 
you are, by definition, a communist); but it is also found in the Greek Communist party's own 
self-centered historical discourse (as in: it was the communists who organized an effective 
resistance). This kind of double reduction also has a place in interviews; for example, in the 
statement that "few were brave enough to resist, and if you did, you were a communist." But 
what does this conflation of dissent and party obscure as a point of departure and how does it 
reckon with the more ambiguous claims: "Am I a communist? Depends whose asking," or "I was 
called many names...communist was the one that bothered me least." Rather than presuming that 
during this period "to be left was to be communist," I take this statement itself to be 
representative of a dominant discourse––one which those I interviewed negotiated in various 
social spaces as children, adolescents and men. My effort here is to take a position against 
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"ethnographic refusal," what Ortner (2005) defines as the "impulse to sanitize the internal 
politics of the dominated" in reductive accounts of participants' "intentions, desires, fears [and] 
projects" as they "engage in these dramas [of resistance]" (62). 
 The categories "left" and "right" are often presumed to represent more or less stable 
traditions of political thought (Kymlicka 2002). White argues there are two primary approaches 
to thinking theoretically about the left and the right: In one reading, the terms enjoy relative 
consensus and are associated with either opposing values or very different interpretations of the 
meaning and priority of shared values (examples would be Bobbio 1993 and Lukes 2003); In 
another reading, the terms are taken to be a highly subjective—and thus flexible—set of 
signifiers that an individual imbues with meaning, according to her values and interests (an 
example would be Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann 1990). In both approaches, the left 
and right are taken as signifiers representing political conflict. 
 Troubling these dominant approaches, White (2011) argues that "left" and "right" are 
themselves "the site of conflict as much as an exogenous device for its representation" (123). He 
claims that the dichotomy is better understood as a "discursive resource with which actors can 
play" (126). Not wanting to risk falling into infinite interpretative flexibility, White cautions that 
the very "possibility of engaging" in such "performance" nevertheless suggests that the terms 
"enjoy some level of stable semantic content" (124). He calls for analyses that explore the 
"second life" of the terms, following their "adoption in day-to-day politics and the "effects" 
which are thereby "achieved" (124).  
 While White's analysis begins to gesture towards (what I call) "the social life of political 
categories," it is nevertheless framed through positioning theory and applied narrowly to the 
discourse of politicians. I am more interested in observing how men narrate their negotiation of 
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these terms in the years after the civil war, in the streets of Toronto during the junta and in the 
Metapolitefsi. This dissertation is grounded in the theoretically and empirically-informed 
assumption that those referents that we have generally taken to be indicative of well-defined 
stakes, interests and ideological position have a complicated, dynamic and nuanced social life 
worth tracing.  
 Speaking of the "social life of political categories" thus involves approaching terms that 
have been steeped in the institutional discourses of states and parties as capable of surprising us. 
In a very different context, Raymond Williams' (1977) raised awareness of our tendency to take 
"terms of analysis as terms of substance" (129), thereby "reducing to fixed forms" those dynamic 
"presences and processes" that "masquerade as fixed forms" (ibid). Williams thus proposes the 
concept of "structures of feeling" to capture "meanings and values as they are actively lived and 
felt" in process (132). I am attracted to this framing and find inspiration here for thinking about 
the presences and processes of the political categories "communist" and "the left." As I will 
show, these categories are woven through interviewees accounts as ambiguous structures of 
feeling that entail quite a bit of interpretative labour in their negotiation.  
 I also see my treatment of the social life of political categories as inspired by Joan Scott's 
(1992) call to take "concepts and identities as historical events in need of explanation" (792), 
rather than as historical facts, documented and closed off from interpretation or easily 
identifiable social formations (as in "the Left"). It is not, in other words, a matter of what the Left 
did or did not do and what those actions, inactions and decisions mean for the course of history 
that is my concern here. Consequently, we have something much more or much less than a social 
history, depending on the vantage point:  Much less for the left historian, as (ig)noble political 
causes are put aside and the agent (whether this be "the resistance", "the party" or "the people") 
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loses its recognisable form; and much more in the sense of both inviting that which is statedly 
beyond ("irrelevant to") the political (kin, blood, soul, culture) into our analysis and including 
the experiences of those who––from the retrospective gaze of 2013––do not belong. The latter is 
not the intention, but the result of a project that follows the social life of political categories, 
rather than a predetermined "Left". 
The Lexicon of Politics of Kinship 
 
Closely bound to the guiding preoccupation of this dissertation with the social life of the political 
is a specific problematic best summarized as the "politics of kinship." This is a theme that first 
struck me after reading a Guardian article published in February of 2009.25 In the context of the 
shooting death of 15-year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos by an on-duty police officer, a young 
Athenian woman is quoted as saying: "What we have had in Greece is a civil war that never goes 
away. [Those] who come from left families, have grown up with political warfare, the police in 
our homes, the struggle in our lives. My family has suffered a political murder in every 
generation since the Nazi occupation." There are two things about this quote that are of particular 
interest here: first, the construction of the family as a political unit and the expansion of a 
political identity usually associated with an individual to the family as a whole; and second, the 
fact that this statement is expressed publicly sixty years after the civil war and more than thirty 
years after the fall of the dictatorship (and the subsequent government-led initiatives to improve 
the material conditions and the status of the Greek left). This suggests that the figure of the 
politicized family endures as an experiential trope. It also implies that injury is a meaningful 
premise upon which contemporary identification with the Left may be based. 
                                               
25 Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith, "Children of the Revolution," The Guardian, February 22, 2009 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/22/civil-unrest-athens (accessed February 2, 2010). 
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 Reflecting on her position as a "native anthropologist" studying Greece, Panourgia (2009) 
writes that "members of my family have been imprisoned, have been sentenced to death, many 
more have voted for the Party, but the family as a whole has been Centrist," a fact that has "not 
sheltered the family from suspicion" (17). This statement also raises a number of questions about 
the relationship between the political and the familial. How can a family be "on the whole" left, 
right, or centrist? What political subjectivities and experiences need to be repressed, ignored, or 
obscured in order to formulate a family’s political identity? This is particularly ambiguous given 
the realities of Greece’s fratricidal history: the civil war did not split the country in ways that left 
families and villages; violence cut brother from brother and son from father.  
 In developing the concept of politics of kinship, it is important to indicate how I am 
departing from the conventional use of the phrase in anthropology. The term was used primarily 
within mid-20th century structuralist paradigms to express the centrality of kin relations in the 
organization of societies. This work was based on the assumption that by analyzing the 
intricacies of kinship relations, such as marriage conventions and the distribution of power 
through lineage––defined as "bounded entities that demand allegiance of members, maintain 
order through intervention of elders, and provide the fountainheads from which flow the 
leadership and authority structures" (Kurtz 2001: 82)––one could locate fundamental organizing 
principles underpinning larger cultural and social relations, including the economic and the 
political.  Importantly, this research was almost exclusively focused on communities deemed 
"pre-modern"—those existing either prior to (or at the margins) of modern states. According to 
Borneman (1992), this was the result of two tendencies underpinning anthropological studies: 
first, the categorization of societies by state presence (concluding that those with states were 
organized on the basis of territorial control and those without states were organized by kinship 
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patterns); second, the dependence on evolutionary paradigms by which "kinship polities” were 
"superseded by a territorial state" (28-29). Consequently, when studying Western European 
societies, the significance of kinship (in relation to the political) was relegated to the past, "prior 
to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the epochs before states and national groupings 
began occupying the landscape" (29).  
 In the Greek context specifically and in "the West" more generally, Herzfeld (2005: 132) 
has shown how kinship metaphors (along with those of blood, intimacy, and love) have been 
extended to the national level, a process he terms the "stretching of domesticity" (see also Hunt 
1992 and Berezin 1999). This language of kinship, according to Herzfeld (1993) serves as a 
"powerful emotive magnetic"(12) and a rhetorical device that provides a familiar model of 
attachment and belonging. Beyond the rhetorical, family relations can also operate as literal 
conduits for the distribution of resources, a constitutive feature of bureaucratic favouritism and 
clientelism long identified in Southern Europe (50)  
 My analysis examines kinship as an organizing principle of modern state practices and 
presents the family as a primary site of political reproduction. In chapter three, I examine in 
detail the ways in which those I interviewed were targeted and marginalized by the Greek state 
on the basis of the actions and perceived thoughts of their relatives––usually fathers, uncles and 
brothers. My analysis of the politicization of kin began, in the introduction of this dissertation, by 
outlining the Greek state’s persistent use of law to inflect kin ties with political meanings and to 
render them central to processes of political reproduction. For example, laws in effect from the 
1920s to the 1970s made it possible for family members to be internally exiled and imprisoned 
and for the children and siblings of resistance fighters and leftists to be placed in re-education 
camps in order to purge communist ideologies from the family. Moreover, the certificates of 
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social thinking (already introduced and discussed again in chapter three) were "extended [or 
denied] to the whole family on a semi-hereditary basis, as a formal presupposition for every kind 
of license, public certification and work" (Tsoucalas 1986: 32). 
 Let me then outline the lexicon of this specific problematic. First, I define the politics of 
kinship as both the practice of ascribing political identities based on kinship and the forms of 
sociality that take shape around this practice. Political inheritance is the term I have given to 
these bestowed ascriptions and their consequences (specific forms of denial and 
marginalization). Finally, political genealogies refer to those narrative frames within which 
political subjectivities are constructed in relation to one's political inheritance.  
Political Subjectivity & Forms of Sociality 
 
Subjectivity is defined by Ortner (2006) as both "the ensemble of modes of perception, affect, 
thought, desire and fear that animate acting subjects," and the "cultural and social formations that 
shape, organize and provoke those modes" (107). This definition is an appropriate point of 
departure for considering how men narrate themselves and story their relations within an 
explicitly polarized political culture that constructs the family as a primary political subject. I 
frame the political subjects at the heart of this dissertation as having been born out of a sharply 
divided post-civil war sociopolitical environment and, in some cases, through exacting state 
interpellation and marginalization. 
 My earliest thinking about political subjectivity was significantly influenced by the 
accounts of those who had been interpellated through family ascriptions. Thus, in chapter three, I 
discuss at length men's coming into awareness of their political inheritance. The analysis in this 
chapter resonates with Voglis' (2002b) argument that the "Greek Left" was produced, in the 
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Foucauldian sense, through systematic persecution and punitive measures. Importantly, Voglis' 
project is centered on the treatment and experiences of political prisoners in the institutional 
setting of the prison camp. My departure from Voglis in thinking about post-civil war political 
subjectivity is necessitated in two respects: first, despite the fact that the file was institutionalized 
and activated systematically in the post-war period and up to the fall of the junta, life in the 
meantime was not a prison sentence; second, there is a broader sense in which men express the 
structuring experience of "living in the file"—a vague awareness of "being one of two." 
Consequently, I take the ethnographic route out of the Foucauldian paradigm (of the productive 
aspect of discipline) and immerse the analysis in the everyday storied accounts of negotiating 
political categories and political inheritance.  
 Even for those who experienced what I call the "paper effects" of the anticommunist state, 
I show that the articulation of political subjectivities don't end with the file, nor can men's 
encounters with the state or their negotiation of the political categories "left" and "communist" 
be deduced once and for all from the politico-legal apparatus of the period. Their stories, of 
course, continue; indeed, the analysis I offer stretches over many decades and follows men 
through their narratives into the anti-junta movement in Toronto (chapter four) and post-junta 
social worlds in the Metapolitefsi (chapter five). In each chapter, as we are introduced to sites of 
transformation and emerging political forces and political actors, close attention is paid to "how 
the self is enmeshed in relations" (Han 2012: 20). Navigating the social life of political 
categories becomes an interpretive labour carried out among others, involving risks and 
opportunities. Central to the construction of political subjectivity in these accounts is the use of 
narrative tropes that convey this labour, as well as the fears, anxieties and (in the words of one 
interviewee) "big disappointments but also big hopes."  
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 Voice is one of these recurring tropes, along with visibility and proximity; all three are 
drawn upon liberally to express forms of sociality and their significance. While I want to keep 
these terms open, rather than prescribe a definition to each at the onset, voice deserves some 
clarification because it has a very strong presence in sociological and anthropological literature. 
As Weidman (2014) points out, the term both carries "a set of sonic, material, and literary" 
connotations and is "invoked in discourse about personal agency, cultural authenticity and 
political power"(38). Having both material and metaphorical dimensions, voice thus "lives a life 
in two registers" (ibid). It also conveys expressions of both the most intimate and the most 
public: The "figure of voice," writes Kunreuther (2014), is a "nexus of metaphors associated with 
the voice as a sign of intimacy, consciousness, and presence [and ...] above all, with those modes 
of selfhood central to [...] political agency" (5).  
 Voice is also shown to be a site of vulnerability, where ideas of authenticity and presence 
are either challenged or suspended. Butler's (1997) interventions here are well known; voice 
(perhaps better framed as speech) is not simply created by a stable self; rather, as repeatedly 
enacted discourse, it is productive of the subject. While I make some use of this intervention in 
my discussion of the political file (in chapter three) my thinking about voice is closer to Veena 
Das' (2007) ethnographic formulation: In periods of explicit violence, says Das, where social 
norms, modes of expression and forms of trust can not be taken for granted—that is, when 
"context is no longer in place"—there is a dislocation of words, voice and the subject. Das 
remarks in "fragile and intimate moments [...] a shared language [is] built" without trust in 
"shared conventions," the risk being that one may become "voiceless—not in the sense that one 
does not have words—but that these words become frozen, numb, without life" (8). In my 
discussions of post civil war Greece, the anti-dictatorship movement in Toronto, as well as the 
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Metapolitefsi (post-junta Greece), my interest remains in the labour of interpretation involved in 
establishing and negotiating voice(s) in sites where "context is not in place," where there is a loss 
of trust and where conventions either present risks or are unreliable for the speaking subject. 
Throughout my analysis of the accounts men give, I focus on who or what is constructed as 
having a voice; the ways in which the categories men negotiate afford or deny voice; and what is 
at stake in the very act of naming oneself and others. Used as a trope, voice thus carries 
ambivalent concerns with (mis)recognition, agency, authenticity and morality. This is to follow 
Panourgia's lead and to ask "what is in the act of naming and of the admission that one knows the 
person who resides within the name?" (Panourgia 2009: 141).   
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Chapter 3  
"Living in the File": The Social Life of Political Categories 
 
"Greeks have been living in the file for generations" 
"Files are made to be kept, not thrown away" 
 
As we have seen in the brief history I outlined in the introductory chapter, the instability of 
governments and the oscillation between monarchical, republican and dictatorial regimes 
throughout the history of modern Greece took place alongside the persistent persecution of those 
deemed politically dangerous. Supported by police and military force, a politico-legal apparatus 
came to define the lives of families on the left for more than fifty years. In these conditions, what 
we could call a "dossier society" (Samatas 1986: 52) or "political economy of papers" (Hull 
2012b: 114) emerged, in which the file ("o fakelos") became the central means of classifying 
citizens and their families. Only on the basis of a clean file––that is, one indicative of a 
"nationally-minded," religious and conservative family history––would a "certificate of civic-
mindedness" be given (Samatas 1986: 12). This document was necessary for the acquisition of 
licenses and passports, access to university studies and employment in many occupations (ibid). 
In this way, the file––and the politics of kinship upon which it was premised––became a 
structuring feature of everyday life in the post-civil war years and up to the fall of the Junta (in 
1974). 
 I do not address here how and by whom the citizen file was produced, circulated or 
authorized.. Nor do I approach the file from the position of what was "in fact" written. I should 
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interviewees had with the files as young men, they have not seen them since. By government 
decision, the majority of citizen files were destroyed in 1989, while a few––those deemed of 
"historical importance"––were kept and classified. As I will show, the file has an ambivalent 
presence in these pages. It has, at once, a materiality (emerging in storied "encounters"), a 
spectral presence (no longer a physical object, but leaving profound traces); and a 
representational force (as an abiding metaphor for "being one of two" in a highly polarized 
political climate). 
 In  this chapter, "reading" the file ethnographically involves unveiling its "role [as a] 
document in the construction of subjects and forms of sociality" (Hull 2012a: 260). Taking the 
deeply divided political climate of the 50s and 60s as its point of departure, I explore the file as a 
structuring experience for those I interviewed. What does it mean to have been "living in the file 
for more than three generations"? How does one inhabit the file––that which has all the 
connotations of order, preservation, and authority? In whose name does it speak? What is the 
social life of those political categories that are animated in the file? And finally, to what extent 
could the file be contested? 
 I divide this chapter into four sections. In the first, I discuss the most concrete and material 
encounters with the political file. As young men seeking employment or entering the army, many 
interviewees confronted a bureaucratic initiation into their political inheritance—some even read 
their "fates" in print. In the second section, I detail the politics of kinship that underpins the file, 
unpacking its primary conceptual components and demonstrating how men, in turn, narratively 
construct the family as a political unit. I specifically show here how the relation between men 
and their fathers is established as a primary site of political inheritance. In the third section, I 
explore men's accounts of coming to age in the file, emphasizing the sometimes surprising ways 
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in which they negotiated political categories in the social spaces of their everyday life. 
Approaching "life in the file" ethnographically, I pay close attention to how forms of sociality 
are narrated along with the tropes of visibility, proximity and (mis)recognition. I conclude the 
chapter with manners of "closing the file"––the most feasible being migration to a site where the 
file would presumably no longer hold meaning.  
I. Encountering the File 
 
 
Details of life in the file emerged in my first interviews in Toronto, in the winter of 2011. Thanos 
was an Athenian, born in 1934 of Cretan parents and raised in a "historic neighborhood of the 
working class." As I listened to Thanos weave his personal stories through accounts of 
transformative events, such as the street combat between the English army and the Greek 
communist partisans in his neighborhood in 1944, I was struck by a recurring reference to the 
file. Thanos referred to Greeks as "a people who have lived in the file for many generations." He 
also spoke of "being filed" and recounted for me the circumstances in which he read the details 
of his own file. While part of my interview guideline had been designed to evoke conversations 
about "left" and "right" and the experience of being categorized as one or the other, I did not 
expect such a reoccurring emphasis to be placed on documents. Yet, Thanos—and many of the 
men I interviewed after—spoke of the file emotively and in the experiential terms of "living in 
the file."  
 Thanos' material encounter with his own file had all the elements of a dramatic scenario: 
locked doors, mischievous young soldiers, shocking revelations. Having snuck into the office of 
his military camp, he and a friend found their files and read them aloud. He recalls: 
 66 
Oh yes, I remember reading in that file that I was categorized [...] I was category A [alpha], 
which is the first letter for "Aristera" [left]. "A" was leftist  by association. Blood. Family. I 
remember that "Β" [veta] was leftist with his own personal involvement with the 
movement and that "Γ" [gamma] was very active and very dangerous. "Ε" [epsilon] meant 
you were a nationalist, a "good" person.  For those people, they needed no other 
information. Just the category. It was written that I was "A" through my father's family. 
Thanos was reading about his father during his mandatory military training—a period of his life 
he described as "unbearable."26 His father, who he referred to as a "fellow traveller of the 
communist party," had been identified as part of the resistance and brought into the Athens 
police station on many occasions after the civil war but avoided imprisonment by signing a 
statement of confession.27 Certainly, in cases like Thanos', the encounter facilitated proximate 
and explicit contact between interviewees and the authoritative gaze that had shaped the lives of 
families, neighbours and friends for many years.  
 The fakelos was often recalled for the covert act of reading it, its bulk, size and colour, the 
contents of one's recorded fate and the curiosity peaked (or satisfied) by family descriptions. 
Many participants "met" the file for the first time during their obligatory military duty; others as 
                                               
26 Thanos was one of a number of interviewees who described his months of military service in these (or 
similar) terms. Politely declining to go into detail, he stated that he was blessed with a convincing 
"nervous disorder" that became the grounds for his early dismissal from the military. "It was just 
eczema," he said, with a sly grin. 
27 Others commented on the regularity with which their fathers or uncles were called to the police station. 
Laughing cynically, one interviewee reenacted how his father might have handled these summonses. With 
one hand lifted as if holding a pen, he exclaimed, "OK, OK, just tell me what to sign this time!" The latter 
signals some of the contradictions at work in the writing technologies of state governance. As Das (2007) 
has demonstrated, "once the state institutes forms of governance through technologies of writing, it 
simultaneously institutes the possibility of forgery, imitation and the mimetic performances of its power" 
(163). My interviewees comical reenactment suggests a sense of "going through the motions" of signing 
one's name to a document, yet the very repetition of the action belies a gesture of insincerity and the 
inefficacy of the technology itself. 
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young men trying to enter universities or seeking employment. Like Thanos, they snuck into 
military offices where paper files were kept, asked friends stationed as office clerks to smuggle 
files out or to tell them the details of what was recorded. "It was written that I was a communist, 
on account of my father," another interviewee told me with a shrug. Discovering the contents of 
his file a few weeks into his military placement, he added, "I had known this file existed, but I 
had never seen it firsthand." 
 Evangelos, who was being trained as a typist at the time,28 had access to all the soldiers' 
files in the main office. He recalls inconspicuously reading the files of his friends. Of his own, he 
recalled, "I read there that my father had abstained from the elections in 1946 and, as a result, I 
was considered a communist.29 For this reason they would not make me an officer." "I couldn't 
believe what I saw," another interviewee exclaimed, "All of the details! Where you are from, 
who is your family, what you have done, what they have done, your uncle was in the 
mountains..."30 
 This sense of wonder was similarly expressed by Stavros, for whom the file was a 
revelation of sorts: "In that file, I read about my father. I knew that he was involved, but he never 
spoke about it. He was working on the ships for years. I didn't know the details. But in that file, I 
learned how smart my father was and all the places he had travelled." In this way, reading one's 
file could be a discovery into the personal history of a father or uncle, or a confirmation of 
                                               
28 The ways in which men describe and justify the division of labour in the military is both interesting and 
inconsistent. Some men recall being isolated from the others, being placed outside of the camp in a 
garbage sorting site or being kept in the office as a typist-in-training. Ex-office boys tended to explain 
their isolation as a means of denying them arms training (signaling the potential danger they were 
perceived to pose as young leftists) or, quite oppositely, as a reward, more or less, for good behaviour and 
exceptional intelligence. 
29 In 1946, the Communists and their followers abstained from the elections on account of right-wing 
intimidation and rigging of the ballots. 
30 This is a reference to participating in the civil war on the side of the communist partisans. 
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exclusions and marginalizations already felt but not yet named. Some interviewees recall being 
surprised, not so much with the categorization itself but more with the details provided. 
 It was not until April of 1967, just days after the Colonels' coup, that Ilias encountered his 
file "first hand." Previously denied jobs because of his "roots," he, like his father, had been 
working as a sailor on a foreign-owned ocean liner. In the early days of the dictatorship, 
however, he experienced directly the paper effects of the new regime: 
Let's say somehow I had already been characterized [...] But when the junta happened, they 
turned my [...] work license into a [...] dirty rag. There was no job for me anymore. Not 
even with the commercial fleets. I went to the police station and I saw my file. They had 
underlined my name in red ink. That was in the port police office. I tried again with a 
foreign company in Kavala, a factory for making fertilizers. I went and took some exams 
and I was struggling for 4 months back and forth from Athens to Kavala31. They kept 
saying "come back next week, come back next week." I was really pissed off and asked the 
clerk working there, "don't fool with me, what's going on here? I'm living in Athens. I have 
no money and I'm just waiting for news..." He was a good guy and he told me, "look, don't 
drag yourself here anymore. They will never take you..." 
Ilias narrates the discovery of his file together with the degradation of his license and his 
vanished exam scores. For others like him, unrecorded grades and missing exams marked both 
the seriousness of the file's implications and the emergence of a consciousness of bureaucratic 
marginalization. It was, as Stavros describes, a feeling of "being wrapped up in paper," of there 
being too many records of exclusion and not enough of the kind that would "open doors." The 
repetition at the heart of many of these stories––writing tests over and over for a job one would 
                                               
31 The distance between Athens and Kavala is about 650km. 
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never be offered or for university studies one would never take up, visiting again and again the 
offices of consulates, local authorities and police only to be told, "come back"––represents a 
bureaucratic initiation into one's own political inheritance. The repetition is both scripted and 
subtle: on the one hand, accounts of these experiences are common, widespread and similarly 
narrated; on the other hand, this form of exclusion does not deny through the name explicitly, but 
allows time and fatigue to erode requests for recognition. The futility of the effort is not voiced, 
but implied.  
 In this chapter, I use voice quite often to convey related encounters between men and 
persons of authority, men and their files, and men and their peers. I approach "voice" in the 
broad sense of conveying men's concerns with (mis)recognition, agency, authenticity and 
morality. I focus on who or what is constructed as having a voice, the ways in which the 
categories men negotiate afford or deny voice, and what is at stake in the very act of naming 
oneself and others. In whose name, after all, are these files perceived to speak? Local authorities? 
The village? An abstract "anticommunism"? There are many instances, where authors of voice 
seems absent, as in the repetition of vanished scores or in the details of family histories 
apparently recorded without author. Indeed, if in those fleeting, often illicit encounters with one's 
files, boys noted the presence of particular signatures, as men, they do not recall them. One 
common and identifiable tendency is to refer to the file's recorders and keepers with an abstract 
and undeveloped "they." 
 Let's pause here for a moment to consider the initial theoretical implications of these 
encounters with the file and the paper effects of being categorized on "the left." In so far as they 
constitute moments of bureaucratic marginalization––of record keeping in the pursuit of 
exclusion––Judith Butler's (1997) brief remarks on the interpellative function of documents are 
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compelling. Writing that "the interpellative name may arrive without a speaker," Butler adds, 
"the bureaucratic and disciplinary diffusion of sovereign power produces a terrain of discursive 
power that operates without a subject, but that constitutes the subject in the course of its 
operation"(34). Instances of bureaucratic marginalization in the accounts above illustrate the 
power of discourse in the absence of "originators of discourse" (ibid) or interpellation without 
the voice of a particular sovereign actor. Butler is not alone in noting that bureaucratic 
procedures and their documents seemingly convey a realm of action without actors. Hull 
(2012b), drawing on Weber, shows that part of the complexity of the "political economy of 
papers" is that the processes in which they are produced, circulated, and used has the sociological 
effect of "mak[ing] it hard to understand who does anything" (115).  
 And yet, men also narrate––with incredible detail––scenes in which the file emerges 
through an entirely social confrontation with a specific person and a memorable voice and face. 
If Althusser's (1970) moment of police hailing (read literally) has been thoroughly interrogated 
with the Foucauldian emphasis on the "death of the sovereign," it is nevertheless enacted—again 
and again—in accounts of both encounters with the file and with the utterance: "communist." 
Indeed it is in these social encounters––some vulgar, cruel, others seemingly benevolent or 
sympathetic––that what has perhaps been latent, whispered, more ambiguous, or at least sporadic 
and unsystematic, is brought to authoritative voice. "Utterance" here refers to a very specific 
encounter with dominant categorizations in the form of "you are a communist" or "you are a 
traitor"––moments of blatant, explicit naming that men recall experiencing as children and young 
men. 
 Markos' story reveals this second tendency within accounts. I met Markos in his dental 
clinic on the Danforth, just as he was finishing with a client. We spoke of his father's political 
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activity and exile—experiences his father did not discuss explicitly with Markos until he was a 
very old man. Coming to the end of his mandatory military duties in 1966, Markos approached a 
lieutenant general to request a letter of good behavior in order to make a visa application for 
studies abroad. In telling me this story, Markos brought to life the timidity with which he 
knocked on the door and then acted out the lieutenant's response to his request. With sweat on 
his brow, Markos slammed his fist on his desk and raised his voice dramatically: "I won't help 
you people, I won't! You, your father, and your papers will stay on this shelf until they are eaten 
by insects!" Collecting himself and shaking his head, Markos added, "He said, 'the law gives me 
permission not to let you go.' What could I say to that?" A few moments later, Markos' surmised, 
"Anti-communism was a profession for some." 
 The vulgarity with which this lieutenant exposes Markos' political inheritance is in stark 
contrast to the dull, repetitive bureaucratic initiation that I documented above. Dimitris' account, 
below, brings together both the aspect of a ritual denial and a social interaction that finally leads 
to an explicit exposure. In this case, it was a relative "on the right" who spelled out the future 
repercussions of Dimitris' political inheritance: 
I was arriving again for the test to enter the navy college and I had already written it three 
or four times. And each time, these papers went missing. I persisted. And finally my uncle, 
an officer, said, "You could write it eight times perfectly and you'll never be accepted." I 
didn't understand. "Why?" He said, "You know your father is a communist." And I said, 
"But that was my father, this is me." And he said, "Even your kids, when you get married, 
and their kids, all of them will have this stamp." 
The stamp here seems to have a double significance; as the signature––par excellence––of the 
state's bureaucratic marginalization and as a testament to the longevity of stigma attached to 
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Dimitris' political inheritance. Indeed, offspring stigmatized before they have even been born, 
records intended to last as long as nature permits (how long would it take for paper files to 
decompose?) and the fact that "files are made to be kept, not thrown away"––all of these 
references point towards an indefinitely condemned inheritance.  
II. Politics of Kinship and the File 
 
Even in these initial reflections on material encounters with the file, we can identify an 
underlying logic that tends to animate it; namely, the categorization of citizens based on one's 
family history. How did those categorized—"the filed" ("i fakelomeni")—view these attempts at 
definition by the post-civil war establishment? One answer came out of my interview with 
Dimitris. With some exasperation, he attempted to explain how "the state" isolated its object and 
then subjected it to writing: 
Dimitris: You see they keep the records, like who your family was, were they involved, 
and the relatives of the family, were they involved? For example, if my mother did not 
participate but let’s say my uncle [her brother] did and my aunt [his wife] did, then I would 
be on the left side and they characterize my family as left. That is how we were 
characterized. Even if we did not participate. By association. Or by relations. 
Katherine: So what happened in those families that were divided politically? 
Dimitris: Yes, that was the case too. One brother was right wing, one brother was left 
wing, so nothing happened. 
Katherine: What do you mean "nothing happened"? To whom? 
Dimitris: Because if there are two brothers, one from the right and one from the left, the 
kids of the right brother are OK, the kids of the left brother are not. It would be better for 
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the kids if there was a third brother, on the right. But in this case, they [the authorities] 
would use their judgment. But the right side is fine, the left side is not. And that's the way it 
is. 
What begins as an effort to map the logic of the politics of kinship is quickly reduced to the 
subjective assessments of individuals in power. Indeed, the messiness of real families, those 
which are not homogenous in political beliefs and activity, challenge the logic and introduce 
human judgment and intervention into what seeks to be a pseudoscience of governance. It would 
be "better," a more simple affair, if the bloodline was more purely one or the other, suggests 
Dimitris. The added "That's the way it is" (a phrase used quite often with small variations) lends 
a sense of both clarity and finality to an interpretative labour that seems, if anything, open, 
difficult and complex.  
 I argue that in men's narrations of the file, there are two notable constructions: i) The 
family (rather than the individual) is cast as the primary political actor; ii) Political identity is 
conveyed as an ontological state––that of being "left." I turn now to a detailed exploration of 
what I term "the politics of kinship," referring to both the practice of ascribing political identities 
based on kinship and the forms of sociality that take shape around this practice. "Political 
inheritance," in the way I have used it above, refers to bestowed ascriptions and their 
consequences (forms of denial and marginalization). Finally, I use "political genealogy" to refer 
to identifiable narrative frames in which political subjectivities are constructed in relation to 
one's political inheritance. These terms will be fleshed out through ethnographic reflections 
below. 
 Working through one's political inheritance––part of the interpretive labour of "living in 
the file"––involves both a sociological and metaphysical imaginary on the part of those I 
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interviewed. More specifically, we see a pairing of what we would typically refer to as 
"socialization," with something that tends, quite paradoxically––to subvert the social. This 
reflects the file itself, which does the sociological work of categorization, on the one hand, while 
evoking a stigma that goes beyond the living social, to ancestors now dead and unborn children. 
Panourgia (2009) artfully captures this rather (anti)social aspect of the political through the 
metaphor of DNA: 
But how can I lay all this open for you, so that you can sense what this thing we call a 
"civil war" [...] really means on the ground for children who are not old enough to 
understand that there is a realm in their lives called politics (let alone that this politics 
organizes their lives in brutal and inexplicable ways) and for adults who find themselves in 
the vortex that produces a political DNA of sorts [...] which organizes not only their lives 
but also the lives of generations to come and has been organized by kinship lines that 
extend into the past (6)? 
Panourgia's reflections, read alongside the narratives of "the filed," are the inspiration for 
building a theoretical vocabulary around the "politics of kinship." 
 Reflecting on his "historic neighborhood" in Athens––known for the support it gave to the 
Communist Party and its efforts and losses during the first months of the civil war—Thanos 
spoke of the significance of the word "resistance." "It was the first political term I was aware of," 
he explained, "and when I was just 8 or 9 years old, I wrote a poem about resistance, which I still 
have today." He added: 
I didn’t go to primary school until grade 6. From no schooling at all to grade 6!  Because 
the day I was supposed to be in the first grade, was the day that the Italians attacked 
Greece. We had war, the famine [...] I remember reading the newspaper from the time I 
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was four years old because I had all the siblings before me and they had schooling and 
were teaching me. I was four years old and I was beginning to read! I was reading 
everything and by the time the war started my father took pride in giving me some articles 
from Rizospastis.32 I was six years old. It was 1940. And I was taking and reading the 
newspapers from my father, which made me very proud but not as proud as my father. 
Thanos conveys the image of a close-knit family, actively instructing the young in political 
ideology––in this case, in the absence of the school. With the exception, perhaps, of a touch of 
the child genius, Thanos' rendering of childhood seems to present continuity in political lineage 
as a result of family socialization.33 
 In Pavlos' account, we discover something only slightly different. In the 1950s, Pavlos was 
a child growing up in a small northern village, close to the border of Yugoslavia.34  I met him at 
his "joint"––a busy food court in a Scarborough mall, where he and his friends gathered 
everyday because it was easily accessible from their respective suburban neighborhoods. With a 
Tim Horton's coffee in hand, and surrounded by a sea of shoppers and their purchases, Pavlos 
enthusiastically explained what it meant to have "left roots": 
In the village, as a child, I was always putting my ear to hear everything. You know, we 
didn't have a television at that time, of course. Some of us had a radio.  But we observed 
things. We had these family stories. Our mothers told us about our grandfathers. I am from 
                                               
32 Rizospastis is the official newspaper of the Communist Party, first published in 1916. 
33 The theme of children's socialization into specific political ideologies and sensitivities has been 
discussed in the case of "red diaper babies"––children of American communists (see Kaplan 1998). 
Loring Danforth and Rick Van Boeschoten (2012) explore, through interviews, experiences of children 
who were evacuated from their homes in northern Greece by the Communist Party during the civil war 
and placed in orphanages in Eastern Europe. The remaining children were relocated by the Greek 
government to institutions overseen by the Queen. This case is rich ethnographic ground for interest in 
children's political socialization outside of the family. 
34 This area now borders the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
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Left roots. My grandfather was very active politically, he was a revolutionary, not a 
politician, but someone who fought for justice. He was a very impressive person [...] and 
my father participated in the solidarity movement before the popular front was organized 
against the Nazis. He founded the organization in our village to help people with food and 
clothes [...] That was one of our three enemies: Hunger. The Germans. And the Fascist[s]. 
He was supporting the resistance [...] I was not so active as a boy, of course, but I had all 
this in my blood. 
Once again, we seem to have an account of very early socialization into left culture and history 
through a combination of stories of village elders and careful attentiveness. But there is also a 
hint in Pavlos' account of a kind of non-socialized spirit or soul––a quality of "being left" that is 
said to run self-determined through the family line like a genetic proclivity. While Pavlos states 
that politics proper is the realm of adult action, he nevertheless imagines that, even as a boy, the 
quality of the left was alive within him. As the bearer of an impressive political inheritance, the 
son thus narrates himself as an extension of his forefathers' tendencies towards social justice and 
solidarity. 
 Reflecting on his family's political orientation, another interviewee spoke of both his 
parents' and his own distaste for uniforms. Digging a little deeper into this shared aversion, he 
discovered a Cretan "soul" at its root: 
My mother was anti-establishment, if I can use that term. Very anti-establishment. She 
could not stand uniforms. That is why she lived so many years in harmony with my father. 
On that, they agreed. They both had contempt. But when I had been to Crete, I saw that 
this was a characteristic of the Cretan soul. Not that she was following vendettas and 
getting a knife and killing somebody, no. But there was this soul... 
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In this way, both the suspicion of authority for the son of Cretan parents and the quality of "being 
left" for the grandson of a communist, point to origins somehow both in––and statedly beyond––
the realm of culture (either transcendent, in the case of the soul, or inherent, in the case of blood.  
The Family as a Political Agent 
 
In the excerpts from interviews above, there is an identifiable tendency to  narratively 
constructing the family as a political unit. In the academic literature, the idea of the "left family" 
was raised conceptually––albeit more precisely as the "socialist family"––in the context of the 
ex-Soviet Bloc by Basile Kerblay (1996) in the mid 1990s. Was it possible, he asked, to speak of 
an organized form of kinship that bore the exclusive mark of Soviet Socialism? To make the 
case, legal changes and social policies concerning abortion, marriage, divorce, child benefits, and 
taxation were compared across Eastern European countries of the ex-Soviet bloc. More than a 
decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in a volume dedicated to the history of the 20th 
century European family, the "socialist family" was again raised but determined to have little 
analytical value for understanding the diversity of families under communist rule (Blum 2003). 
In other words, researchers had a difficult time isolating any consistently occurring features of a 
"socialist family" across countries.  
 Approaching the figure of the family as a political unit ethnographically moves us away 
from specifying the empirical existence of the "socialist" or "communist" family with such and 
such characteristics. The question here is not which family is indeed a "left family," but rather 
how families were imagined as integral political actors, and how in turn, subjects come to terms 
with their own political inheritance. To this end, we might consider the vocabulary involved in 
constructing the family as a political unit. In what terms were families of the left discussed? This 
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is a dense question and one I can only begin to address here. When asked, men had quite a lot to 
say about familial adjectives. Certainly, "left family," ("aristeri oikoyenia") is probably the 
broadest manner of asserting the left-leaning tendencies of a family over the course of 
generations and it was used widely in accounts. It often refers to families "deep in the left 
tradition," explained one interviewee, stretching as far back as the first articulations of 
communist and socialist sympathies. Because a "left family is probably one with many books" 
explained another, it may also share significations with the "cultured family" ("kalliergimeni 
oikoyenia"),  the "educated family" ("morphomeni oikoyenia") or the "atheist family" "atheistiki 
oikoyenia." Yet, neither "cultured family" nor "educated family" can be seen as the exclusive 
lexicon of the Left. 
 While there appears to be many expressions in Greek that construct the family as a political 
subject, not all of them emerged organically within interviews. At times, I asked after the terms 
interviewees had heard or those they had used themselves. Some adjectives bring the experiences 
of families closer to a periodized political history. A "family from the mountain" ("oikoyenia apo 
to vouno"), for instance, refers to those who fled to the mountains of Grammos, where the civil 
war was fought between 1946-1949. "Mountain family" is thus a more subtle variant of "fighting 
family" ("agonistiki oikoyenia"). To speak of the "kinigimeni oikoyenia" is to implicitly refer to 
the persecution of one's family, derived as it is from the passive tense of the verb, "to hunt" 
("kinigo"). Use of the term, "hunted family," expresses both the political identification of the 
family and the suffering that this necessarily entailed. Unlike "fighting family,"–– which tends to 
carry a sense of agency––"hunted family" is more self-aware of one's participation in a war that 
had been lost, and speaks from the position of the vanquished. Finally, the "banished family" 
("diogmeni oikoyenia") describes those who fled from Greece––very often to the Soviet bloc––
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as a result of systematic persecution. In this way, it signifies the completed act of state and 
paramilitary practices. Importantly, all of these terms capture both the social life of a political 
category and the intimate and historical variations of families over generations. Of course, some 
of these terms have fallen out of use. Interviewees stated that while their parents would use some 
of these terms, their own children would probably not know what they meant.  
 In this way, the tendency to speak of the family, despite the reality of divisions, as a 
singular political subject, capable of acting and thinking in common, comes not only from the 
position of governance––that is, the discourse and practices of regimes historically––but also, as 
I have begun to show, from those who were "characterized" by the state. Indeed, families taken 
to be integral political agents are even woven into accounts of the first republic: "Greece is like 
an ancient tragedy," said Panos, "the divisions are so deep. Even during the Greek revolution 
against the Ottoman empire, we have the family vendettas and assassinations. Families willing to 
kill the first democrat because of what they risked losing!"  
 In the construction of one's own political genealogy, remarks like Athanasios' were 
common: 
All my family are left people, democratic people. My father was with Venizelos in 1922.35 
My father was a soldier in the Middle East and Turkey in 1932.  He saw the catastrophe 
there. He saw Smyrna burn!36  He was with Venizelos at the time but he was left. My 
                                               
35 Venizelos was a leader of the Republican movement in Greece. He sought to incorporate the Greek-
speaking populations throughout the Ottoman Empire into a single nation state (a project termed the 
"Megali Idea"—the "Big Idea"). The National Schism, which interviewees speak about, refers to the split 
that was created between the Republicans and the Monarch over Greece's position during the first World 
War. While the King wished to keep Greece neutral (implying support of the Central Powers), Venizelos, 
as Prime Minister, brought Greece onto the side of the Allies. 
36 After WWI, the Greek army, under Venizelos, fought the Turkish army over the partitioned land of the 
Ottoman Empire from 1919-1922. In Smyrna (today's Izmir) there was a large population of Greeks and 
thus it was Venizelos' intention—part of his "Megali Idea"—to incorporate the city into the Greek nation 
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family was never right. Never right! From far, far back, they were communists [KKE] and 
PASOK. I don’t have any rightists in my family. No one from my family ever voted for 
Nea Demokratia!  
Petros' description constructs a brotherhood of the left comprised of PASOK and communists––a 
genealogy that is defined principally by its exclusion of the right. His remarks render PASOK 
well-rooted in the tradition of the left through its association ("and") with the oldest political 
party in Greece (KKE). The effect is one of asserting longevity and continuity in political 
genealogy. 
 Of course, the civil war in Greece is so lamented precisely for the ways it cut through 
families, arming "brother against brother" and "son against father." How then, can the family be 
taken both as a unified political subject and site of significant political divides? And how is this 
contradiction worked out in personal accounts? Some interviewees found very interesting ways 
of neutralizing their right-wing relatives. For example, consider how Vasilis describes his right-
wing uncle:  
My family was left, but there was an uncle who worked with the right wing. But he was 
not killing, because he knew that if you kill like this, one day they will come back for you. 
For that reason, when he died, so many people went to his funeral. Leftists came to say, 
"Thank you!" There were many communists who expressed this, because, OK, better he 
sends you to the island, because if you stayed in Athens they would imprison you, torture 
you, kill you. So he sent many to the islands, saying, "Stay over there, or sign." 
If Vasilis' uncle emerges, in a roundabout way, as a kind of benevolent actor for the left, and is 
brought into the family fold without compromising an otherwise consistent lineage, Angelos' 
                                                                                                                                                       
state. The attempt failed and the Turkish army reclaimed the city in 1922 and set it on fire. Many 
thousands of Greeks and Armenians died and those who survived were evacuated en masse.  
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maternal relatives on the right are remembered as good guys playing for the wrong team: "They 
joined the right at that time not with consciousness, but out of habit, like you follow a hockey 
team here in Canada. And they were the ones who informed my mother that the prospects for me 
in Greece were not very good at all." This last point––that right-wing relatives became 
instrumental in navigating a dangerous political landscape and, as we will see, acted on behalf of 
"the filed"––is one that I discuss more fully in the final section of this chapter.  
 Others worked through the right-wing tendencies of family members by placing them in 
their historical context. The result, in the case of Kostas, was a carefully surmised tragedy: 
He was my half-`brother and he was very right wing. Even though his father was killed by 
them! He was killed by the Germans because the fascist [Greek] government did not open 
the jail for political prisoners when we were occupied. They handed over all these 
prisoners to the Germans [to be] executed. Presumably [...], well, he told me once that his 
father had left him a journal. It was given to him by a colleague [...] and presumably he 
read it and became right wing. Probably his father had a disagreement with the party within 
the prison [...] Ah, [they faced the] worst punishments when they disagreed with the party. 
It's worse than the police! [To see] them do this to their own colleagues [and] to isolate 
them from the rest... 
In explaining his brother's right-wing position as a reaction to the persecution of his father by the 
left, Kostas presents a political genealogy turned against itself. To be marginalized by your own 
blood, "communist against communist," "brother again brother" is a feature of left political 
history and a reality for families most poignantly articulated by the "sons of signers"––those 
whose fathers signed statements of conversion in order to avoid imprisonment or exile. 
Importantly, the historical lens through which Kostas observes his half-brother (one which 
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introduces the sins of the party) was neither used nor acknowledged by those maintaining a 
communist position at the time of interviewing. 
In the Name of the Father  
 
It will be apparent to the reader by now that my ethnographic reflections on the politics of 
kinship are heavily shaped by male protagonists and the political genealogies under examination 
tend to pivot around patrilines. It is not that women are totally absent from men's narratives, but 
rather that they tend to be  depoliticized in one of two primary ways: Mothers are either narrowly 
storied into contexts of domesticity and care or, when they do appear as potential "political" 
actors, their commitment or reasoning is swiftly undermined. Let's consider two illustrations.  
 I have just addressed the situation of Kostas, whose half-brother was right-wing. I add here 
that Kostas described his father as a "democratic person" and his mother as "left." I asked Kostas 
to tell me more about his mother. The narrative emergence and disappearance of Helen as a 
political actor is quite remarkable in its ambivalence: 
My mother was a leftist but nobody knew. She did not speak about it. My father was 
pressuring her to vote liberal and my brother was pressuring her to vote for the right wing 
[...] They were like vultures but she was voting for the communists. Not the communists 
because there was no communist party [they were banned], but there was the substitute 
EDA [...] But she was the kind of leftist [with air quotes] who had an instructor. [Our 
neighbour], Mrs. Kefalas would come and put [a piece of paper with] the name of the 
person that she must vote for under [the garbage bin]. And [my mother] was taking it and 
going to vote.  
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After introducing his mother as holding a distinct political opinion, Kostas then narrates the 
influence of a neighbour who essentially dictates to his mother how she should vote. Kostas 
concluded frankly that his mother "knew fuck all," having "finished grade 4" and having "never 
read a book in her life." Of his half-sister, who was once "a communist," Kostas added with a 
cynical laugh, "she was left until the moment she turned religious!" 
 While Kostas relates the political sensibilities of his mother and sister with allusions to 
their lack of commitment or intelligence, others removed their mothers from the frame by 
placing them on a kind of transcendent plane. Some men portrayed their mothers as angels—
divine creatures—who had no relation to the political world, fraught as it was with the all-too-
human pursuits of violence and corruption. Others denied more subtly that their mothers knew 
anything about the political, but showed great respect and care in descriptions of their mother's 
domestic worlds. Angelos does so while maintaining his mother's intelligence: 
My mother was a self-educated philosopher. She went just three years to school and after 
her mother died she basically became mother of her brothers and sisters. About 5 years 
ago, I heard a very sad and touching story about my mother. During the day, nine or ten 
years old, she was doing a job for a full grown-up woman, cooking and doing stuff like that 
and at night, when the moon was shining in her room, she was taking her doll out and 
playing. That was a thing which has struck me. My mother was...Look at the picture... tells 
a story, doesn't it? 
I was in Angelos' home in Toronto when he shared these thoughts with me. Just behind him was 
a large photograph of his mother's face, tilted sideways and framed by a beautiful golden light. 
He noted tenderly, "that was taken just before she passed away."   
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 It would be an exaggeration to suggest that men's attempts to narrate their mothers' worlds 
were frequent or elaborate. In fact, my efforts to get men speaking about their mothers were 
often felt by interviewees as departures away from the main story they were trying to tell. 
Nevertheless, we can gesture towards alternative readings of Kostas' description above. While 
sites of silence emerge in a number of interviews as an effect of fear of reprisal by state actors, 
Helen's muteness must also be read against pressures to vote alongside her husband or son. 
Might we then see, in that tiny piece of paper, an act of solidarity between two women subtly and 
silently subverting the "vultures" and their attempts at intimidation?  
 Still, when considering the place of parents in men's narratives of political lineage, it is 
fathers that remain the primary preoccupation. These fathers have many faces: There are noble 
and heroic fathers whose courage was recounted with pride; sensible fathers, who warned sons 
about the costs of a political life and emphasized moderation; fathers weighed down by fear or 
shame; fathers perceived as victims of the times; fathers who called for the end of doctrines, 
ideologies, and "isms" and who encouraged their sons to think for themselves, to find their own 
way and to be their own man. Some spoke of distant fathers. The story of one's father often 
involved some speculation or filling in gaps. Evangelos, himself a "social democrat," recalls: 
My father was supporting the Communist Party all along, but he wasn't a member. I 
remember in the elections of 1946 [...] there was a referendum for the restoration of the 
king in Greece and the Communist Party ordered followers to abstain from that vote. My 
father didn't vote on that occasion. And it was written in the books, the fakelo, that he did 
not vote, that he abstained from the elections, that he was a communist. Of course, he was 
a truck driver and for that reason I think it is at least possible that he was travelling, and 
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that is why he didn't vote that day. In any case, he had leftist ideas, although I don't think 
he was a member. 
Ilias' father was covertly assisting the resistance. Hired as an electrician by the German army to 
fix the telecommunication lines that were frequently sabotaged by the resistance, he was killed 
when the Germans discovered that he was covertly passing messages to the guerillas. This legacy 
was perceived by Ilias as an immense burden: "In Greece as things have been, from the primary 
school until you are an adult, it depends on who your father is [...] So I had enough of all of this, 
who is your father, who is your grandfather." 
 While "left and right" are the organizing principles for those who had a communist––or 
"fellow traveller"––father, slightly older interviewees experienced the file as a result of a prior 
"national schism" between republicans and royalists. "As you know," began Markos, whose 
father was a veteran of the Greek-Turkish war, "we had an earlier split in 22, between those 
supporting the king and those who wanted to make a republic [Venizelists]." The semantics of 
communism and resistance later played a strange role in the lives of these self-proclaimed 
Venizelists and their sons. Many fathers were described as having been critical of the communist 
party; as one interviewee recalls, his father "could not tolerate the heavy and crude things they 
were saying, like Stalin was always right." Yet, liberal supporters of Venizelos, and later George 
Papandreou, were not shielded from accusations and persecution. In the decades after the civil 
war, by which time the national schism had been remapped onto the polemic, Left-Right, the 
sons of centric fathers sometimes found themselves strange bedfellows with active communist 
members and their sons. 
 Born in 1939 on the island of Naxos, Nikos spoke at some length about his family's 
characterization: 
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My father was a war veteran from the Greek-Turkish war. And he was a Venizelist. And 
for this, my family suffered. But he never spoke about his support. I first discovered it 
when I realized there were no pictures of the king hanging in our house! And in those days, 
if you found a house with no king, you knew who they supported [...]  But he didn't want 
us to get involved [...] Still, we suffered because they cut his pension. For two years he had 
none. He was very sick and we were 8 people in the family. This was in 1946 when there 
was a referendum to bring the king back. My father didn't want to bring the king back so 
he didn't vote. They manipulated the numbers, rigged the elections. The King returned [...] 
And, you know, I was a very good student at the time, but I left school because they would 
not give me books to study. They refused to give me a book because my father was with 
Venizelos!  [...] So when I left Greece, I said to myself, I am going to leave and I will 
never come back to this place [...] I was very angry with the whole system. 
These reflections reveal a social life of political categories that was consequential for those we 
are not likely to include in accounts of "the Left." In other words, the sense of having inherited a 
condemned political inheritance was not an experience exclusive to the sons of communists.  
 Interestingly, only one interviewee denounced the resistance movement on account of his 
political inheritance. Dragging the family into collective responsibility was irresponsible and 
destructive in his view and "good fathers" were those that remained home, stayed quiet, and 
fulfilled their obligations to their family. "Those were the real heroes," he said. When more 
subtle resentments surfaced in accounts with other interviewees they were typically stifled with a 
general remark about the profound anxieties and difficult living conditions of the time: "We all 
suffered....How could we not?" 
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 Additional narrative elements of a condemned political inheritance were those claims of 
bequeathed accusations and even sins. The chain of responsibility, from one generation to the 
next was, at once, lamented, challenged and claimed. Vasilis was the first interviewee to name 
the two sides of the paternal sin ––resistance and its denial: "My father and my uncle were 
communists. They were part of the resistance. My uncle, he was a brilliant philosopher actually, 
but they imprisoned him and then they killed him. It was just after the civil war in 50, 51. They 
were hunting all of them. [...] My father? They let him live, because he signed." 
 In the years after the civil war, the Communist Party regarded the signing of "declarations 
of repentance" ("dilosi") a shameful offence against the party and its core principles. In 1945, the 
question of how to negotiate the previous "generation" of signers (those who had repented of and 
renounced their communist sensitivities during the Metaxa dictatorship of 1936-1940) was 
raised, and the Communist Party's new constitution formally denounced these men and women 
(Voglis 2012b: 80). Consequently, in the post-civil war years, signing the dilosi was also signing 
one's fate in relation to the party. Thanos recalls: 
My father was asked to sign and I believe he did sign. It was true that after signing such a 
thing they lived their lives with guilt and shame and these are not feelings that a person 
should feel in such an environment. I was the son of a signer. This was used to disgrace me 
many many many times when I disagreed or did not follow a party line. This is a mistake 
of the party that we can not forget. 
While some men attempted to work through what the act of signing represented for both their 
fathers and for themselves, others spoke of this part of the family's history dismissively or with 
hostility. One interviewee recalled brusquely, "I had asked as a kid, why didn't he just keep his 
big mouth shut?"  
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 In reflections on the Communist Party as an active political force, the practice of shaming 
signers is deeply lamented; indeed, it is seen as a formidable error and unforgivable sin of the 
party. This is one of the primary instruments by which the party turned against its own, rendering 
people of the left vulnerable and doubly marginalized. The second oft-referenced historical 
mistake of the Communist Party was the official call to abstain from elections in 1946. This 
abstention, as we have seen above, provided the speedy identification of many communists and 
"fellow-travellers," leaving them exposed to police intimidation and arrests. In this sense, the 
party played its own ironic and tragic role in the persecution of left-wing Greeks.   
 In a story concluded sadly with, "That's war for you, my dear," Thanos explained  the trail 
of events that led to his own marginalization by the youth wing of the Communist party. I quote 
Thanos at length here: 
My father was employed at a German factory [...] making beer. The chemist was a German 
fellow [...] and when they occupied Greece he appeared to the workers in the uniform of a 
Nazi captain and apparently, according to my father, he assured them that they had nothing 
to fear. But at the same time, the majority of [...] the workers had joined the communist 
party [...] Now, before the end of the occupation, the Germans wanted to take Greeks to 
work in the war machine […] and they tried to gather those people, by organizing 
blockades in the different neighborhoods of Athens [...], gathering all the men from age 16 
to 65. At the same time, they wanted to wipe out the communists, who were the leaders of 
the resistance at the time. You have probably heard the stories of the guy with the mask 
[…] He would go in front of a line of hostages and point out the communists, saying him, 
him, him and then they would take them out and kill them right on the spot. The rest would 
[be gathered] up and take[n] to the famous labour camp or jail [...] So my father, of course, 
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he had to present himself in the square and he was pointed out, identified by the guy with 
the mask as being a communist person, and we were there, my mother and I, watching. But 
all of a sudden, just as they lined him up, the German jeep drives up and the owner of the 
factory jumps out! He picked up 6 or 7 workers from the factory, including my father, and 
brought them back to work. So, you can only imagine the type of problems that created for 
my father with the communists. 
The publicly displayed favoritism for Thanos' father by the German boss––turned uniformed 
fascist––made relations between him and the party difficult. Thanos himself would later face 
claims of collaboration and being "an agent for the CIA"–– charges bequeathed because he was 
"the son of a signer." Thanos followed this story with an emotive critique of the party's silent 
condoning of this kind of treatment: 
This is terrorism exercised by those who have been terrorized themselves for many 
generations. This is a terrorism in defense! I am against terror no matter what. There is 
nothing, for me, more ugly and pitiful than the sight of an eleven year old boy who went 
through 4 years of occupation and then all of a sudden experiencing the allies using a 
machine gun to hit people in your own neighbourhoods.37 That is the worst kind of 
                                               
37 Thanos is referring to the events of December, 1944,  in Athens, when the British Army (previously an 
ally against the German occupiers) turned its guns and tanks against the Greek left-wing resistance forces. 
He elaborated: 
 
"I was scared, yes I was scared. I remember exactly when the British airplanes began to machine gun the 
streets of Athens. The neighborhood––my neighborhood––you understand? As a child in those days, you 
didn't scare easily...You get used to machine guns, to killings, you know, you still believe what adults say 
about the better days ahead of you. But the day when I saw the plane is when I really felt for the first time 
what fear is. I broke. I remember my mother was there to embrace me and she hid me in this embrace, 
because I was really shocked and I was crying for hours. That, I had forgotten until now. I was probably 
ashamed for having broken down [...] Looking back, I think I began to sense that my father was scared 
also. Because as a real strong guy from Crete, he never let his fears show. But in those days, fear became 
the eighth person in my family. We were seven people, but fear became the eighth, going in and out of the 
house, in and out of his work, and returning home. And I sensed this and it made me weak. Because I 
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terrorism! Now, this blackens your soul. And then you can adopt measures and thinking 
that can terrorize other people. And yet, no one has the right to do this, no matter what you 
have gone through. 
Finally, it was the sins of the others that interviewees wished to speak about. Having discussed 
their own condemned political inheritance, we turned to those who, over the course of many 
decades, had evaded punishment. One interviewee lamented that George Papandreou was 
remarkably "lethargic" at the close of the second world war, making little attempt to punish 
collaborators.38 "If you write anything," said Nikos, as our interview came to a close, "please 
write this: Nobody...nobody ever got punished in Greece, neither the collaborators with the 
Nazis, the traitors. Never did they get punished. After the dictatorship too." The left, on the other 
hand, "Well, you know the story..." 
III. Coming to Age in the File 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed at length men's encounters with the material file, 
framed by some combination of repetitive bureaucratic denials and acts of naming that varied in 
subtly. Yet, years before men encountered their files in institutional spaces like the military, 
everyday life had presented its own proximate interpellations––at school, in the playground, at 
church and in the streets. Narratives reveal, on the one hand, a dynamic "social life of political 
categories" and, on the other hand, a vague sense of "being one of two." Memories of the first 
utterance––"You are a communist"––were poignant for their vulgarity and the way they ruptured 
the ordinary, slicing one moment out of a day like any other. Angelos frames the story he tells 
                                                                                                                                                       
remembered what my father had told me six months before...that soon Papandreou would have Greeks in 
their own blood." 
38 George Papandreou Sr. was appointed Prime Minister in 1944 but resigned in 1945 after the December 
events that Peter discussed above. 
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below with: "From the time I was small, the three forces in my childhood were the teacher, the 
priest and the policeman": 
I was [...] twelve and I had written a sad story about a kid who was really sick with a high 
fever, he has no money, and another story about another boy who has lots of toys and is 
celebrating carnival. I found a way to join these stories, to show they are both human. The 
next week, everyone is asked to read their story in front of the class. The teacher doesn't 
call on me, so I ask, "Won't I read mine?" He says, in front of the others, "Come over here" 
to the front [of the class]. He takes up my paper from his desk and tears it to pieces. He 
began assaulting me there in front of the other kids and he says, "You are a communist." I 
say, "What is a communist?" I didn't know...I mean I had heard the word before but never 
bothered with it. But after that, you can imagine, I was inclined to figure out what it meant! 
The teacher, the public humiliation, the interpretation of a child's imagination as politically 
engendered: These are common elements of the first utterance in the social space of the school. 
For Kostas, memories of his most despised teacher are recalled with a sense of the absurd: 
I was in the first year of high school and, at that time, we had these oral exams. We had to 
stand up and recite the previous lesson. I had this teacher who refused to test me! He never 
called on me and near the end of the class he gave me 2\20 [...] One day, I wrote a response 
to one of the stories we had to read. There was swearing in this story and at the time I 
thought this was wrong! I wrote that "the Good God said not to swear. And once someone 
swore and he developed calluses and pimples on his tongue, full of blood and puss." It was 
harmless. In 10 days he called the entire council of teachers––the school had 2500 
students, can you imagine how many teachers? He wanted me to be expelled from all the 
schools in Greece and my philologist, my teacher of philology––God bless his soul––said, 
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"What do you expect of this boy? You fail him and don't even put him to examinations!" 
Finally they compromised and gave me six days suspension. But Katherine, when the 
dictatorship came to power, he went directly to the police station, gave them the paper I 
had written, and said, here, "Here is a communist!" They called me to the station, I went. 
And they asked, "Why are you here?" SLAP [across the face]. The captain asked, "Why 
did you write this?" [...] And I said, "This teacher is not a serious person! It was a form of 
joking!" He said finally, "You are lucky that he shit in his own nest," meaning that he used 
to play it democratic and then played it right-wing, "because if it was not this way, you 
can't even imagine what we would do to you..." 
Stories of this kind bring to life the overdetermined polarity of the post-civil war years, but they 
also remind us of the creativity and intrepidness of young people in their own self-defense. 
Caught between perceptions of children as mere vessels for the reproduction of communism and 
as already-guilty subjects carrying the sins of their kin, the autonomy and intelligence of youth 
was regularly denied by authorities in narrated accounts: 
I remember [the priest] was telling us about all the angels God had. Gabriel and the others. 
Out of innocence, I said, "If god is so good and has all these angels working for him, why 
doesn't he send one or two down to earth and care for the sick children and bring my friend 
Fortula's father back from exile?" He was a communist. The next day I had to go and 
answer from where I got this idea. When they hear you talking like that in Greece, the next 
thing is they call in your parents, never believing that the child's mind could produce such 
an idea... 
Police, the third of Angelos' childhood "forces," were present in narratives of youth as the source 
of spontaneous bullying and intimidation. Having been sent to purchase the left paper "Avgi" for 
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his father, Ilias recalls being stopped by an officer of his village: "What is this?" the officer 
demanded, "You are a communist?! You should be ashamed of yourself! Tell me here and now, 
who won the war?" Encounters of this kind explain why parents sent their sons to adjacent 
neighborhoods to purchase left-wing newspapers. 
 If this trilogy of authority––teachers, priests and police officers––comprised a field of petty 
symbolic tyrannies, physical violence (more often implied in narratives than named explicitly) 
can hardly be overlooked. Recounting his nightly adventures, Takis "could not forget the 
beatings." He told me, "As boys, we would go about the village and wherever we would see 
white walls, we would make the symbol of the sickle. Of course, they caught me and made me 
blue all over. My mother was putting onions on me for days after to treat the bruises..." 
 Takis' recollection and the cost of what might otherwise (that is, in a different time and 
place) be nothing more than boyish mischief is enough to explain the hesitancy with which 
interviewees discussed the matter of "being involved." In the years following the civil war and 
up until the fall of the dictatorship, children of the left were inherently so: "Getting 
involved...What does this mean?" posed Ilias, "We were so by birth." Intimidations and 
accusations of guilt by birth make it difficult, then, to speak in terms of action. It also makes the 
denial of these charges and the claim, "I am innocent," almost impossible to substantiate. 
 In the social space of the school, children navigated terms pulled from adult discourse––
fragments from conversations and newspaper headlines–– and a "foggy," sense of "being one of 
two." Dimitris, born and raised in a small northern village close to Mount Olympus, described 
the years after the civil war as a space of division with clear borders but without obvious 
significance. "As children," he recalls, "coming out of the war, we did have some kind of 
division [...] The village had a square and the kids north of the square fought for power over 
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those in the south. It was an instinct of the war that had remained with us, I suppose." Others 
recalled more precise words of exclusion. Thanos described a persist politicized bullying: "There 
was even a song, whoever does not want the king, the country, religion, they would be paid to go 
Bulgaria! There were asking us to go somewhere else even though they never actually gave us a 
chance to do it! But you can imagine. I was 12 years old and I had so-called patriot kids singing 
that to my face at school!" 
 Given this social life of inherited polarities, naming was loaded with significations for 
children and adolescents: It anticipated the denials they would later encounter as young men and 
activated, I believe, both a curiosity about the title and what it bestowed ("As you can imagine, I 
was inclined to find out what it meant...") and an attachment to figures of the self-identified man. 
On this last point, Nikos concluded our interview: "I remember something that my father told me 
as a child, which I didn't understand at the time. He said, 'It's a big thing to say your name in 
front of a crowd.'" This persistent tension between stating one's name and being bestowed a 
degraded title is one I will return to again in both chapters four and five. For the time being, I 
want to continue exploring how this ambivalence is expressed in men's accounts of the post-civil 
war years. 
Visibility of the Political and (Mis)recognitions 
 
An ethnographic approach to political subjectivity involves placing those I interviewed in the 
company of others––ancestors, parents, uncles, grandparents, comrades, "opportunists," friends, 
mentors, leaders, parties and compatriots––and asking after "the ensemble of modes of 
perception, affect, thought, desire and fear that animate" them as thinking and "acting subjects" 
(Ortner 2006: 107). This involves paying attention to "whatever is at stake" (ibid) for men as 
they come to terms with a political history rendered profoundly intimate. This "whatever is at 
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stake" is explored here in the subtle moments of interaction––in silences, gestures, anxieties, 
hesitant exposures and retreats. As I demonstrate, in the highly polarized post-civil war years, 
interviewees inhabit ambivalent sociopolitical sites: on the one hand, men are "known" to one 
another by virtue of their close proximities and identifiable genealogies; on the other hand, they 
find themselves in unchartered social situations, "ceas[ing] to trust that context is in place" (Das 
2007: 9). Thus, questions of visibility, proximity and voice emerge as central stakes in the 
making of political subjectivities. 
 On the question of visibility, Thanos' account is illustrative, as it renders transparent both 
the neighborhood itself and the political genealogies inhabiting each home: 
 I can close me eyes now and remember eight years in one kilometer. My neighbourhood. I 
can still see who lived in this house and who lived in the next. You know, how many girls 
this woman had and were they beautiful girls. I can remember like yesterday [...] that this 
neighbour was involved and what the other did. You know, we knew one another. 
For Thanos, the political involvement of his neighbours is as evident—and as easily recalled—as 
the beauty of their daughters. While what "knowing one another" might mean in such a context 
remains an open question at this point, I'd like to emphasize that this framing of social relations 
as translucent, proximate, and even fixed emerges as a frequent trope. As Dimitris surmised, 
"well, in a sense everybody knows where everybody stands," largely on account of "this family 
orientation."  
 Yet stories of (mis)recognition––some comical, others tragic––reveal the complexities of 
identification, anonymity, and the visibility of the political. As young men from Northern 
Greece, Dimitris and Panos had travelled with their classmates and teacher to the city of 
Thessaloniki for an overnight stay. As it happened, on this very day Grigoris Lambrakis, the 
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much-loved leftist and pacifist, lost his life after being attacked by right-wing gang members.39 
Thousands took to the streets to protest this attack, and young Dimitris and Panos found 
themselves, whether intentionally or not, in the center of the action: "The police come and they 
start hitting us. They say, 'you goddam communist', and I tell him, 'hey hey, wait we are from 
Macedonia...'"   
 Is this cry, "We are from Macedonia," not that of someone whose anonymity has been 
betrayed—of a young boy whose political inheritance should not, technically, be known in 
Thessaloniki and who should therefore be able to remain obscure? Such a response to police 
brutality may not work in one's own village, where one is "known" but in streets that are not 
one's own, it articulates a misrecognition, or perhaps, a recognition out of place: How could you 
know what we are? 
 In recollections of the visibility of political ascriptions in the 1950s and 60s, a tension thus 
emerges from the village––as well as the neighbourhoods of Athens and Thessaloniki–– between 
presumptions of candor and its opposite. If one is told that "the village believes you are a 
communist," it is the village itself that is said to speak through the file. 40 Indeed, as my 
                                               
39 Grigoris Lambrakis was a peace activist on the left who was assassinated in Thessaloniki in 1963. His 
death brought incited public protest and was the catalyst for the formation of a cultural-political youth 
movement. The world renowned composer Mikis Theodorakis became the elected president of this 
organization in 1965. 
40 There is much to be said about how deeply anticommunist ideology of the state mobilized and solicited 
citizens in the practices of surveillance and informing after the civil war. As a young man, one of my 
interviewees who had entered the university in Thessaloniki was called to the police station and offered a 
hot meal. On that visit, he was warned against getting involved in communist activity and then the 
officers asked him to begin informing on his classmates. This practice—of offering meals in exchange for 
information—was discussed in other interviews. Another participant explained that his older brother was 
pressured to close his kafeneio (cafe) in Athens after his subtle refusals to "listen in" on his clients and to 
report back to the police. After many visits by the police to his cafe (which in itself unnerved his clients 
on the left) and failed attempts to persuade him to supply information (as well as the gentle warning that 
he came from a left family, so he should "take care"), his brother closed shop and migrated to Canada. I 
also learned of the "lady informer" in the village of one interviewee. She was well-known for observing 
the activities of his neighbours and for sharing information with the police. The interviewee said that he 
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interviewees recall, the file did rely on members of the community to "inform it" and to abide by 
it. Yet, in the interview excerpt below, we have an example of the file seemingly turning against 
the village as source: 
I knew this man. We all knew him. A guy named Niko. Tom's sister married [...] a tall guy, 
who never speaks politics. He speaks about music, soccer, everything else, but no politics. 
Just when I was leaving for the army, they come and get him and send him to a special 
concentration camp for communists. And we say to [Tom], "What happened? Niko was 
never a communist! He was not a political guy!" And we asked him why did they take him 
over there? [...] He said, "Maybe by mistake." But even the right guys, the conservative 
guys, they all think that Tom is a right-wing guy. Everyone thinks he is conservative. 
Everyone, except the police. So, the years pass. We never see him and then I left for 
Greece [...] Years pass and [...] I return to Greece [after the junta falls] and I go to this 
gathering [for leftists]. So, I see Niko there! And I say [...]"What are you doing here? [...] 
Homosexual!" You know, and he [laughing] says, "It was my secret..." 
This story documents a deeply privatized political identity and positions the narrator in an 
ambiguous relation to questions of recognition and authority: On the hand, it challenges the 
transparency of village sociality and the knowability of one's neighbour; on the other hand, it 
hints at the exacting gaze of authority and its capacity to penetrate even the most guarded 
interiors. The metaphor of sexual transgression and coming out, in the story above, renders the 
political a carefully carried secret and likens it to an ontological reality. This is the awkward and 
                                                                                                                                                       
feared her and tried to avoid her at all costs. When I asked what happened to her after the junta, he could 
not recall any details. All of these brief references to the social relations of surveillance give us some idea 
of i) how the "modalities of the state....rest[ed] on everyday practices" (Das 163) and ii) the ambivalent 
discursive formulations of the "village" as a singular actor or subject capable of laying judgment on an 
individual.  
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hindered social life of a privatized politics, having no legitimate means of expression––one that 
can be traced through accounts of both intimate and enduring silences and hesitant exposures:  
They called me to the army for my duties. They put me first in Athens. But after five days, 
they come and ask me, "What is your relation to Yiannis P?"  "He is my father," I told 
them. They tell me I shouldn't be here and they take me to a site, a place where garbage is 
sorted. And there are two other guys there [...] one was a teacher, one was an artist. We had 
to sort copper with copper, aluminum with aluminum, steel with steel. That was our only 
job. I was at that time 22 years old and was thinking, I don't mind! I don't feel tired [...] 
The secret police would come every few days, but we could see them coming from far 
away and we would make the coffee and the sugar and the cigarettes disappear. I 
remember they caught me sleeping once on the job, so they gave me another month [...] 
Well, time passed and it was the day the teacher was going to finish his duties. And he says 
"OK with our last coffee, I want to know, for what reason you are here?"  [The artist] says, 
"I don't know, but no one bothers me here and I'm happy." And he looks at me, and I say, 
"I don't know, I am a good guy..."  But he says, "Leave that Bullshit! Who is it? Your 
uncle? Your father?" And when he said this, I breathed deeply. I was so afraid! I thought, 
"They know! They know about my family!" And he says, "Listen, I am a member of the 
Communist Youth. Maybe you are not. But your father, your brother..." And I say, "Yes! 
Yes! My father!  And my uncle, they killed him in 1951." And the teacher says, "Yes! Yes! 
My brother is a member of the Communist Party!" We stood and we kissed each other, we 
embraced, and then he left the camp. 
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After telling me this story, Vasilis admitted that he would guard the "secret" of his father very 
carefully for many years after and that he carried this fear of being exposed into his relations in 
Canada. 
V. Contesting the File  
 
We have seen above the ways in which everyday life was animated by a politics of kinship and a 
certain dynamic social life of political categories. Here I ask, to what extent was the file–– 
despite its powerful signification of being both true and authoritative––negotiated or contested 
by those who inhabited it? How does one create distances from identifications imposed? How 
does one demonstrate that he is not who the others claim him to be? I show that living in the file 
was, in many cases, a matter of persuading others to reinterpret it, to see it as unsubstantiated, or 
at least to temporarily ignore it and pretend it didn't exist.   
 I discussed earlier the manners by which right-wing relatives are incorporated into political 
genealogies, such that the designation "left family" remains relatively intact. Indeed, while the 
right is typically not admitted or invited into the family history, they are nevertheless brought 
into the narrative to contest and "close the file" in the sense I will discuss in the remaining pages. 
Described as well-meaning, harmless, ill-informed, perhaps dim-witted, and––most certainly––a 
product of the times, right-wing relatives and friends were often called upon to navigate 
dangerous terrains. 
 Yet, it becomes apparent that the protection offered by the "well-connected" (which is to 
say right-wing acquaintances, employers, friends or family members) was often precarious. 
Admitting the protective effect of having a right-wing relative, Kostas said simply and 
dismissively, "I supposed it functioned as a protection at the time, in the sense that they would 
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have beaten the shit out of me otherwise. But I never asked him to do it for me. He did it on his 
own accord." Given that his brother eventually settled with his own family outside of the city, 
Kostas added that this link, even had he fostered it, would not be strong enough to provide any 
enduring protection. 
 Takis, who made a name for himself as the artist of his village, was encouraged, in spite of 
his file and family history, to stay in Northern Greece under the protection of his employer. The 
latter, a retired police officer and owner of a photography studio, was impressed by Takis' 
detailed photo finishing (a very rare and specialized craft at the time) and implored him to stay: 
"Don't worry," he said, "I'm police. Nobody can touch you."  But assurances of this kind, 
surmised Takis, were rather weak given the volatility of the period. Against the advice of his 
employer, he began seeking ways of leaving the country. 
 It was during the first year of the dictatorship, in 1967, that Constantine first sought the 
protection of a right-wing relative against police intimidation: 
A major came to see me and said they had received information that I had taped illegal 
texts. He looked around my office, found the tapes, and took them. He said he would 
review their content. But a member of my brother-in-law's family was a general, so we got 
in touch with him and he called the boss of the major. So the major came back, returned 
the tapes and said my case had been reviewed and the text wasn't so subversive. But he told 
me not to do it again and then he said as he left, "Skepsou Ellinika!" "Think Greek!" But I 
couldn't stay in these conditions. It wasn't safe. I knew the general [the family tie] could be 
kicked out of the army at any time and that's exactly what happened a few months later. 
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If relationships "with the right" were not perceived to provide an enduring security within 
Greece, they nonetheless seemed to play an instrumental role practically and symbolically in the 
final act under dictatorship: The departure. Dimitri recalls: 
I applied to come to Canada and I was waiting to get my passport. Two months go by, 
three, and I approach some relatives on the right and say, "Come on guys, get some 
information! Help me!" And they say "ok," and I'm sure that they did their best, but I 
wasn't getting the passport and I was very upset. Eventually, I went directly to the chief of 
police in the capital of the region––I was naive––and he checks my file and says, "The 
village believes you are a communist." But he was a reasonable guy. I told him, "I have 
relatives on the right! I have friends on the right!" I told him their names. [...] He made a 
phone call to the office of my own village and he told the policeman, "Give this man a 
passport!" [...]And he hung up and said, "Go now. You will get it." In a few days, I 
received it and I left for Canada immediately. 
Although we can't possibly infer from Dimitris' account that acquiring life-changing documents 
was as easy as naming right-wing friends and family members most of the time, his experience 
(and that of others) does reveal the subjective cracks––inhabited by those "reasonable guys"––in 
the state bureaucracy. Describing his own last act under the dictatorship, Stavros similarly 
demonstrates the power of having friends in the "right" places: 
One day he saw me in the street and he said, "Come here." I said, "What do you want?" I 
was nervous [...] I had avoided him since the junta had come to power. He said again, 
"Come here, let’s go for a coffee, let's talk." I say, "About what?"  And he says, "I don't 
know, Malaka, about girls! Come!" So, we go for a coffee.  He says to me, "I know you are 
scared. I know you are called to the police station but I'm not to blame [...] Be careful of 
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your friends. If you want anything, you come to me. I can help you." And without 
hesitating, you know, I say, "OK, I need a passport!" [...] He says, "a passport? I'll tell you 
tomorrow."  Next day, he comes and says, "I give you a passport but you don't want to 
know how much it costs!" I say, "I don’t care." He said, "give me 1000 drachmas, 300 to 
make, the rest to someone in the ministry. I'll pay them to authorize it." I gave him pictures 
and he gave me the passport in 10 days! So, I have my passport in my pocket [...] Before I 
had no such  thing! Few days after, I am there with my brother in the corner of the 
airport, worried, you know, that they would take it away. And I hear the announcement, I 
go through the check and when the plane is up I say, "Ah, I am  free..." 
VI. Closing the File 
 
What better metaphor exists for continuity and preservation of meaning than the paper file, 
deliberately recorded and secured? For files, as Thanos reminds us, "are made to be kept, not 
thrown away." And yet, in these narratives, the file does undergo a closure––material or 
symbolic––that is intended to render the information within it irrelevant. One way of closing the 
file is to do as Karamanlis' conservative government did after the fall of the junta in 1974: 
officially ban the practice of file-keeping. A more dramatic way of closing files is to physically 
destroy them, as the coalition government of 1989 did in public ceremonies throughout Greece. 
 During the dictatorship, however, it seems there were only two manners of closing the file 
and of rupturing the politics of kinship upon which it rests: The first was to sign the statement of 
repentance, which would, theoretically, have redeemed the signer and his family. Rather than an 
act of repentance and forgiveness, however, it was discussed as something of a formality; 
effective in avoiding the most extreme forms of punishment, it nevertheless rendered the signee 
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(and his kin) additionally suspicious "to both sides" (in the words of one interviewee). The blood 
of the father is only literally saved, while that of the son remains suspect. As Vasilis explain, 
"They know he only signed to save his life! Except if he shows them by signing and agreeing to 
work for the police. To sign, ok, you won't be killed." He added, that for the son of the signer, 
there would be "nothing"; "All you will be able to do is be a driver...a taxi cab driver, or a truck 
driver [...] Nothing else." In this sense, signing does not so much imply closing the file, as a 
personal validation of it (and the state's interpellation). Superficially, it also expresses a 
conversion and, in this sense, is a testament to the completed act of state persecution: the 
cleansing of the body politic. Signing is an act of self denial that neither protects oneself or one's 
family from charges. From the perspective of genealogy, it also has the capacity to render one's 
children political orphans ––unable to claim inheritance on the left or right. 
 In this sense, emigration appears to be a more effective means of rupturing the politics of 
kinship and closing the file during the dictatorship. Thousands took the decision to leave Greece 
for countries in which the files would, presumably, have no relevance and where anonymity 
could be achieved. In the following chapter, however, I show that for those arriving to Toronto in 
the 1960s and 1970s, political inheritance remained relevant and, in this sense, the file was given 
a second life in the diaspora.  
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I discussed the presence of the fakelos in men's accounts and the politics of 
kinship upon which it rests. The file has both a materiality and a metaphorical dimension; while 
men express specific encounters with the file, they also articulate a vague sense of "being one of 
two." Documenting the social life of political categories, I showed how "living in the file" 
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involved a field of careful negotiation and interpretation. Moreover, by tracing the work of the 
file, I began to establish the theoretical and ethnographic foundation of the dissertation as a 
whole in two ways: first, I outlined a theoretical lexicon for thinking about the politics of kinship, 
political inheritance and political genealogy; second, I demonstrated how men's constructions of 
political subjectivity are articulated through a set of identifiable tropes; namely, voice, visibility 
and proximity. 
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Chapter 4 
(Re)claiming the Political: Acts of Naming and Resistance in the 
Diaspora 
 
 
"I was called many names in Toronto. 'Communist' bothered me least." 
"By the time we had arrived, they had all changed their names!" 
"I remembered something my father said, that it's a big thing to say your name in front of a 
crowd." 
 
In the fall of 2013, I visited Yannis in his second-hand store, tucked away in an old 
neighbourhood of central Athens. I was surprised to find Yannis perched against a large desktop 
computer, his face pressed up close to the monitor with squinted eyes. Nearly a year had passed 
since our last visit and he received me with a distracted "yeia" ("hi"). He eased himself away 
from the screen slowly and said, "We have a computer!" I knew that Yannis' business had been 
in decline for years and that he was struggling to keep the doors open. To supplement the income 
he had lost, he began selling a few very old books––part of his small stock of treasures that were 
worth quite a lot. To make these purchases, he worked through a small network of personal 
contacts. Aware that there was a more lucrative market online, if only he "could figure out how 
to work a computer," he had been frustrated with his tech-savvy son's reluctance to take the 
initiative. Yannis explained that his son had finally mobilized some friends to help put the store 
in order–– to "modernize" the system and to link it into the rare book market.  
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 Getting online offered more than a supplementary income; it had fostered a virtual return 
to Toronto. As we sat together, Yannis slowly typed the names of people he had known from 
Toronto, amazed to discover that some of them had become "important" people. Then he told me 
that he had found something I'd be interested in seeing. Taking a DVD from a small brown 
envelope, he struggled to find the drive and then handed the disc to me with exasperation. Once 
loaded, a video opened and there was a slightly younger Yannis, standing where we sat now and 
addressing a small, white-haired audience. I pulled my chair closer.  
 The video is a recording of an event from about 7 years ago. Yannis had organized a 
commemorative gathering for his friend Manos, who he had met in Toronto during the years of 
the Junta. Being an atheist, Yannis explained that he could not "step foot" in the church or 
cemetery when Manos died, but he wanted to honour his friend in his own way. Inviting Manos' 
family and friends to his shop, Yannis made a presentation about what his friend "had done for 
the Greeks" in Toronto. Originally a member of the Communist party of Greece (KKE), Manos 
later became active with the Eurocommunists (KKE-I).41 A few moments in, Yannis paused the 
video to explain how difficult it was to organize this event. Calling a number of "the guys from 
those days" to invite them, he was met with long-winded critiques of Manos' decision to break 
with the KKE. "I don't give a fuck about that!" Yannis recalls yelling, "Will you come and 
honour the man, or not? He's dead for Christ's sake!" 
                                               
41 KKE is the Communist Party of Greece, which narrates itself as being founded in 1918 as the Socialist 
labour Party of Greece and thus the oldest political party in the country. KKE-I was formed after the 
significant split in the KKE in 1968, a result of opposing opinions about the role the Soviet Union should 
have in guiding the party. KKE-I, like other left groups in Europe, critiqued the Soviet Union's invasion 
of Czechoslovakia and built close ties to the "Eurocommunist" movement.   
. 
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 The recorded commemorative event begins with Yannis stating that he would like to share 
the struggle of the "Greeks in Toronto" in honour of Manos. And then, for the next half hour, he 
highlights moments in the anti-dictatorship movement, with images projected against the wall 
behind him: Here is Manos in the boîtes of the Danforth; there he is protesting in the street; here 
are his friends outside of the consulate, holding a hunger strike. And suddenly, a surprise (Yannis 
glances at me sideways to see if I've noticed): In a sea of white hair and black hats, there is the 
poster-boy of the contemporary resistance himself, Alexis Tsipras. It is in Mr. Alexis Tspiras and 
his left-wing party SYRIZA that many hopes lies today, but at the time of the commemorative 
event, Tsipras was "just" a young member of the municipal council of Athens. I show my 
surprise at seeing such an important public figure in this intimate setting. Yannis laughs at my 
reaction, "Who would have thought, eh?" 
 This is surely a unique moment of historical folds: the present insecurity of Yannis and his 
shop, "pre-crisis" images of a more agile, healthier, confident self, a commemoration site for the 
diasporic struggle, the casual but pensive pose of the future Prime Minister in his younger days. 
As a visual composite, perhaps there is no better mode of illustrating the ambiguous present from 
which Yannis spoke to me at length of his 15 long years in Canada. 
 Yannis was among the many thousands of young Greeks who left for foreign lands during 
the years of the junta. Official figures from Athens show that, between 1961 and 1976, 
approximately 320,000 Greeks emigrated abroad through legal means and Canada is recorded as 
receiving about 40,000 between 1967 and 1973 (Gavaki 1991: 73, 77). More than one fourth of 
the men I interviewed entered the country illicitly while another half entered with official 
passports, overstaying their tourist visa and eventually acquiring immigration status or student 
visas. In other words, only one fourth of my interviewees settled in Canada through methods that 
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Tamis and Gavaki (2002) claims to have been dominant in those years; namely, sponsorship 
through relatives or through the new "point system" that the Liberals put in place (118). 
Nonetheless, the latter may have played a role in the eventual granting of citizenship to those 
who had entered as tourists. There is no estimate for those arriving and staying in Canada outside 
of the formal categories of "nominated," "sponsored" and "independent" immigrants used at that 
time. Most interviewees indicated that they personally knew 10 to 20 individuals in Toronto 
living "paranoma" (illegally) in those years, although they commented that most of these people 
later acquired study visas in order to stay in Canada temporarily. Regardless of the specific 
numbers, some interviewees emphasized that those migrating in the 1940s and 50s (and to some 
extent the early 60s) had generally done so as a result of the devastating economic conditions of 
post-war Greece, while many of those leaving Greece after 1967 were doing so to avoid the 
Junta. As one participant explained, "If you met someone coming after 1967, you understood 
what he was..."  
 This chapter explores forms of sociality and constructions of political subjectivity in men's 
narratives of the anti-dictatorship movement that was established in Toronto. The coup took 
power on April 21st, 1967, and most of those I interview migrated to Canada very shortly after. 
On the basis of interviewees' accounts, I ask: How did men negotiate, manage, and socialize 
along political lines in their new city? And for those who had carried the weight of the file's 
interpolations for many years––indeed having been told what they were and what they were 
destined to be––what was it to actively participate in a movement and to act (often for the first 
time) politically? If, in chapter three, I demonstrated how young men navigated the file and the 
overdetermined political categories that were bestowed upon them, I now focus on how men 
engaged in the articulation and actualization of political identities. In the process, I argue that 
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political genealogy remained animated in the streets of Toronto and that the file gained a second 
life in rather surprising ways. 
 I have organized this chapter into three parts: The first sets the scene of men's arrivals and 
their initial encounters with the established "Greek community." I show that for men in their 20s 
and early 30s, differences of age, but also of culture and education forged a sense of being a 
marginalized and progressive generation in the Greek diaspora. In the second part of this chapter, 
I explore men's narratives of "reclaiming the political," demonstrating specific forms of 
sociality––solidarity, but also antagonism and distrust––that developed between different 
branches of the movement. In the third section, I place the problematic of political genealogy 
squarely into the analysis, documenting both the ways in which political inheritance continued to 
matter between activists themselves and between activists and the regime's representatives in 
Toronto.   
I. The Ambivalent Faces of "Community": Migrating to the Village 
 
From the first days I asked around, searching, trying to find some contact with Greeks who 
have formed an organization with the goal of restoring democracy in Greece. My cousin 
couldn't tell me anything, since he works day and night, cut off from every Greek element, 
in order to feed his four children. As I wrote in my last letter, there is here, unfortunately, 
another Greek town "me oti afti borei na exei mesa tis" [with whatever she is able to hold 
within her]: the politically-ignorant, the indifferent, the "me, if I don't work, no one will 
feed me," the workers, the "restoran man" [restaurant men], the scientists and the priests. 
Here, in this other Greek town, with the successful and the unsuccessful, with their Greek 
mixed together with their Hellenized English, every afternoon after work, I set off for my 
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house....I stop at a disc store that stays open all night, browsing the rich collections of 
classical music. Most of the time, I find cheap copies of performances by Soviet and Czech 
orchestras for just a dollar. Slowly, I've put together a collection that helps me escape from 
the wretchedness and alienation of this "frikis" [horror] they call immigratsia. Most 
nights, I study English. I have to overcome the barriers of the language, because, as the 
situation evolves, I'll only be seeing Greece in post cards for a long time [my translation]. 
This is the description of a new migrant's first months in Toronto, having left Athens with the 
"junta at his feet." Apostolos wrote these words (under a pseudonym) in a 600-page work of 
historical fiction that is based, in part, on his own experiences. I met Apostolos nearly three years 
ago, just as he was completing his first draft. Understandably, his reflections in our interview had 
a literary quality to them—rich in detail, emotive and intimate. He had, after all, spent a year 
churning over sites, relationships, conversations and his own intentions in the labour of writing. 
Before I had even asked a question, Apostolos warned me that he had not spoken English in 
many years and that I "might not like" what he had to say. He elaborated, "Because, how can I 
say it...You know, I never set my two feet in Canada. One foot remained always in Athens, the 
other was sinking into the Atlantic. I didn't pass with both feet."   
 Apostolos' expression of suspension, and his figure of the strolling migrant, invites a 
alternative reading of migrant arrivals to Toronto in the late 1960s. The site that the 
contemporary reader might hurriedly identify as "The Danforth" or "Greektown,"––the street 
lined with Greek restaurants and home of the Greek community's annual parades and festivals––
is narrated here as a space of distantiation, alienation and contempt. The only respites are a 24-
hour record store (now disappeared) and a personal collection of foreign music, claimed against 
the "horrors" of "immigratsia. "The Danforth" as a site of Greek ethnicity has not yet been 
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constructed as such, and the spectacle that Apostolos narrates is a hodgepodge of Greek villagers 
and "professionals," and a cacophony of dialects muted only by the sounds of Shostakovich, 
Rachmaninoff and Stravinsky. In other words, in the space that others have cited as the 
"immigrant settlement" for Greek newcomers, Apostolos moves within the streets like a ghost, 
regarding his so-called "patriots" as if they were nothing more than figures on a postcard.  
 Apostolos' reflections refuse the figure of the "Greek community," illustrating instead a 
distrust that "context is in place" (Das 2007: 9). What kind of political subjectivity and what 
forms of sociality are possible in a space regarded as postcard? Yannis' account invites the same 
probing, albeit with slightly different implications: 
First of all, you had sexual needs, intellectual needs, social needs, to belong somewhere! 
You were learning new things, new mentalities, you had to face Greeks. You knew they 
were Greeks, but at the same time they were somehow speaking a different language. I had 
nothing to do with Greeks from other parts of the country! [...] You know, when they 
migrated in the 50s, most of these people were directly from the mountains, with a stop 
over [on an island] to take the boat  to Canada [...] What was Toronto before we arrived? 
We are speaking about a very conservative community! I mean their thinking was from a 
different time! 
The perceived differences of urbanity and rurality, between north and south, and between 
generations were discussed extensively in this way. Regarding those who had already 
"established" themselves, one interviewee said reproachfully, "by the time we arrived, they had 
all changed their names! Iannis was John! Kostas was Gus!" In the context of the political and 
social dynamics that I laid out in chapter three, one can better imagine both the motivation of 
those arriving in the post-civil war years to "shed" their name through the well-established 
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process of anglicization, as well as the dismay of those arriving in the 1960s at giving up 
something so culturally entrenched. Why change your name in a land that does not recognize its 
political significations and in which you have no record? In this sense, "they had already 
changed their names" is quite a bit more complex than an expression of mere cultural 
assimilation. 
 Yannis was not alone in describing what he saw as a "museum," familiar in some sense, 
but "at least a generation behind" in terms of cultural reference points. Rather than their own 
beloved songs––songs which had been banned in Greece but could still be acquired through 
underground channels and, of course, played and performed at a distance from authorities––it 
was bouzouki music that came out of the "dog houses of the Danforth." The latter were popular 
with mostly middle-aged, working-class men. This significant gap in generational and political 
cultures, then, is at the heart of how the Danforth of the 1960s gets constructed by interviewees; 
first, as obsolete and only later as a meaningful space of sociality. Posed otherwise, this to ask, 
how a "hot spot"—in this case, a site of supposed "Greek ethnicity"— is ontologically defined 
through the migrant's own perceptions?" (van Dijk 2011: 106).  
 Yannis was born to an Armenian mother and a working-class father— the two having met 
in Athens "somewhere under the moon of the second world war." Unlike many of those 
interviewees discussed in chapter three, Yannis had not been filed based on his family's political 
ascription. As a young man, he became involved in the Lambrakis Youth, a political movement 
sparked by the 1963 assassination of peace activist Grigoris Lambrakis and rooted in the growing 
contempt for the repressive state control of everyday life and lack of political freedoms. Within a 
year of Lambrakis' murder, the movement had attracted over 20,000 members and was steadily 
increasing (Kassimeris 2001: 47). In fact, the movement was expressed as a cultural and political 
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flourishing "despite enormous pressure and persecution from an omnipresent secret police" 
(ibid). From his home in Toronto, Thanos described it as a sense of something moving, a hesitant 
but promising awakening: 
You have to understand that the regime was very oppressive. We could not express our 
thoughts! We could not write what we wanted! We needed to find a way out, so we created 
cultural associations in different neighbourhoods in order to express ourselves and to be 
with others who were going through the same situation. You understand? It was for 
survival. And we would be going to different neighbourhoods for our meetings, because 
everyone knew us in our own streets. Not that the police did not know about our efforts 
and that they did not raid our meetings! But's its true that these cultural organizations, by 
promoting literature, poetry, the arts, they brought about a renaissance. Think about 
Theodorakis' music––it first became known through those organizations. And poetry! 
There was political thought, but it was so covered by the arts that we almost didn't take it 
to be political. Listen, I am coming to the end of my life now, and I can say that I loved 
that time. We had music in Greece like never before!  But it didn't come from one day to 
another...we had different metamorphoses, where everything, I suspect, was moving from 
different roads but towards the same river. And the river must have been something 
wonderful, because they created the junta to stop it! 
The perspective that Thanos lends here is crucial, as these creative "rivers" were not developed 
in the previous chapter's discussion of "living in the file." We can better understand, then, why 
the lack of evidence of this "new wave" in Toronto was so deeply lamented—especially for those 
who had participated in the movement but also for those who had come to love the music of 
Theodorakis and the poets he had popularized through his compositions. 
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 Yannis' activities came under the scrutiny of neighbourhood authorities and soon after, he 
experienced first-hand the brutality of the new regime. Beaten and then imprisoned overnight, he 
managed to leave Greece a few days after his release through illicit routes: 
I went to Switzerland because I was stupid enough to believe it was a neutral country and 
asked for political asylum in Geneva. This was 1968. It took them 11 hours to deport me. 
To my luck, there was, in Geneva, the World Council of Churches. Greece, being a 
member, Canada being a member, and Soviet Union being a member, I had the right to go 
there and to say, "I have a deportation order and I can not go back to Greece. Tell me what 
to do." They said, "OK, you have two choices, either the Soviet Union or Canada." So I 
signed a promissory note of repayment for whatever expenses to pack me to Canada with a 
nice tie around my neck and I went to Toronto.42  And that's how it was. One day you are 
here and the day after you are there and you don't know what is going on. No money, no 
job. My English, you know, from Plaka,43 was "Hi my name is Yannis. You have pretty 
blue eyes, let's go and make love." You know, silly things. Well, they told me that there 
were a number of Greeks on the Danforth, so I went. I entered into a restaurant and I said, 
"I'm Greek and I'm hungry."  They said, "Please come in." And that was my first job, 
washing dishes. 
Yannis soon became acquainted with other newcomers who, like him, passed their days between 
tiny rented rooms in the area and the kitchens of the Danforth restaurants. In the evenings he 
would join them at a small Greek coffee house, "Esperides" on Yonge Street. Soon after his 
arrival, the "Trojan Horse" was born on the Danforth, becoming a popular boîte for young, 
progressive Greeks (whose numbers were increasing by the day). Yannis elaborated: 
                                               
42 Yannis was the only interviewee who claimed to have acquired refugee status. 
43 Plaka, of course, is the neighborhood surrounding the Acropolis and is very popular with tourists. 
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 In order to have our own little circle, we had to gather all of our forces, and the Trojan 
horse [became] the center of our existence. Usually, there were no more than 30 or 40 of 
us, you know, under very very difficult conditions. I mean, jobs...Most of us were here or 
there, part-time bartender, waiter, you know, jobs that could not support us to make us feel 
secure that this part of our salary goes to rent, blah blah blah. It was, "today I have money, 
so I give you something." It was a very very hard space for us, so the Trojan Horse really 
[became] the center of our survival. 
In the years of the Junta, the Trojan Horse became the regular meeting place for progressive 
Greeks. The music of Theodorakis played at all hours, musical groups were formed, and a 
constant conversation was nightly constructed around news from home, political developments 
and the shared struggles of finding work, paying the rent and learning the language. It was the 
locus of brainstorming and planning for local initiatives to support newcomers arriving daily and 
for "hundreds of cultural activities." Even after the fall of the Greek regime in 1974, this creative 
wave continued, explained Yannis, reaching an apex with "progressive names of the Left" (like 
Manos Loizos and Christos Leontis) arriving in Toronto for performances. In this sense, the 
Danforth was slowly reframed as a cultural and political "hotspot" for progressives, through a 
combination of many labours, common points of struggle and the desire to "belong somewhere":  
[...] And not only to do it, but to export it: to Montreal, to Chicago, New York and back to 
Toronto. [An] unofficial bridge was created between Athens and Toronto directly, outside 
the commercial framework. Because, what was Greek Canada until then? OK: Bouzouki. 
Who sings at the bouzouki place?  All the leftovers of the cultural material of Greece that 
come to Toronto, all the seamen go there to get drunk, fuck, and listen to shit. So, the 
commercial part of [Greeks]...they were the ones responsible for the one-hour of Greek 
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TV, for the radio. They were involved in all this mentality. So, they would bring the 
leftovers to Toronto––the ones that could not even make money in Athens, but had names 
thirty years [prior]––in what we call "dog houses" OK? To sing here.... 
This "unofficial bridge" can be read as both a cumulative effort—an antidote—against a very 
specific and dominant figure of the "Greek community" and a collective revision of Apostolos' 
lonely figure, standing "on the stairs over the Atlantic, suspended, without reaching the other 
coast."  
 Consider too, that these changes of space and forms of sociality occured just four 
kilometres away from the storied center of progressive and left youth culture in Toronto. In its 
day, Yorkville "served as a crossroads for Toronto's youth, as a venue for experimentation with 
alternative lifestyles and beliefs, and as an apparent refuge from the dominant culture and the 
stifling expectations it had placed upon them" (Henderson 2011: 8). Yorkville had undergone its 
own process of transformation, as diverse groups––"politicians, hippies, journalists, bikers, 
'greasers,' 'speed-freaks,' shop owners and 'teenyboppers' alike"––engaged in its "continuous 
making and remaking"(7). Henderson further notes that "by 1964 most young Torontonians (and 
many young Canadians) likely knew that excitement and Yorkville went together as fingers 
interlaced. By 1970, however, most would have known that the excitement had fled, and it was 
time to look elsewhere" (8).44  
 To some extent, the Trojan Horse did attract those who had previously been active in the 
"Yorkville scene," including artists, poets and a few "progressive types" later involved in the 
                                               
44 "Since the 1970s, and even more so today, Yorkville has been known [...] as the Rolls- Royce of 
Toronto neighbourhoods. Flashy, absurdly wealthy, home to martini bars and salons and overpriced 
restaurants, Yorkville is defined by the kinds of joints where conspicuous people wear three-hundred-
dollar sunglasses inside at midnight, during the Toronto International Film Festival, hoping to be 
mistaken for a movie star" (Henderson 2011: 6)  
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NDP. Those I interviewed described the clientele of Trojan Horse as "mostly male," with a few 
"Greek girlfriends" and a smattering of "Canadian girls." In reference to the latter, one 
interviewee mused, "they came and ordered a coffee and a Greek to go." Beyond references to 
university classrooms and those specific events where Canadian representatives were asked to 
speak on behalf of the "Greek cause," interviewees narrate very little daily interactions with 
"native Torontonians."45  
 "Its hard to believe that it all happened here," Lukas said with a sigh. We had been sitting 
together in his popular restaurant on the Danforth, discussing the "music scene back then" and 
browsing through old photos of the Trojan Horse. Lukas had "jumped ship" as a young sailor, 
lived undocumented in Toronto for some years and was granted citizenship through Trudeau's 
amnesty in 197246. Like Yannis, he had passed the first months in Toronto washing dishes on the 
Danforth. When the owner overheard him singing to himself, he said, "that's some voice, come 
sing for us." Lukas found himself relocated from the back kitchen to front stage, collecting good 
tips for performing and waiting tables. Many years later, he opened his own restaurant. "And 
now, I'm still here washing dishes," he exclaimed with a laugh. "I'm one of the only ones left 
around here." Lukas explained that by the mid-80s, "the scene" had slowed right down, as many 
Greeks left the area to buy houses in the suburbs or returned to Greece. With the end of the 
dictatorship, explained Lukas, "all those revolutionary songs" became somehow out of place. 
                                               
45 There are, of course, important exceptions. A few of my interviewees told me that they had serious 
relationships with Canadian women and three ended up marrying women who were not from Greek 
families.  
46"Assent was given to amendments to the Immigration Appeal Board Act. The universal right of appeal 
from a deportation order was abolished and provisions were made to clear up the backlog. Appeals from 
deportation orders were limited to landed immigrants, people arriving at the border who had been issued a 
visa overseas and "bona fide refugees". Persons in Canada since 30 November, 1972, were given 60 days 
to apply for adjustment of status. More than 39,000 people from over 150 countries obtained immigrant 
status" (Report by the Canadian Council of Refugees). (https://ccrweb.ca/en/hundred-years-immigration-
canada-part-2) June 1 2014 
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That they continued to have a force and an audience throughout the late 70s was credited largely 
to the presence of young Chileans, exiled by Pinochet's 1973 coup. A few excellent musicians 
eventually made their way to the Danforth, and the Trojan Horse in particular, where they began 
collaborating with Greek musicians who had already made a name for themselves. The band, 
"Companeros," was formed, producing music in both Greek and Spanish and bringing "new 
blood" to the progressive scene on the Danforth. 
 These initial reflections on men's narratives are important in two respects: First, they warn 
against any homogenous treatment of the Danforth as a mere "immigrant settlement" or any 
inclination to see Greeks living in the area as a "community." Second, they remind us that, in 
speaking about political genealogies, as I have done at length in the previous chapter, we have to 
acknowledge that not all of those participating in Toronto's anti-dictatorship movement had 
experienced state repression on account of their family backgrounds. In the case of Apostolos 
and Yannis, for example, it was their involvement in the Lambrakis movement in the mid-1960s 
that caught the attention of local authorities and eventually made them targets of the Junta's 
henchmen. Taken together, their accounts represent an alternative political genealogy to the one I 
have opened this dissertation with. 
II. (Re)claiming the Political  
 
Those who organized themselves in the first days against the military junta in Toronto had 
immigrated to Canada a few years earlier. These were men who had left Greece with the 
intentions of staying in Canada and had begun to establish themselves in their new city. When 
the news of the coup came, on the evening of April 21st, 1967, it was a shock for Thanos and 
Kristos. Kristos was thirty-three at the time and had been working at a large Canadian 
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manufacturing company. He recalls his efforts "to be middle class, trying to have a nice happy 
life in a civilized country and suddenly, on the evening of April 21st, it was like a wild horse 
kicked my head." Re-enacting for me the first conversation he had with his closest friend, 
Thanos, he explains that "it was as if all the ancestors woke up in us." By the following evening, 
they had managed to bring together "a hundred or so Greeks" in front of the local Orthodox 
church to condemn the illegal regime. This was the first act of public protest and the earliest 
manifestation of the anti-dictatorship movement in Toronto. 
 Both Thanos and Kristos were Canadian citizens when the Junta came to power––
something that marks their stories as quite distinct from most others. We met Thanos in the 
previous chapter, as one of the "fakelomeni" ("the filed"). Having been involved in the "creative 
river" he so beautifully captured above, Thanos left Athens when he fell under the even 
heightened scrutiny of local authorities. Kristos' migration was very unique in the sense that he 
was a landed immigrant from the moment of his arrival. In a curious way, Kristos insisted that he 
too had left Greece due to the weight of his political inheritance: "My family was a political 
family since the early 1900s and we had members in parliament at that time. People came to us 
for favours and, as a young person, I was disgusted. I wanted to avoid all that." As the grandson 
of a well-known Venizelist (liberal), Kristos yearned for anonymity abroad. 
 When they staged their first protest, Kristos and Thanos did so without having had any 
experience with political organizing in Canada, although Thanos, as we already know, had been 
involved in "cultural" youth groups in Athens. Of this event and the days after, Kristos recalled 
the initial orientations of those gathering and the discouraging interventions by the Greek 
embassy: 
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At least 100 came that first day, a large group, including the so-called elite of the Greek 
community––intellectuals, professors, business people––but then something happened that 
probably characterizes coups of this kind [...] There was a guy there who agreed to print 
some leaflets for us to hand out [...] You know, telling people to come to Toronto City Hall 
for another demonstration [...] But he just disappeared. We were supposed to meet a few 
days later, but we couldn't find him. Then some of the leaders of the community––
professors, senior executives––disappeared as well. "Where were you?" "Where are you?" 
we asked them. "We called you...." "Well," one says, "they called me and they said my 
mother would...[that they] would cut her pension." Somebody else said, "I have a brother 
in the army and he is a captain and if I don't shut up he will be kicked out." Or whatever 
else they do. Everyone had a relative. Everyone had something to lose. 
This emphasis on the potential risk to loved ones is a theme I will discuss at length below; it is 
important in so far as it suggests a continuity in the forms of sociality I analysed in the previous 
chapter. In addition, Kristos suggests that, from the very first days, the anti-dictatorship 
movement was structured along politicized lines and a target of intervention by Greek 
authorities. It is certainly true that interviewees report having felt anxious about intimidations of 
this kind and held the belief that what they were doing in Toronto was risky and consequential 
for loved ones back home. 
 In trying to reconstruct for me the "who" of the movement, Kristos surmised that the main 
protagonists were Greeks of the working class who had migrated to Canada in the years prior to 
the coup and a steady stream of young newcomers who left shortly after the junta came to power. 
Kostas, who we met in the previous chapter in the context of his "divided" family (having a 
"democratic" father, a "communist" mother and sister, and a "right-wing" brother), came to 
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Canada as a tourist and then was sponsored by his father's sister in Montreal. He details how he 
became involved in the movement in Toronto: 
We had agreed on everything. [My uncle] showed me my room. He had decided what I 
would study: I would become a dentist [laughs]. Yes, because his son was a professor of 
medicine [...] so I should be a dentist [...] He took me and dressed me up properly. Oh, 
what else? Who I was going to marry, this was decided for me too! And he said, "On one 
condition. No politics!" But to please me, he brought me Greek newspapers. And on the 
first page, there was my old friend who was underground and who had been arrested. They 
had pulled out all of his hair. So I started swearing and he said, "Didn’t I say no politics?" I 
said, "Fuck you!" and left. It happened the first days I was there and I left for Toronto. 
Kostas had encountered the first signs of what he later referred to as the "apolitical Greeks," who 
others similarly described as "unaffected," "apathetic," and "indifferent." Upon his arrival in 
Toronto, and searching for signs of organizing, he discovered very quickly that "the community" 
was basically a group of "indifferent immigrants" and that it was dominated by the Orthodox 
church and the Greek embassy. Another interviewee said with exasperation, "What was this 
'Greek community?!' Nothing but an artificial union of people that become members completely 
"efkeriaka" [by chance]." Apostolos' written portrayal of local hegemony is particularly incisive: 
Here exist two primary poles around which the Greeks concentrate: the church and the 
local organizations. The first is clearly a politico-economic organization, where you pay in 
order for them to baptize you, to marry you and to bury you. At the same time, and as 
usual, when it can't be the only power, it becomes indistinguishable from the political; that 
is, the Junta. As for the others, the local organizations..."What news do you have from the 
village? Come to the celebration of our organization! We'll have souvlaki, mousaka, 
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keftedakia [meatballs] and...kefi [good mood]!" Unfortunately, nobody can expect 
anything from them, neither from the one nor the other. Their difference is this: While the 
role of the church is something like an informal embassy of the Junta, most local 
organizations are her branches [my translation]. 
Another interviewee claimed that "this bunch" took to the street only once, in 1974, when the 
Turkish forces occupied Cyprus. "But this was because it reached their national feelings ––about 
the Greek Cypriots––not their politics," he explained. 
 Apostolos joined the "Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Greece," an 
organization established in Toronto, in August 1967, with the manifesto for all Greeks of 
Toronto––"the free part of Greeks [...] of all political colours"––to take a stand against the illegal 
regime.47 While the elected representatives of this organization were from both "communist" and 
"democratic" backgrounds and had a stated prerogative of "welcoming anyone against the junta," 
one interviewee recalled that there was a "definite red colour over" the group. This sentiment 
was shared by others and sits awkwardly aside claims that The Committee was a broad group of 
democratic people organized with the sole purpose of overthrowing the illegal regime. Pavlos, a 
supporter of the (banned) Greek Communist Party (KKE) at the time, commented on the 
formative presence of the "old guard": 
I met those old persons. They were the first ones to immigrate here. Many of them were 
left–– communist, organized, non-organized, followers––they were the first ones who 
made an anti-dictatorship movement. They were the first ones to make a political 
organization against the junta [...] and they were quite a bit older than me, the previous 
generation. They had an organization called "Sparta" before the Junta and they had been 
                                               
47 Neos Kosmos (August 25, 1967). 
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helping  the left movement in Greece economically and politically after the civil war, 
sending money to the families of the exiled... 
Stavros, who arrived in Toronto in the winter of 1967, similarly recalled an older group of men 
who were "communist to the bone." "You have to realize," he began, "that at that time we were, 
what, let's say 20, 25 years from the civil war?" After silently doing the math in his head to 
confirm, he continued, "There were many people from the ranks of the Communist Party and 
from ELAS,48 many of them. Especially the Greek butchers of the St. Lawrence market. Maybe 
50, 60 of them, of the old generation of fighters." Stavros explained that this older generation of 
Greek immigrants were effective organizers, experienced in clandestine activity and connected to 
anti-junta activists abroad. 
 Pavlos was eager to speak about the early days of the movement, when there was a "sense 
of solidarity" and a shared commitment to raising awareness about the repressive regime:  
We were making handouts and distributing them to show Canadians that where democracy 
was born, it was no longer, making pamphlets in English about those who were being 
tortured. We were protesting the role of the government. The Committee for the 
Restoration of Democracy was a solid, solid group. But it's true that the major role, you 
know, politically and ideologically, was taken by the communists. No matter if the KKE 
was underground, it always found a way.  And we welcomed anyone who wanted to 
restore democracy in Greece [...] You know, they had the Voice of Truth, a radio station, 
and once a week a communist newspaper was issued in London [UK] and we were 
receiving some others also from Greek political refugees in the socialist countries, 
                                               
48 ELAS  ("Greek People's Liberation Army"), formed in 1942, was the military arm of the National 
Resistance against the German occupation during WWII.   
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announcing the decisions of the KKE about this or that. They were sending books from 
Bulgaria, from the Soviet Union. We also raised money for the families of prisoners. 
The language of being on the vanguard of the movement emerged frequently within the 
narratives of active communists. This likely reflects the ideological discourse of the time, but 
also the experience of being marginalized as a group from the movement after the arrival of 
Andreas Papandreou in 1969. I will pick up on this  thread again below.  
 When it was announced that young King Constantine would be visiting Toronto, in August 
1967, to participate in an international sailing competition, the Committee called for all 
"democratic Greeks of Canada" to come out in protest.49 By refusing to denounce the military 
junta, the king had discredited himself in the eyes of democrats, who were already against 
monarchical rule of Greece. In the days before the royal's arrival, the president of The 
Committee was accused publicly of insinuating that Constantine would be subjected to a 
"continuous ordeal" during his visit––words that caused the King's supporters to ring alarmist 
bells about violent demonstrations.  
 Interviewees participated in a multisite protest, which began with picketers outside of the 
airport and along the highway leading into the downtown core. Others met in Queen's Park—in 
numbers which led some interviewees to claim that Toronto had never seen such 
demonstrations.50 Placards of "Don't Make Greece another Vietnam" and "Democracy for 
                                               
49 Neos Kosmos (August 25, 1967). 
50  At Queen's Park, religious leaders (including a rabbi and a pastor from the United Church), 
representatives of local organizations (including "The Voice of Women") and the NDP showed their 
support with short speeches. A member of the Committee proposed and read aloud the points of a 
"psisma" (resolution) to the crowd: The Fascist regime was to step down; political prisoners and those in 
exile were to be set free; immediate efforts to establish a democratic parliament should be made; the king 
should recognize his limited role, as defined by the constitution, and refrain from involving himself in 
Greek politics. The crowd clapped loudly to show acceptance of each point. A small group gathered later 
in front of the Park Plaza Hotel to deliver the proposal to the King. With the supportive and well-known 
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Greece" filled the park. "Foreigners looked on in astonishment, not having ever seen such a thing 
in Toronto," the Greek newspaper, Neos Kosmos, reported days later. "Den Xortainei to mati," 
(the "eye could not be satisfied") and the King and the "Ksenoi" (foreigners) had seen something 
"from the chest of the Greek people." 51 
 Some attending the protest still remember the haunting figure of a young Greek girl, 
dressed as Athena, enchained on a float and surrounded by men in Nazi uniforms. This photo 
made the front page of the Toronto Star, while the Globe and Mail published a photo of one 
interviewee with a placard raised as if to strike. "That made things difficult with my landlord," 
said Petros. "The picture made me look like an angry terrorist, so I denied it was me!"      
 This event convinced some interviewees that the democratic element of the community 
was must stronger than they had originally thought. "We were amazed," said Kristos, "and we 
had Canadians asking us how we were able to organize such a large crowd!" Neos Kosmos 
boasted that the police congratulated the group for demonstrating "so democratically" (meaning, 
of course, in a disciplined manner) and Kristos added, "we had our own people, security guards, 
to keep our own in line." This emphasis on the democratic mode of protesting was a measured 
response to those who had been warning of violent demonstrations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
rabbi by their side, activists entered the hotel, were told that it was a matter for the embassy and were then 
escorted out. After walking "2 miles in the rain" to take the letter to the embassy, protestors found the 
doors locked. After persistently ringing the bell, a “very polite young night guard came and received the 
vote” reported Neos Kosmos (September 1, 1967). 
51 Neos Kosmos (September 1, 1967) . 
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Figure 4: "...something from the chest of the Greek people" 
 
 
The desire to "show something from the chest of the Greek people" was also expressed in 
accounts of men's encounters with "Canadians." "Generally, to go to a new country is an 
experience that I want everybody to avoid," said Markos. He added, "especially if you are a 
sensitive person." He recalled the typical exchange he would have with Canadians: "When they 
asked, I would say 'I am Greek'. 'Ah, such nice weather you have over there! Why would you 
leave it?!" Shaking his head, he added, "Yeah, we all dealt with that." Of the same kind of 
ignorance, Yannis was less forgiving: "Greece! Yes, what a lovely country! Lovely islands, we 
have! Ah, you've been to Naxos? How nice!  But 10 miles from that island is another with 
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10,000 political prisoners and these people have families and they are hungry! Can you help us 
please?!" This was, of course, the semi-imagined conversation Yannis had in his head when 
confronted with the question, "Where are you from?" 
 Thousands gathered again in April of 1968 for an event narrated with profound 
ambivalence. The coming of Andreas Papandreou is a symbolically schizophrenic placeholder 
for both all that was right with the movement and all that was destined to destroy it. Apostolos 
writes: 
Who would expect that this city would be converted into a "resistance" stronghold? Living 
here in his family's mansion, in the aristocratic suburbs of "King City": the "Leader of the 
Resistance." But let's start from the beginning.  After his departure from Sweden and his 
stay in the country of enemies [the US], he would be visiting us here, in the city of Toronto, 
due to our  large democratic movement and from here he would preach the "eiper pandon 
agona" [lit. "struggle for the sake of all"]. The Committee for the Restoration of 
Democracy in Greece [...] had undertaken the preparations for his reception. It had to be 
an "upodoxi sullalitirio" [reception-demonstration],  capable of rousing the Greeks of the 
diaspora, of sending a message of resistance and a condemnation as loud as possible 
against the junta. No one from the Committee offered even the slightest criticism. Without 
reservations, and all together, we worked to rouse the people, calling our friends and 
acquaintances throughout North America. We had neither the same ideas nor the same 
political past; with us were the Communist Party, old fighters, centrists who waited for him 
like the Messiah, Lambrakides [from the Lambrakis movement] and even some right-wing 
antifascists. In the end, with patience, we had managed to bring together as many as we 
could in this joint effort. And yet, some of the old men who had passed through the fire of 
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the Resistance and the Civil war, clenched their teeth and shook their head, certain that he 
would break us apart and that the unity of the whole anti-dictatorship forces would be 
added to the pile of lost dreams [my translation].  
Andreas Papandreou: Harvard-trained professor of economics, son of the ex-Prime Minister 
George Papandreou, and father to little George Jr., who would himself become Prime Minister 
forty years later. Andreas Papandreou had begun his political career in 1964, when he was 
elected to the Greek parliament as MP of his father's Center Union Party. His outspoken protests 
against foreign interventions in Greece, critiques of NATO, as well as his imprisonment and 
exile in 1967 rendered him a controversial international political figure with quite a lot of public 
appeal. In February 1968, Papandreou had established the "Panhellenic Liberation Movement" 
(PAK) in Stockholm and began actively raising awareness about  the plight of Greece throughout 
Europe and North America. 
 Papandreou's visit in April of 1968 marked the anniversary of the Colonel's coup. Several 
thousands gathered at Varsity Hall, leading interviewees to remark that it was the largest 
showing ever for a political figure in Toronto. 52 Laughing, Pavlos exclaimed, "Even Trudeau 
didn't attract those crowds!" Another interviewee remembered that his "knees shook" with the 
thrill of standing among so many democratic Greeks and of hearing his native tongue spoken in 
such a massive public forum. Papandreou's speech, recalls Apostolos, was charged, emotive, 
revolutionary––all the elements a young Marxist would wish to hear from a popular political 
leader. And then, as Apostolos narrated it to me, came the moment of awareness at just that point 
in the speech when Papandreou was evoking the epitaph of the fallen Spartans: "And if we fall in 
                                               
52 The Toronto Star estimated 7,000 greeted Papandreou at Varsity Hall 
"7,000 Greeks Scream and Chant Welcome to Exiled Papandreou," Toronto Star, April 8, 1968: B25 
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the beautiful struggle for democracy, we won't expect anything but a humble placard, on which 
will be written for the one who passes, 'Go tell the Spartans, passerby, that here, obedient to their 
laws, we lie.'" Apostolos "lost his words." 
 
Figure 5: "They waited for him like the Messiah" 
 
 
In Apostolos' written account of this moment of awareness, it is more collectively elicited in the 
company of his comrades. One in particular––an old partisan who "had counted Makronisos 
stone by stone [and] was one of the last who left, with a broken back but with his head held 
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high"53––signaled with a low-toned curse that Andreas was looking for nothing but adventures. 
"I hope I come out a liar," warns the old man, "but I think he'll break us."     
 In the days after, as Neos Kosmos threw its absolute and unreserved support behind 
Papandreou, Apostolos and others were on edge with a new piece of information: Andreas 
Papandreou had been offered a position at York University in the department of Economics.  
"You see, Katherine," said another interviewee, "he had not come here as a liberator. He was 
looking for a job."  But Alexis, a communist who had lost family members in the civil war, was 
moved by Papandreou's speech and waited in the long line to thank him for the strong, public 
stance he had taken against the dictatorship: 
I was impressed with many of the things he had said, so I waited to have a chance to speak 
with him. When I reached him, I shook his hand. I was emotional, and I said, "Thank you 
Mr. Papandreou." I told him what the communists were doing in Toronto and I explained 
that my father was imprisoned after the civil war and my uncle was killed..." But he 
gestured to come closer and said, "Are you still back there? We must exelichthoume 
[evolve]." I understood that what he had been saying was just words... 
Sharp words received as sudden betrayal. Alexis, added, "I've never forgotten that." Within a few 
months, Papandreou had taken up his position at York University, which he would hold until the 
fall of the Junta, in 1974. Alexis and others continued attending the meetings of the Committee 
for the Restoration of Democracy, sensing a growing tension between members. Apostolos and a 
few others believed it might be a good idea to speak with Papandreou "face to face" and made an 
appointment to see him at the university: 
                                               
53 Makronisos was a prison island during the civil war and up to the fall of the Junta. Today it is 
uninhabited.    
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Someone [...] said, "Mr. Papandreou, you said you are going to establish here PAK. You 
saw the welcome that we planned..." "Oh yes," said Papandreou, "I thought it was Athens!" 
"Well, OK, we have done that united. All the antifascist and anti-junta forces of the people. 
Now, if you are going to create, to establish another anti-junta organization, from where 
are you going to attract people around you? People here in Toronto are either [...] with the 
junta, indifferent people [or] against the junta and those against are in this committee 
already. It is impossible to attract from the indifferent people, because they are indifferent 
and they will stay indifferent. So, [...] do you know what is going to happen? You are 
going to take people out of the Committee. And that is going to be another pull of 
attraction, and in future times [...] we'll lose our target, the junta, and we are going to end 
up fighting each other." "Oh," Papandreou said, "No, no, no, we are another story all 
together. We have nothing to do with that. We are an armed force [and] we are going to 
train [men] in lake Ontario, in order to attack the junta." This kind of bullshit! You know? 
"We are an armed struggle, we are not a committee for restoration, we are a liberation front 
and we are going to establish and start an armed struggle against the junta." And we all lost 
our words! We didn't know what to say! "He's a joker," we said. 
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Figure 6: "Are you still back there?" 
 
 
Soon after, the Committee called for a meeting to elect a new council for the organization. It's 
this event that is narrated in quite a few interviews as the "breaking point," at which more or less 
latent antagonisms were suddenly unambiguously exposed. In the middle of proceedings, 
someone evoked the "two extremes," referring to the Junta's henchmen in Toronto but also the 
communists "lurking" on the corners. Nikos remembers trying to calm the storm this created 
among attendees but, despite his efforts, only a few members of the Committee remained behind. 
"This is all we needed to fall apart," he said sadly. 
 Quite often, those who migrated to Papandreou's PAK reflected on this split in the 
Committee as "inevitable" and nothing more than a reflection of the wider political conflict in 
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Greece. Some suggested that it was a split provoked by the communists, so keen on putting their 
"stamp" on everything. Yannis spoke candidly about this frustrating tendency:  
There was this conservative element...how to convince the Greeks that what we were doing 
was right. First problem. Second: How to convince the communists not to mention that. I 
mean, ok, you are communist, I don't give a shit [...] because my job is to overthrow the 
Junta. When the Junta is overthrown and the Greek parliament opens, go there! Bravo, 
Yes! Go and do your fight! But right now, you are doing a great deal of harm to us! Shut 
up! Down with the Junta! Mexri ekei kai tipote allo [Up to there, and nothing more!] [...] 
But it was a constant struggle with the Communist Party. We were always having to deal 
with the fact that they wanted to define and stamp everything [...] To put their name on 
everything, you know? We are going to write on the poster that this is organized by the 
Communist Party. But why?!  
And yet, from the perspective of others—not all of whom were communists—this obsession with 
not "stamping" the movement can be seen as an extension of precisely the kind of censoring of 
the left that many had sought to evade. Speaking about visions of a future Greece—the stuff of 
"real politics"—was essential, and there was no reason to believe that protesting against the junta 
should be incompatible with an analysis of the political and economic structures of the country. 
Especially for those who identified with the history of left persecution or who felt themselves to 
be explicitly caring the weight of this interpolation, the movement against the junta was an 
opportunity to contest their degraded genealogy (not the genealogy itself, but the degradation of 
it), to imagine a kind of reconciliation and to take an active part in the left struggle. For others, 
focused strictly on the regime and its illegality, the fall of the junta was an end in itself. In a 
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sense, men were working with different temporalities: one stretching back to (at least) the civil 
war, another to April 21st, 1967.  
  But what else could the fall of the junta represent for the Communist Party, having been 
banned since 1936 by both right-wing and center governments? Like the collaborators before 
them, the Junta's men and their descendants would appear as familiar faces in parliament, 
explained Nikos. The forces would reproduce themselves, as they had done for many decades, 
with or without this specific regime. Understandably, many communists were preoccupied with 
questions of political amnesty for political prisoners and provisions for families of the convicted. 
They were also vocally challenging the practices of surveillance, expressing the concern that this 
was continuing in Canada–– a position which led others to claim they were conspiracy theorists. 
 In this context, men narrate a series of retreats away from others, as well as the emergence 
of new groups. Having previously been located on the west end of Bloor, Rigas Feraios—the 
name under which the Communist Party was operating in Toronto—opened up an office on the 
Danforth. PAK opened a new office on the same street. In Apostolos' written account, this 
created a stale political environment: 
I have to tell you, living in the "free Greece of foreign lands," and whether or not I wanted 
it, I ended up passing through all [...] the democratic and anti-dictatorship places and they 
all had a similar character: "If you aren't one of us, you are against us." [...] There are 
clear and specified separations [...] But taking a distance from the political shops of 
immigration and the different representatives [...] who parade from shop to shop with their 
sacred words, we decided to do something in order to overcome the inaction: We 
established a newspaper. [...] The first issue has reached 10, 000 Greek homes, but I'm 
certain even more will read it...[my translation]. 
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Apostolos had decided to go to graduate school, finding at the University of Toronto a small 
group of like-minded students eager to express their frustrations and visions through more 
creative channels. Passing long days in classes and at the Robart's Library, they spent their nights 
at the Trojan Horse brainstorming the next edition of the student newspaper. 
 In fact, a good number of those I interviewed were pursuing university degrees during the 
years of the junta. Given that the opportunities to study for children of the left were limited, 
some were eager to register in universities and colleges as soon as they arrived. Their 
participation in the anti-dictatorship movement often took the form of, and was mediated by, 
student groups and initiatives. "Studying in Canada" also functioned as a blanket term for parents 
and siblings to minimize or obscure migrants' political activities under the scrutiny of the Greek 
authorities. 
 Students at York University and the University of Toronto were organized sporadically 
throughout the dictatorship. Inviting Greek intellectuals and activists for seminars, distributing 
anti-junta material on campus, and raising money for democratic student newspapers were 
among their typical activities. One student project that captured the attention of the media, in 
1971, was a campaign to challenge networks of exploitation that had been set up by "established" 
Greek Canadians. Under the cover of tourist offices,54 newcomers from Greece were offered 
translation or pseudo-government services by representatives claiming to liaison on their behalf 
in order to secure resident status or unemployment benefits, or to sponsor relatives remaining in 
                                               
54 Of these tourist agencies, Tamis and Gavaki (2002) writes that they "helped the sponsors at every stage, 
filling out the application forms, going with them to the immigration offices, translating and guaranteeing 
the loans for the immigrants' fares [...] and upon their arrival in Canada, the agencies were the only 
entities that could help the immigrants make sense of their new world, translate papers for them, and give 
them advice for action. They also helped many immigrants find a job" (118). That these networks may 
have involved exploitation (or indeed, remuneration of any kind) seems not to have entered Tamis and 
Gavaki's analysis. 
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Greece. Charging hundred of dollars to "simply fill in names and addresses," or arranging for the 
first of a series of government cheques to be sent to their office, rather than to clients, they took 
particular advantage of those without documents or with very little English. Sotiris was one of 
three students who set up a voluntary program at a church on the Danforth. Open at designated 
hours every day of the week, Sotiris estimated that they processed about 500 people in the first 
few months of operation. Eventually, they secured government funding to hire more regular 
employees and to keep longer hours of service. 
 At York University, there was also a small contingent of graduate students involved with 
PAK, some of whom were students of Papandreou. For Kostas, then a graduate student, 
Papandreou's presence at York was transformative; "You have to understand, he was a god at 
York. A king! I mean, suddenly, professors were coming and treating us like we were very 
respectable people!" Others similarly reflected on their rather sudden transformation from being 
"country boys" to "respectable people," with an awareness that this was entirely the result of 
Papandreou's position at York. According to Stavros, the social and political networks 
established in the university halls during the PAK years would later be important inroads to 
positions in post-dictatorship Greek, where Andreas Papandreou would lead the country as the 
"first ever socialist" prime minister. Stelios disagreed with the latent "populism" of the PAK 
movement, taking a critical distance from the "center of the action": "Remember, Katherine, we 
were just a bunch of country boys and we saw others like us accessing Papandreou's academic 
corridors of power...being called to "King City!" [...] It was like The Godfather, OK? Kissing the 
hand..[laughing]. We're talking jobs, baptism, patronage!" 
 Petros, who was studying political science and actively engaged in any efforts to 
undermine the junta "in or outside of the university," explained to me what it meant to be invited 
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for dinner at King City,55 where Papandreou had made his family home. After politely refusing a 
number of invitations by a central member of PAK and "close friend of Andreas," Petros 
eventually clarified to this man that if he wanted to be a member of PAK, he would have done 
so, rather than "wait for an invitation from Papandreou."  Critical of the kind of star-gazing that 
he felt characterized many of Papandreou's relations with students, Petros simply didn't want to 
get involved in King City affairs.   
 Spyros, then a graduate student in Economics, lamented having "wasted his time" 
attending all of the events put on by each organization individually. He recounted for me, with a 
shake of his head, one PAK meeting in which Papandreou announced that they were "Marxists 
but not Leninists." Spyros eventually concentrated his efforts in a small group of students who 
called themselves the "Anti-Dictatorship, Anti-Imperialist Front of Greeks Abroad." (AAMEE). 
Reflecting the break in 1968 within the Greek Communist Party between the Soviet-dominated 
party line and the "Eurocommunists," these students became associated with the latter, focusing 
on "democratic socialist" solutions to the problems of their country. Kostas was at the same 
meeting with Spryos and Papandreou and recalls feeling "relieved to hear [Papandreou's words]" 
because he was a Marxist and wanted to be "open about it." But, like Alexis above, who was 
disillusioned in his private exchange with Papandreou at Varsity Arena, Kostas surmised that 
"these were just words." Indeed, by those remaining closely identified to the Communist Party or 
the "left of the left," Papandreou was often associated with "mere words" and empty rhetoric. 
 Efforts to mobilize student unions were also taking place at the University of Toronto. 
Panayiotis, who was one of three interviewees to have immigrated to Canada with other 
                                               
55 King City is a town 50 km north of Toronto. 
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relatives, was a young undergraduate student in 1971. Involved with the Greek student union, he 
found himself in a constant struggle against the imperatives of the union to "avoid politics": 
Graduate students who had some exposure to the Greek University system were much 
more politically orientated. There was an organization of Greek students, some in 
McMaster, Western, and they would move between universities, in Hamilton, London. 
They would come and visit and try to organize the Greek student unions or the Greek club. 
There was a lot of involvement from those graduate students––they were politically left 
[...] I was, of course, much younger, so that's why I was chosen, after some discussion, to 
be the go-between, communicating between those arriving from Greece and the Canadians 
[of Greek descent] [...] And at the Robarts library, we would have 5 or 6 tables, in the 
cafeteria, Greeks and some Greek Canadians, and we would begin our political 
conversations at 9 o'clock in the morning! There were about 150 of us at the Greek student 
association, most of whom were born in Canada. Those of us who were chairmen or 
secretaries from Greece, wanted to position the union [...] We decided to write letters to the 
embassy saying that the Greek students disagree with this and that, but it was difficult to 
convince the other students to get involved in the Greek plight. [...]  How could it be their 
struggle? [...] So, I would say that the Greek Canadians, those not coming from Greece, 
tolerated us. But when we got into fights with the Greek community center, then they 
differentiated their position [....] Well, they stopped us from going forward, actually. You 
know, we would try to disrupt Greek community meetings, for example, by demonstrating 
in front of the church. But then they would disagree [...] I don't actually remember any 
Greek Canadians who got involved. 
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Of the same "tolerant" attitude, another interviewee began, "put it this way, if anyone was from 
the other side they would not be studying in Canada because they would have positions in the 
Greek university, right? They would be looked after by their side.” After pausing to find his 
words, he continued, "So anyone who emigrated to study had problems, ok? What would they 
have in common with Greek Canadians who had never experienced oppression?" Others echoed 
the distant relations between these two groups of young people and said that they couldn't "recall 
the face" of a single Greek Canadian––meaning here the children of those who had migrated to 
Canada ––who engaged in political initiatives during those critical years.  
III. The Return of the File in the Diaspora 
 
Having established some of the main points of contention and division in the movement against 
the Junta, I want to explore how men were positioned between the two states of the Canadian 
"liberal democratic government" and the Greek regime. Government archives of the period 
present us with a fairly clear picture of the Canadian state's position on the 1967 military coup, 
as well those migrating from Greece. Lester B. Pearson's liberal government spent the first days 
of the junta corresponding with Canadian ambassadors in Greece, Western Europe and the US. 
The dominant question was that of recognition. Given the co-membership of Greece and Canada 
in the NATO alliance, on the one hand, and the illegal character of the coup, on the other, how 
should Canada frame its relationship with the new regime? Correspondences between Canadian 
embassy officials in Greece and ministers in Ottawa reveal a careful diplomacy on the question:  
Embassy officials were told to avoid contact with any members of the new government—to not, 
for example, attend social events where they would be expected to shake the hand of a 
representative of the regime––until the issued could be analyzed. Eventually, the Canadian 
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government decided not to take an active position against the dictatorship, even when the 
Netherlands filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe and 
the Scandinavian contingent began pushing actively for the expulsion of Greece from the 
Council. While these countries were specifically calling on Canada to differentiate herself from 
the Americans, Pearson's government remained set on encouraging those in power to restore 
stability through elections, and urging democratic dialogue with the Greek government within 
NATO relations, rather than expulsion. 
 In May of 1967, the Pearson government was again specifically called upon by the 
Canadian Labour Congress and the Canadian, French, Danish and Norwegian delegates of the 
International Labour Organization to support efforts to block the regime's access to common 
markets and to back a complaint against Greece submitted to the governing body of the ILO. No 
efforts were made by the Pearson government to support these requests. When Trudeau came to 
power in April 1968, a year after the coup, Canada's official position did not change. Asked in 
parliament a number of times by NDP ministers to clarify Canada's relation to NATO funding of 
Greek arms and the support of an unelected regime, Trudeau insisted that Canadians' tax dollars 
were not supporting the military regime. NDP MPs repeatedly called on the liberal government 
to cut all diplomatic relations after the dictators implemented mock elections under martial law 
in September 1968. After the decision of the European Council, in December of 1969, to force 
the withdrawal of Greece from the council, Canada maintained its position that the best route to 
restoring democracy in Greece was by keeping it within diplomatic folds. Thus, despite a letter 
campaign by Greeks and a few Canadians, the Canadian government offered a consistent 
response throughout the period of the military junta. Nevertheless, Kristos and others recall one 
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small victory for the movement: Not one representative of the military junta came to Canada on 
an official visit during that period. 
 Of Andreas Papandreou, who the Toronto Star heralded as the "Exiled Greek Freedom 
Leader," 56  Canadian state agents appear initially cautious and then tolerant—a position 
interviewees often attributed to the "friendly" relations between Papandreou and Trudeau. The 
files kept on Papandreou in government archives reveal exchanges between the Minister of 
Foreign affairs and the Dean of York University concerning Papandreou's terms of employment. 
The Minister first insists that Papandreou agree to refrain from politically organizing in Canada 
as a condition of his employment. Although this was refused by the dean, Papandreou's 
employment was processed nonetheless. Later, when Papandreou was seeking travel documents, 
having been dispossessed of his Greek citizenship and passport, Canadian authorities again 
suggested that these be given on condition that he not use them for activities related to PAK. 
Based on Papandreou's extensive travelling during the course of his employment at York, 
throughout Europe and to the United States, we can probably conclude that authorities were only 
weakly committed to obstructing Papandreou's movements. This lack of genuine concern about 
the activities and whereabouts of Papandreou was not at all surprising for many interviewees––
especially those who were communists at the time. After all, Pavlos claimed, “Papandreou was 
one of their own guys”–– that is, part of the American-educated elite who were comfortably 
established in Canadian institutions at the time. Still, it should be noted that the establishment of 
foreign political organizations in Canada was illegal. For this reason, PAK––having the 
overthrow of the junta as its core objective––was always publicly termed "Friends of PAK" in 
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order to take a symbolic distance from these objectives. This is also true of the Greek 
Communist Party, which masqueraded under the name "Rigas Feraios." 
 Many of the men I spoke to—across political backgrounds—spoke of the "tolerant" stance 
of the Canadian state and the RCMP towards newcomers from Greece. In fact, interviewees were 
fond of saying that the Canadian state "treated me like a gentleman," while the Greek state 
"treated me like a criminal." Three of the men I interviewed were visited upon their arrival in 
Toronto by police officers, questioned about their political involvements in Greece and Canada, 
and cautioned to avoid trouble. "Do you associate with communists?" one officer asked plainly. 
Two of the three were sailors who "jumped ship" in 1968 and entered the country illegally. Both 
were subsequently deported but once again obtained papers through "unofficial" means and were 
back in Canada within a year. 
 Petros, who was visited by a police officer within 40 days of arriving in Toronto, recalls 
the conversation being "respectful" and the officer's manner "sympathetic." Petros believed that 
the Greek embassy had tipped off the RCMP to an "illegal alien," on orders of the Greek regime. 
In fact, Petros' mother had been visited many times in the weeks following his departure by 
officers enquiring into which local authority had granted him a passport and how he had 
managed to leave the country. His mother pleaded ignorant. 
 Speaking to Constantine in a quiet cafe in Toronto, I was told that although he could not be 
sure what the extent of the Canadian state's interest was in Greek activists, there was a palpable 
concern that activities were being observed:  
The guys did believe that the state was monitoring their activity. They were saying the 
RCMP was after them, they were checking the walls for bugs, saying they were being 
followed. But of course, some of these men, many really, were the sons of communists, 
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who had been exiled and some executed. They had been illegal, so they had to conspire for 
survival. So they learned this and assumed the same here. 
Of the Greek Embassy in Toronto, interviewees consistently voiced the belief that it was a 
vehicle of the junta, describing instances of surveillance, interference, and even direct threats. 
Some of these complaints came to the attention of journalists in the summer of 1969. A month-
long investigation by the Toronto Star documented complaints to police quarters in both 
Montreal and Toronto, formal accusations against members of the Greek embassy, and a request 
sent to the External Affairs Minister for state intervention.  Professor Portokalis claimed that in 
the years following the dictatorship, "a very efficient organized campaign" was created to 
"terrorize an entire community into silence" and to "quiet the opposition of oversees Greeks by 
the dictatorship in Athens."57 At the heart of this effort was a "system of informers and 
information, as well as just plain goons." A correspondent for The Toronto Star documented 70 
reported cases of intimidation in both cities. According to interviewees, threats were made 
against activists and their families in both Greece and Canada, and some were explicitly warned 
to stop their involvement in Canada because parents and siblings could face consequences at 
home. One man claimed he was asked to visit the embassy and was told by the consular that 
"they had information" about him, that he was to report back to the embassy regarding the 
activities of others in the movement against the dictatorship, and that he must "think of his 
father" and the position he stood to lose back in Greece if he did not comply with the request. 
Later, he discovered that his father had undergone repeated interrogations about his activities in 
Canada. There were also documented cases of violence: After receiving threatening calls 
warning against participation in anti-dictatorship activities, two men were attacked by a knifed 
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assailant on the way to a protest. This case went before the court. And in Montreal, the daughter 
of an outspoken critic of the dictatorship was threatened by a swerving car, the driver warning, 
"Tell your father that next time, I won't miss." In the summer of 1969, these threats were felt by 
some to be so serious as to constitute a community-wide injustice. An man quoted in the  
Toronto Star at the time explained, "There are two governments for us here [...] one is the 
Canadian government, which is little known to most immigrants. The other is the junta. It has its 
own machinery, its own police force, its own political party right here in Canada. We have not 
escaped."58  
 A member of the Greek Communist Party explained that, "we had this pressure when were 
in Toronto. People were talking and many were too afraid to come to gatherings. They feared 
that everyone was watching and they were hiding their faces from the cameras because everyone 
was saying that there were spies all over." In fact, the "regime's men" were suspected of 
infiltrating protests and opening meetings of political organizations. "There were many stories," 
explains Pavlos, "that men were pretending to be supporters and they would go and take words, 
take watch, in order to persecute the people. It was this climate of fear and intimidation." 
Giorgos adds, " I always had it in my mind that people who were in PAK, they might be double 
agents. One [didn't] know who to trust." The position of the Orthodox church in Toronto was 
also discussed with contempt by interviewees. In the days leading up to the protest against King 
Constantine's visit, one of my interviewees recalled the appalling threat from the Archbishop, 
warning that protestors "risked hell in the afterlife."  
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 Asking about conversations in those years with family members back in Greece, I was told 
that they were infrequent and devoid of political content. Most, like Kostas, wrote letters to 
parents, avoiding references to any activities in Canada: 
We didn't speak about these things in the letters. For God’s sake, not there. When I went 
back to Greece [after the fall of the junta] my father had burned my books. I said, "Why the 
fuck did you burn the books!?" He did it because he was afraid. They were coming in and 
he was afraid that they would arrest him and also he had my military clothes [...] He 
burned those too. Because he could be accused of plotting to have a counter-revolution 
using the military clothes. When I left, my parents lived in fear. Because they were making 
searches, coming into houses, you know. And I mean my father was an old man. Let’s say, 
he was 71 years old. And they were coming on occasion, policemen, coming and inquiring 
about me.  
Men expressed their concern for the safety of their parents and siblings in Greece, although most 
learned of the reality of interrogations and intimidations only after the fall of the junta. "My 
brother was a smart guy," explained Nikos. "When they tried to force him to discourage me, he 
said, 'I don't want to know anything about that guy, don't tell me!'" Implying a false sense of 
strife between siblings in this way was one way of justifying their alleged lack of information or 
contact. Parents similarly pleaded ignorant about or disinterested in their sons' political activities, 
or emphasized that they were "just studying." 
IV. Political Genealogy in the Diaspora 
 
Having discussed the political mobilizations of the Greek diaspora and the forms of sociality that 
took shape around them, I wish to situate the narratives I have discussed squarely within the 
problematic of political genealogy. I argue that political genealogy remains a useful analytical 
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device for thinking about political subjectivities and forms of sociality in the diasporic 
movement against the Junta.  
 In chapter three, I argued that the sons of those deemed to be leftists were interpolated by 
the Greek state as having inherited political affinities. Through an ethnography of the file, I 
showed how kin relations were drawn upon as justification for marginalization and persecution. 
In this way, it was difficult to speak of a political actor, in the sense of a politically-informed 
subject who processes, acts upon and affirms a position in relation to the dominant or counter-
hegemonic political discourses of a period and place. In fact, much of that chapter was marked 
by a tension between overdetermined political categories and the absence of men's own 
ideological assertions, position-taking, and instances of political action. To the extent that the 
latter were present, they tended to be familial rather than "personal"; in other words, they were 
storied in the actions of fathers, uncles, and sometimes older brothers.  
 In contrast, this chapter explores a context that is defined by protest, demonstration and the 
consequences for men in Toronto and their families remaining in Greece. In these accounts, the 
political file—and the politics of kinship upon which it is premised—gain a second life in the 
streets of Toronto and the family homes of relatives in Greece. Here, it is not so much the spectre 
of left-wing fathers and uncles that marks the scene, but the activities of men themselves that 
have engendered the suspicions and interventions of the Greek state. Even if the consequences 
for family members were not particularly serious or pronounced, a social imaginary emerged that 
was defined by a concern for one's kin and the prospect and fear that one's actions in Canada 
could harm those in Greece. Combined with new arrivals' relatively limited knowledge of 
Canadian state practices, the condition of "being between states" was at once productive of new 
modes of dissent and familiar punitive consequences. While most of the men I interviewed stated 
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that, in retrospect, concerns about the Canadian state were probably more "imagined than real," 
at the time, there was really no way of knowing. 
  It is important to note that just as the forms of political inheritance discussed in chapter 
three were not straightforward––recall, for example, statements like "my father was left but not 
communist," "my father was a driver, so it is at least possible he was unable to vote that day," 
"my family was left, but...", "he was asked to sign and I believe he did sign"––in Toronto they 
were similarly fraught with contestation and ambivalence and marked by a tension between 
desires for visibility and fears of (mis)recognition. When one's family genealogy was 
recognizable, as in the case of Kristos (from a family with known centric associations), the 
navigation and articulation of one's political identity and ideological position could be fraught 
with condescension, suspicion and name-calling. Kristos explains how, as a very active member 
of the resistance movement, he was continuously dismissed for being too conservative––charges 
that were not felt to be based on what he was saying or doing, but on the positions of his father, 
uncle, and grandfather: 
 Kristos: I was a "red centrist," OK? I never really belonged there, but that was the  tradition 
 and that was the perception of me. 
 Katherine: The Tradition. So the center for you at that time was more of a family 
 designation? 
 Kristos: Yes! Yes! Exactly that! Although this is why I had left—I left Greece to avoid this 
 "who your father is"... 
 Katherine: But did you claim a more politically centric position in your work with PAK? 
 Kristos: No, I didn't claim anything...The perception about me was that I am a 
 "Fiotakis," [family name] and that my family are center union, therefore, [I am] a 
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 conservative. But I wasn't comfortable with what we were. It was not the same for my best 
 friend in Toronto, whose father was a communist, although we used the same labels of 
 being left for ourselves. The communists here would say, "That damn Fiotakis! He is 
 conservative, he is center, his background, I mean." 
The important point made by Kristos is that the weight of political inheritance can not be 
understood as exclusive to the Greek Left. Phillipanos, who I did not interview at length but had 
the great opportunity to meet at the end of my research, similarly described his own struggle with 
political inheritance—this time from the perspective of having "right roots." Originating from a 
small Northern village, which had experienced mass immigration to Toronto, Phillipanos found 
himself marginalized by the Communist Party on the basis of his family's political ascription: 
OK, so my name can tell you something––right-wing family. And for those of us who were 
from non-working class families [...], if you were from a bourgeois family and you started 
to disagree with some aspect of the party line, people would start questioning your 
motives. Your family background must play a role, "Ah, you say this because you are a 
member of the bourgeois class, you are a Trojan force of the bourgeois imperialist!" After 
that, they would isolate you and then maybe expel you, so that you would not be on good 
terms with the rest of the party. 
The significance of names—as symbolic articulations of concrete, local political affinities—in 
the diaspora is something worth exploring in subsequent research. While discussing the case of a 
Greek Leftist in Toronto, Phillipanos explained that this man would not have access to 
communist countries during the junta because his communist father had "been a snitch" in 
Athens after the civil war and had revealed the names of other party members in order to avoid 
punishment. His name "was known." I encouraged my interlocutor to say more: How could they 
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possibly know that? "Simple," he began, "they say, OK, Grigorios Mintsoulis, Where is he from? 
Athens. What region? Send a message to our guys in Greece, find out about his family." OK? 
The same way the police operated in Greece, the Communist Party operated. Within our own 
party, we had an oppressive state apparatus! [laughing]" 
 We can also imagine the level of sensitivity activists showed with one another in order to 
avoid fractions and conflict in Toronto. Stavros, for example, described speaking more freely 
with his student friends, but otherwise keeping the conversation strictly to political issues––the 
junta's activities, progressive analyses, party decision, and anti-junta actions. Stavros was one of 
a small organization of Maoists involved in the anti-dictatorship movement. During our 
interview I was interested to know as much as I could about this group, whose members were 
quite a bit older than he was and who have since passed away. When I probed a little further into 
their family background, Stavros reflected a little and then explained: "You know, I never asked 
them if they were from left families. It was a sensitive thing. We never spoke about this and I 
was never asked myself. Perhaps they were exiles. I don't even know when they came. That's 
interesting, actually, isn't it? That we knew very little about each other's histories. It would have 
felt inappropriate to ask..." The response was not what I expected from a group of similarly-
minded political compatriots, far removed from Greece and presumably from the dangers that 
had existed for those on the left. Perhaps this collectively maintained silence about family 
histories was precisely what kept the small group unified and active in those years.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I explored the question of how men managed and socialized along political lines 
in their new city. I argued that in the streets of Toronto, political genealogy remained animated in 
the directives by the dominant arm of the resistance movement ––PAK––to minimize the 
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"communistic" element of the movement, in encounters with the regime-controlled Greek 
embassy, and in the belief that one's actions could have dangerous consequences for family 
members back in Greece. If chapter three demonstrated that men were navigating the political 
categories bestowed upon them, chapter four showed how men engaged in the articulation and 
actualization of political identities and that, in the process, the file gained a second life. 
Importantly, I also discussed what we might call "alternative genealogies" to those I introduced 
in chapter three: We met men who had migrated prior to the Junta, men who engaged in the 
political movement in Toronto who had not been filed in Greece but became so in Toronto, 
and—in the case of Constantine—a man from "right roots" negotiating his own ambivalent 
political inheritance. 
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Chapter 5 
Precarious Returns: Giving an Account of Oneself in the 
Metapolitefsi 
 
"The junta fell, the parliament opened, and I said, "They can go and pull their eyes out!" 
"It was one of Papandreou's great passions that the Greek diaspora come back to Greece. The 
question was: Which Hellenism, which diaspora, would return?" 
 
"It's a riddle: What gets red in Toronto and green59 in Athens?" 
 
Apostolos offers just one sentence in his novel to characterize what became of Greece after the 
fall of the junta: "The opportunists of the foreign circles have begun to liquidate their political 
investments, digging up titles of resistance from the battles they gave in the Latin Quarter in 
Paris, Trafalgar Square in London, the Danforth of Toronto and the villas of King City." By 
1981, elements of the PAK resistance movement had evolved into the first-ever governing 
socialist party in Greece, PASOK, and Andreas Papandreou was Prime Minister. Many of those 
who had left the country as "dangerous citizens" (Panourgia 2009)—or who, in their activities 
abroad, had become so––returned as protagonists of the resistance.  
 Once in power, and as a "reconciliatory gesture," PASOK provided pensions for those who 
had fought against the Germans in WWII and permitted the return of partisans who had fled to 
communist countries after the war (Panourgia 2009: 151). This marked the close of the Greek 
state's long practice of seeing and constructing the Left as dangerous and abject. According to 
those I interviewed, its symbolic weight was enormous, but not without ambivalence. 
                                               
59 Green is the colour of the PASOK emblem; red the communist party  
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 Official data from Greece indicates that 17, 143 "Greek-Canadians" returned to Greece in 
the 70s and 80s (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1997, in Tamis and Gavaki 2002: 45). This 
figure does not including the large number of those who never claimed Canadian citizenship 
(students, permanent residents, the undocumented or temporary workers). Those who returned 
did so in the "Metapolitefsi"––a term signalling the process of democratization and a period of 
transition between political regimes that was inaugurated with the elections of 1975. The "end" 
of the Metapolitefsi was announced again and again in popular media and party discourse 
throughout the 80s in order to declare a new age free of lingering civil war antagonisms. 
 I use the term "Metapolitefsi" to convey the discursive, ideological, institutional and 
relational transformations that shaped experiences of return after the fall of the junta. In the 
previous chapter, I was interested in forms of sociality that men narrated in their negotiation of 
emergent and institutionalized (a)political sites––whether this be "the Greek community," the 
"movement," "the state," or "the party"––as well as their expressions of ambivalent and contested 
political identification. In this chapter, I locate men's accounts of return in a context where a 
particular pronouncement of "the left" was ascending through the party and personality of 
Andreas Papandreou, gaining institutional legitimacy and opening up unprecedented 
opportunities for those who had been marginalized for many decades; in other words, in a period 
of reconciliatory gestures with symbolic weight but primarily manifested as redistribution of 
jobs, benefits and funds. 
 In accounts of those returning in the Metapolitefsi, political subjectivity is constructed and 
expressed socially—within relations of fluctuating intimacy and in more or less institutionalized 
environments—and is expressed narratively through tropes of proximity, visibility and naming. 
What was it to move from a diasporic site––and a marginal one at that––to the "center" of the 
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action in homeland politics? How were relations established in the diaspora reconfigured in the 
transforming political space of Athens? Consistent with the ethnographic approach developed 
throughout this dissertation, my primary interest remains with the subtle moments of dialogue 
and exchange, of hesitant approaches and retreats, rather than party lines, slogans, ideological 
formulations or electoral results. A close reading of men's recollections, reveals both the social 
and moral implications of where one "stood" in a period of tremendous change. 
 As Passerini (1996) reminds us, "memory speaks from today" (23) and in the narratives of 
those I interviewed, the present-constructed-as-crisis penetrates the discursive frame, both 
implicitly and explicitly. Crucially, many of those returning in the Metapolitefsi did so as 
"founding fathers"––or at least active members––of the new socialist political party PASOK—
the very same party that (in the now of 2012) has fundamentally lost its legitimacy because it set 
the country on the course of austerity measures. PASOK has governed for the greater part of 
thirty years and is currently serving as the minority partner in a coalition with the conservative 
New Democracy. According to recent polls, PASOK ratings are around 5% (from 43% in 2009), 
indicating a striking blow to its social (and electoral) base. The party has been publicly 
disgraced; its claims of justice, democracy and reconciliation, which brought the party to power 
in 1981, are now discussed as farce or parody. Questions of responsibility, shame, culpability—
while never part of my interview guideline—were often creeping around the edges or entering 
our discussions. In asking after the period of the Metapolitefsi, I was unwittingly placing many 
of my interviewees in the position of having to give an account of themselves. 
 An analysis, then, of what's at stake in "giving an account of oneself" involves reading the 
narrated "I" within the "social conditions of its emergence" (Butler 2005: 8)––in this case, within 
the sociopolitical contours of both PASOK's ascent and its very dramatic decline. From this 
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double angle, I show that narrated returns are fraught with connotations of culpability, 
innocence, opportunism and integrity, both in the accounts of those who remained in Canada and 
those who re-settled in Greece. In drawing on a nuanced set of tropes––of naming, visibility and 
proximity––men engage in precarious "appropriations" of moralities (7). A particular kind of 
normative political subjectivity emerges in these accounts, one which tends––albeit discretely––
to promote withdrawal over participation and marginality over "being at the centre." This 
corresponds with a surprising reversal in common sense understandings of failing and 
succeeding; failing in Papandreou's Greece is  framed contemporarily as an indication of the 
speaker's integrity and even one's commitment to a specific political genealogy that has long 
been hollowed out by the bureaucratic gestures of a "socialist" government. Indeed, in light of a 
now delegitimized––but once hegemonic––political project, "failing" in Papandreou's Greece has 
its merits, while successes require distantiation. 
I. "I didn't come back with the rest of them": Narrating Returns 
 
Those returning to Greece directly after the fall of the regime did so amid transforming political 
tides. At the governmental level, Karamanlis, leader of the newly established conservative party 
"New Democracy," was invited to take over power from the junta's generals in July of 1974. His 
first acts of reconciliation were to legalize the Communist party, abolish citizen file-keeping, free 
political prisoners and pardon any crimes against the junta. He also called elections for 
November of the same year, at which time he was chosen to be Prime Minister.60 Among his 
                                               
60 While most observers of the Metapolitefsi period agree that these were "probably the freest elections 
ever held in the country," they did not proceed without criticism. Parties of the left complained that 
elections were premature, that they did not have time to organize themselves and that the elections could 
hardly be termed "democratic" given the extent to which junta supporters remained entrenched in the state 
apparatus. They also pointed to "mechanisms of repression" still in place, especially in rural areas of the 
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initiatives towards democratization were the referendum in 1974 that abolished the monarchy, 
compulsory "retirement" for hundreds of officers of the junta's military army, the bringing to trial 
of the junta's principle protagonists in 1975,61 the implementation of a new constitutional act to 
satisfy student demand for "dejuntification" of the universities (which included the restoration of 
positions to leftist professors who had lost their jobs during the junta and the removal of those 
who collaborated with the junta "beyond the call of professional duty") and the granting of 
permission to university students to hold their own elections. By January of 1975, "108,000 civil 
servants and other officials and employees had been dismissed, transferred or otherwise 
disciplined" (Psomiades 1982: 259). The formal recognition and legalization of the communist 
party and the release of political prisoners and exiled persons were the most significant acts of 
the Karamanlis government for the Left. Having been outlawed by successive regimes since 
                                                                                                                                                       
country. Other complained that: the electoral system discriminated against small parties; voting registers 
were out-dated (given many politically motivated exiles and migrations); the large population of Greek 
workers living outside of Greece should have the opportunity to vote; and that the election age should be 
reduced from 21 to 18. This last point was especially important for the Left given the fact that four out of 
every five university students, most of whom were under 21, were oriented towards the two communist 
parties, other left-wing fractions and PASOK (Psomiades 1982: 260). 
61 I point the reader to the trials of the Colonel's, documented by Amnesty International (Torture in 
Greece: The First Torturers' Trial, 1975).  It should be acknowledged that in the post-junta years, 
according to the testimonials of those put to trial and the witnesses that were asked to testify, those soldier 
who had been serving at holding cells and camps as "part of their duty" experienced stigma and 
marginalization by their communities.. When one soldier was brought to trial, he said the following: 
 
I think in this hurricane of terrorism, violence and fear, I tried to participate as little as possible. I 
would rather not have participated at all, but it was impossible... I was caught up in a machine and 
became a tool without any will of my own to resist. I remember Spanos threatening a soldier that 
he would ruin his family.  The next day the boy began to beat prisoners... Now all of my friends 
and relatives look upon me with suspicion and pity.  I can not find work. A friend took me on 
and, after a few days, he gave me quiet hint to leave. The [...] discharge certificate is like a 
leprosy....I feel the need to tell this respected tribunal and the Greek people that I am a human 
being, like you, like your neighbour's son, like a friend. When I struck, it was not [my] hand , but 
the  hand of Spanos, of Hajizisis  [officers]...(Quoted in Kritz (1995) 245) 
 
At the trial of this same soldier, his father, a farmer, stated, "We are a poor but decent family [...]  I see 
him now in the dock as a torturer. I want to ask the court to examine how a boy who everyone said was 'a 
diamond' became a torturer. Who morally destroyed my family and my home?" (246). 
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1936, the fractured elements of the Communist Party set about busily reconstructing themselves 
as autonomous parties. 
 Men frequently expressed their energized commitment to political engagement upon their 
return. Tasos, who had been organized with the Eurocommunists (hereafter referred to as KKE-
I), said he had returned to Greece in 1975 fully believing that, in doing so, he was "part of the 
socialist revolution." "I wanted to be part of the reconstruction of my country," he explained, 
with a serious expression and a long sigh. Another interviewee involved in the same group in 
Toronto, looked forward to being part of a "socialist project in Greece"—one devoid of the 
"Stalinist orientation." Others similarly narrated their return to Greece as deliberate and 
enthusiastic. Ilias, who had been an active member of PAK in Toronto, described being "full of 
dreams" upon his return and acutely conscious of the responsibility tied to establishing a new 
political party. One of the founding fathers of PASOK, he recalls a flurry of travel, discussion 
and planning. Having recently obtained a Masters degree in Economics, his friend Manolis was 
also returning as a founding father of the new party, ready to participate in the difficult campaign 
of convincing Greeks it was time for the first ever "left government." Regardless of the fact that 
these men were returning with different visions of Greece in mind, they shared the condition of 
returning to Athens with university degrees in hand and a readiness to participate in political 
configurations that had never before had a legitimate place in Greek politics. The emergence of 
new parties was one important manifestation of new beginnings. 
  Against the narratives of zealous and urgent returns were those of a different kind––
measured, hesitant and sometimes emphatically so. From his small second-hand store in Athens, 
Yannis spoke at length about his own return. During our first meeting, I showed him some black 
and white photos of the PAK group. He brought the first one close to his face to inspect it: Here 
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was an exuberant Andreas Papandreou, one armed raised above his head in a charismatic wave, 
stepping out of an airplane upon his arrival in Athens and surrounded by PAK members. "Ahh," 
he said, "Papandreou and all his cronies." After a pause, he added, "You know, I didn't return 
with the rest of them. I came a few months later." 
 I encountered the same statement just a few months later in the wealthy neighbourhood of 
Kifissia. A former PAK member, Kristos presented himself as "probably the most favoured of 
the guys from Toronto" and then, in the same breath, stressed the point: "But I didn't come back 
right away with the rest of them." Both Yannis and Kristos were keen to have me understand the 
difference between their own contemplative returns and those who hurriedly jumped on the first 
plane back to Athens with (what Yannis called) "the taste of yummies in [their] mouth." 
 In other accounts, returns were portrayed as gestures of fatigue or withdrawal. Yannis 
described feeling like he had no reason to remain in Canada. He recalled waking one morning 
and "not recognizing the face that stared back" at him in the mirror. Having been a "known 
person" in the movement, Yannis went through a period of total isolation upon his return: 
And I came here and I wanted  nobody even to know my name. Nothing. I wanted to be 
totally left alone. So I occupied a deserted house [...] for about a month and then some 
relatives of the owner arrived and I said, "Listen, I'm not a thief. I want to live here. I will 
paint it, and any time you want to take it, you can." So they agreed, I gave them some 
symbolic rent and I got a table with a nice cloth over it and I started selling some used 
[goods]. [...] And that's how I started. 
Yannis’ account is probably the most poignant example of a reclusive return. Yet, others  
similarly expressed a process of disentangling themselves from the political relations and 
activities with which they had been preoccupied in Toronto. Having politely received me at his 
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home in Athens, Giorgos offered me some coffee and then very quickly began to explain that he 
was not at all interested in the political developments of the post-junta period. When I asked him 
about the political mood in Thessaloniki, where he first settled in 78, he responded: 
I have a total blank about the years after the junta. I really don't know what happened. 
Actually, I haven't followed anything since then [...] I really don't know what to say 
because I didn't keep any friendships or relations from that time. I had a clear head about 
not being involved [...] Politics just wasn't for me. 
Giorgos’ description of "blanking" is interesting in so far as he equates his lack of knowledge 
about the period with the cutting of social networks and a resolved and intentional distancing. 
This speaks to the tendency demonstrated many times throughout this dissertation to give 
accounts of the political alongside anecdotal stories of social intimacy and distance. Note that 
while both the accounts of Giorgos and Yannis involve retreats, they do so in different ways. If 
Giorgos could convey nothing to me of the political mood of the Metapolitefsi, it was precisely 
the peculiarities of the post-dictatorship period that Yannis detailed as the impetus for his drive 
to withdraw. Yannis was returning to Athens as one of the few who had had their citizenship 
revoked. Returning to the center of Athens––"his neighbourhood"––was an entirely ambivalent 
experience: on the one hand, Yannis described feeling fearless and full of disdain for the fallen 
regime; on the other hand, he found the transforming political map dizzying and strange. 
Revolutionary songs were coming out of every cafe and restaurant, stories of suffering and 
resistance under the junta were surfacing left and right. The sight was disorienting, somehow.  
 Another interviewee remarked cynically that "if the government decided to give pensions 
to those claiming they had fought against the dictatorship, like they did for partisans against the 
Nazis, the state would have gone bankrupt." These are reflections on what was, for some, an 
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excessive (and superficial) visibility of the very progressive and revolutionary tendencies that 
had been so punitively suppressed only a few years prior. Marginality was spilling into the 
mainstream, a situation that seemed to mock or undermine those who had lived a persecuted 
existence for many decades. 
 Apostolos, who returned to Greece in 1979 with a master's degree in Engineering, was 
optimistic only in his portrayal of one short period just "after the junta but before the rise of 
PASOK." "We were politicized but not yet particized," he explained, "that was the big 
difference. Everything was open." Laughing, he admits that there was a certain cultural 
hegemony in the university at the time, among both students and professors, and among people 
of his generation and younger: "Let me say it like this [...] If you weren't Left, you couldn't get 
laid".  
 This sense of things being "open" is more difficult to discern in the accounts of those who, 
upon returning to Greece, were immediately shuffled into the army to fulfill their obligatory 
military duty. Spyros was not the only interviewee who told me he had pursued every 
opportunity to study abroad in order to avoid the army during the dictatorship. Recall (from 
chapter three) that the military was a concentrated site of filing and surveillance, even prior to 
the junta. Once the dictatorship came to power, stories from within the military camps deterred 
those from "left families"; studying abroad was one way to postpone one's service until the junta 
had been overthrown. When Spyros returned in 1975, the army had already been purged by 
Karamanlis of the most adamant junta collaborators; nonetheless, the practice of filing persisted: 
Spyros: Although I was doing all the jobs of an officer during those 28 months, I was not 
made an officer [...] I will tell you, because I had friends who were in the so-called "Third 
Office," "Trito Grafeio." The "First Office" is for personnel, the "Second Office" was 
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where I worked, to plan the education, and the third was simply to follow the people who 
were left. To follow what they do... 
Katherine: Wait, this is after the fall of the junta? 
Spyros: Yes, I am talking about the summer of 75. So I had friends responsible and were 
telling me. They said there were three categories: alpha, beta, gamma [...] Alpha was 
unknown; Beta were those with political ... those who were left and Communists in 
Greece; and Gamma [...] were Slavic speaking persons [...] These were the military 
characterizations at that time [...] We could not bring newspapers to the camp, we could 
not be mixed in politics [...] These were orders... 
As I explained in the previous chapter, a great majority of files have been destroyed or classified, 
making it difficult for scholars to compare filing practices of different regimes. For this reason, I 
refrain from making generalizations about characterizations as they emerge in interviewees' 
accounts. The point I wish to make here is simply that Spyros invokes a site of continuity in the 
file-keeping of the left (as well as those deemed "Slavic"). Given the fact that he was entering the 
army with a master's degree in Economics—a rare level of educational achievement in the mid 
1970s—not being made an officer certainly poses a curiosity. 
 It is useful, at this point in my analysis, to begin distinguishing between the narratives of 
those who remained in Canada and those who returned to Greece after the fall of the junta. 
Although there is nothing like homogenous perspectives on either side of the Atlantic, it is 
possible to identify specific modes of relating to the past that are structured around "having 
remained" or "having returned." In this regard, it is interesting to keep in mind research 
exploring returns to other post-dictatorship sites, such as Chile, Brazil and Argentina in the 70s, 
80s and 90s. Much of the research on Chile, for example, reveals accounts of ambiguous 
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receptions. Media portrayed returnees as having had a privileged "golden exile," and even 
children born abroad were reportedly received coldly. Resume items, such as foreign education, 
exposed a person's absence and rendered him suspicious as having been abroad because he was 
leftists, or because he was part of a left family. Comrades who had remained in Chile also drew 
on the discourse of the "golden exile" after the fall of the dictatorship, expressing resentment 
towards those who had not stayed behind (Hirsh 2012; Wright and Zuniga 2007) 
 This chilly reception did not emerge in my interviews with those returning to Greece in the 
70s and 80s, neither in their recollections of popular or state discourse or in everyday 
conversations. But this doesn't mean that one's absence in the years of the junta was perceived by 
others to be inconsequential. Kostas, for example, returned to Thessaloniki in the late 1970s. 
Having just reunited after more than 8 years, he and his friend attended an outdoor political 
speech by a PASOK representative in the center of the city. Recognizing a man from their 
village who had been brutal with both of them during their military service, Kostas nudged his 
friend in a state of disbelief, cursing and shouting––in his words, "freaking out." He was about to 
confront the man: how dare he show his face at such an event, given all those years of "working 
for the junta?" But his friend held him back. "Leave him," he insisted, "you're not here, Kostas. 
You don't know how things are. He's one of us now." This instance was brought up again in a 
subsequent interview as Kostas' evidence of the fickleness of both memory and conviction after 
the junta. Yet, the story also reveals how claims of proximity could be used to silence critique. 
Kostas' companion played the experiential card of "being here" to put him in his place.  
 Recall (from chapter three) the appeal of two village boys finding themselves accidentally 
in the turmoil of a political protest in Thessaloniki––in the very same public square where Kostas 
reunited with his friend. These village boys had wandered out to the streets of Thessaloniki 
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during a high school trip just after the death of the beloved activist, Lambrakis, in 1963. Their 
defense against the police officer's charge, "goddam communists," was this simple appeal: "But 
we are from Macedonia!" I argued that this case was a betrayal of anonymity and the security 
that distance was expected to provide. But in Kostas' story above, the period he has spent outside 
of Greece renders his gaze partial, somehow uninformed and from another—now irrelevant—
time. His recollections of the way things were, along with his appeal to background and 
familiarity, are now interpreted as misrecognition: "He's one of us now." As a consequence, 
whatever experience of marginalization Kostas had before and during the first months of the 
junta is reduced to a peripheral perspective that becomes all the more distant and irrelevant as a 
result of 8 years "exoterika" (abroad). 
II. Political Genealogies at the "Center": Living PASOK'S Ascent 
 
Andreas Papandreou declared the establishment of his new political party, the "Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement" (PASOK), on the 3rd of September, 1974. He did so in the presence of 
PAK comrades from Canada, Germany, Sweden and Italy.62 As Spourdalakis (1988) has pointed 
out, the declaration "signalled PASOK's entrance into Greek politics in an unprecedentedly 
radical fashion" (65), referring as it did to "Greece's dependence upon the imperialist 
establishment of the US and NATO," the vision for a "socialist democratic Greece," the 
"elimination [...] of the [...] exploitation of man by man," the "social liberation of the Greek 
working people [through] the socialist transformation of society" and the "socialization of the 
                                               
62 On the emergence of PASOK in the late 70s and 80s see also: Clogg's (1987) Parties and Elections in 
Greece: The Search for Legitimacy; Mouzelis' (1978) On the Greek Elections, New Left Review 108: 73; 
Kalogeropoulos' (1989) Election Promises and Government Performances in Greece, European Journal 
of Political Research 17 (3): 291; Featherstone and Katsoudas' (1987) Political Change in Greece: Before 
and After in the Colonels; Sotiropoulos' (1994) Populism and Bureaucracy: The Case of Greece under 
PASOK 1981-1989, British Journal of Sociology 45 (3): 349-365; Lefeber's (1989) The Socialist 
Experience in Greece, International Journal of Political Economy 19 (4): 32-55.  
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financial system in its entirety" (ibid: 65-66). "Statements such as these," writes Spourdalakis 
"made the 'Down with Capital' slogan [of] some of [...] PASOK's most radical recruits [...] seem 
not as out of place as one might have thought" (ibid: 66-67). 
 Founding fathers of the party busied themselves with a campaign focused on appealing to 
leftists, who had been marginalized from the political process, and convincing "moderates"––
especially from the rural areas of Greece––that socialism didn't mean (in the words of one of my 
interviewees) "stealing your sheep and chickens and giving them to the state." The result was 
impressive, but "still disappointing," explained an interviewee supportive of PASOK: In the first 
elections of 1974, PASOK won just over 13% of the popular vote, although they were supported 
by 21% of the students (most of whom were not eligible to vote because of their age) (ibid: 84). 
 One of the great strengths of PASOK in the late 70s and early 80s was its capacity to 
navigate contesting political genealogies, claiming as its own a history of injury and resistance, 
while carefully obscuring the anti-communism of some of its founding members. Many of the 
men I interviewed commented on Papandreou's broad use of both the critiques and rhetoric of the 
far left, as well as a kind of conciliatory language focused on overcoming the traces of civil war 
discord. One interviewee explained that in public speeches, Papandreou represented himself as a 
figure through which three generations of resistance could be united in a common genealogy: 
The generation of the resistance against Nazi occupiers during WWII; the generation of the 
"unending struggle" (referring to the campaign initiated by his father's center party against right-
wing terror and vote-rigging in the 1960s); and the "Polytechnic generation," named after the 
November 1973 student protests against the junta, during which the army and police showed 
brute force. Papandreou's orchestration of the politics of memory and generation coincided with 
 164 
the portrayal of PASOK as breaking entirely from the right-wing and its corrupt practices of 
repression. 
 By the second elections of the Metapolitefsi, in 1977, PASOK had built up a stronger 
support base, winning over 25% of the votes (Spourdalakis 1988: 166). Many of those I 
interviewed described the years leading up to these elections as "very PASOK" and members of 
the party were euphoric with the prospect of becoming Greece's first governing socialist party. 
Lukas, who was trying to resettle in 1981, explains why he voted for PASOK in the elections of 
that year despite being a communist: 
I was never a member of PASOK [...] but I voted for [them] because I was preferring them 
over Nea Demokratia.. If there was chance for the communist party I would vote 
communist. But you know, many people, most of the people, who were coming back were 
voting PASOK. They were voting for the party that could change the system that was for 
hundreds of years...It was the same people running the country, even during the Ottoman 
Empire. So we were voting for democratic and socialist ideas. That's how they got [...] so 
many votes. 
This reference to the "same people" emerged especially in accounts of those who continued to 
describe themselves as "left." For these interviewees, the shared processes of subordinating 
minorities, marginalizing the left and protecting the elite, rendered political actors "the same," 
regardless of their party affinities. Some of the men I interviewed were more exacting in their 
interpretation of continuity from the 1800s, claiming that it wasn't just the same sort of people, 
but the "same families" who had governed and excluded. With the ubiquitous campaign slogan 
of "change" ("allagi"), PASOK promised fundamental breaks with a political structure that had 
been dominated by "tsakia"—literally meaning "fireplaces," but referring to long-established 
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families belonging to the right. Papandreou also promised to cut the chains of foreign 
interventions that had defined the country since its inception. Famously, in response to Prime 
Minister Karamanlis'  claim that "Greece belongs to the West" (meaning that the country should 
actively seek integration into the European community and avoid Soviet political influence), 
Andreas Papandreou declared, "We prefer that Greece belongs to the Greeks!"63 This was 
received with enthusiastic applause. In this way, as Spourdalakis points out––and interviewees 
attested to––the early successes of PASOK certainly sprung from the fact that it was the "first 
organized attempt to lay claim to that part of the political spectrum which had traditionally 
belonged to the left" (67). 
 Kostas observed the performance of PASOK from Toronto with a mix of enthusiasm and 
foreboding: 
[In the] elections in 1977 he got 26% and I started to get worried because I thought, "you 
can't double the number of supporters in your party so quickly if you want to have a 
socialist party because you don't have the structures to absorb them. You are going to 
become another leader party," which is exactly what happened in '81. Papandreou would 
ask the minister of affairs what time it is was and he would respond, you know, "Whatever 
time you want it to be!" 
Variations on Kostas' last comment––namely, on the leader-centric aspect of the emergent 
PASOK––were especially pronounced by those who were originally members but left the party 
on their own accord or because they were "pushed out. Evangelos was in the process of resettling 
in Greece in the years between 1977 and 81––the crucial period, as we have seen, in which 
                                               
63 This occurred during a 1977 debate concerning Greece's accession to the European Union. 
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PASOK secured its social base.64 With a strained voice and sad eyes, Evangelos described his 
movement away from Papandreou: 
I disagreed with what Andreas was doing. I was deeply believing that he was a democrat 
and then I felt he was a dictator. I could not follow him anymore. I had invested dreams in 
him [...] I lived this experience with PAK and I feel those were some of the best years of 
my life. But unfortunately, after 1975, it changed. The period before one was one of agony, 
of despair, but also of big hopes and I will take inspiration from that time. The period that 
followed didn't have those qualities. I could see a new reality and it was not the one I had 
dreamed of. 
Others were "removed" in 1977, when Papandreou clamped down on the most "radical" and 
Trotskyite elements of the left. In the words of one interviewee, these groups had "infiltrated" 
PASOK—something that they "were very adept at doing." He explained that a few hundred 
people were removed "from leadership positions," a decision that he believes helped Papandreou 
to win the next elections. And indeed, PASOK came to power in 1981 with 48% (Spourdalakis 
1988: 210). While a consideration of the party's policies over its almost continuous three-decade 
rule is far beyond the scope of this dissertation, I quote Yannis here, as his remarks offer a 
relatively representative portrayal of "what PASOK did right": 
                                               
64  Political scientist, Nikiforos Diamandouros (1993) demarcates two "sub-periods" of the "post-
authoritarian" period, distinguished by the "capacity of the polity and economy to successfully 
incorporate and to integrate the extensive and upwardly mobile social strata effectively marginalised 
within the postwar, anticommunist system and excluded from autonomous participation in it" (8). The 
first, "incorporative moment" (from 1974-1985), is marked by the "incorporation of these strata into [...] 
political democracy [...], their autonomous participation in the political system [...] and their clear 
ideological (1974-1981) and political (1981-85) ascendancy in society and politics [...]; The second, 
"moment of entrenchment" (the post-1985 period) is "to be understood as a period in which the 
incorporative momentum reached its limits, as the social forces which had served as its main carriers 
sought to consolidate their gains and to entrench themselves in their newly-acquired social and political 
space" (ibid). 
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At the beginning, they did some beautiful things. The formation of the family law. A 
woman had no rights in Greece legally until 1983. OK? Like if you were my wife and you 
were in a hotel with your lover, I had the right to come with the police, grab you, it was 
evidence of a divorce and you had no rights to defend yourself. The other fucking shit. The 
dowry problem...if you have no dowry, there was no way you would find a husband. OK? 
For that, I take my hat off [...] Good reforms. They did reforms on the health. They copied 
OHIP from Ontario and brought it to Greece. A direct replica. OK, later on [...] they fucked 
it, but it still exists. They did a number of things. They established the official language of 
Greece, the demotic, the spoken Greek [...] The abolition of the tones of the Greek 
language [to make it] more accessible to everyone... 
Luck, Favour and Being at the Center  
 
Those who became involved with matters of governance, public office, or the emerging research, 
educational or economic institutions when PASOK came to power, tended to narrate their 
incorporation as a matter of "luck," "exception," "being convinced," and "a surprise." Similarly, 
those who occupied these positions–– but did not identify themselves as party supporters at the 
time––recounted their integration as being "lucky despite" their divergent political ideologies. 
These remarks fascinated me.  
 Hired at a technical institute with a master's degree in Economics, Manolis (who had been 
a member of both PAK and then PASOK) explained that he had been encouraged to apply for a 
teaching position by one of the founders of the institution and was evaluated by a hiring 
committee "from the party." "You know something? I am a very lucky person. There are two, 
three times in my life when I can say I had good luck, and this was one of them." Narratives of 
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this kind––that is, of "getting established" under the PASOK regime––were especially interesting 
in so far as they somehow tended to evacuate one's education, experience, merit, or any other 
personal achievements out of the story. In fact, not a single interviewee who became integrated 
in so-called "PASOK institutions" spoke from the position of having outright deserved their 
placement. Even if they used a narrative of excelling, development or mastery in their 
descriptions of work and school in Toronto, this self-portrayal was not extensively carried into 
narratives of re-settlement.  
 But time and time again, sitting across from the faces of those who had described their 
PAK anti-junta activities in Toronto with so much enthusiasm and pride, I became aware of the 
precarity of their contemporary speaking position. The stories from Toronto had been ones of 
struggle, but also of protest, action, vision and knowing what one stood for (as Evangelos 
recalled above, it was a time of "agony, [and] despair, but also of big hopes"). Regardless of the 
ideological and social factions that dissolved the movement, there was nonetheless something—
at least temporarily—thrilling about the feeling of standing together against something bad, 
totalitarian, illegal. But in asking men to reflect on their activity in PASOK, the narrative of 
solidarity in the face of injustice could not stand up to scrutiny—certainly not as protestors were 
presently filling the streets to condemn the local "PASOK traitors" who had delivered the 
country into the hands of the Troika. To what extent, then, was this kind of narrative self-
effacing a reflection of the unique moment in which I was conducting my research? Put simply, I 
was asking after the birth of a party with which these men were closely involved, at the very 
moment of its degraded (and very public) decline.  
 My thinking on this finding remains tentative. I shall pose it this way: If recourse to bad 
luck, as Hertzfeld (1992: 134) suggests, is one way of distancing oneself from one's failures––by 
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implying a line of causality that is out of one hands––does good luck perhaps function in the 
same way for those successes that are now––for one reason or another––deemed suspicious? But 
if that is the case, how do these expressions of good luck position the speaker differently to 
questions of power and culpability than would outright admissions of patronage, on the one 
hand, or claims of merit, on the other?  
 Merit, of course, implies education, experience and expertise, and is ideally translated into 
competency and contributions on the job. I thus read this hesitancy to claim a merit-based 
allocation as retrospectively guarding against suggestions of responsibility. In the case, for 
example, of the two well-educated PASOK economists who I interviewed––one having worked 
as a Professor of Economics and the other having worked for the country's central bank––both 
emphasized that despite being actively involved in the party, they left matters of economic policy 
to the experts. There were "always those who knew more," surmised one of them. "That's just the 
way it was." 
 If in this analysis of narrative self-effacing, merit is undermined and luck emphasized, 
outright admissions of obtaining positions through either intimate or clientelistic relations were, 
in general, absent from my interviews. I consider here an excerpt from my interview with 
Antonios as unusual in this regard. Antonios, described himself as "probably an exceptional 
case,"65 and was extremely forthcoming about his placement in PASOK structures upon his 
return. Antonios was an active member of PAK and met Papandreou when he was a student in 
Toronto. When PASOK formed a government, he was given a ministry position and moved to 
Athens. Anticipating that the post would be a busy one, he learned otherwise soon enough:  
                                               
65 For reasons I will not discuss in order to protect the anonymity of my interviewee, Antonios' biography 
is exceptional in ways that have justified his exclusion from my analysis. I nonetheless include him in this 
section for his insight into the everyday working of institutions as well as his poignant and rather blatant 
use of the familial metaphors that emerged (albeit more discreetly) in other accounts.  
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Basically, I was there to collect a salary [...] It was not because I didn't want to do 
anything. It was because the structure was so weak that no one gave me anything to do!  
[...] One of my stories about that period [is that] after I had become head of the section, 
three months later [I discovered that] I had 8 people working for me that I didn't even 
know existed!  But who were they? How did I find out about them? They came into my 
office one day, one at a time, asking for me to sign their leave of absence. For vacations. 
They needed my signature. But I didn't know they existed! [...] But, it was tragic, in the 
sense that I was getting a salary for basically doing nothing [...] And you know, the dream 
of the Greek youth was to get  a job in the public sector but that was itself tragic. I saw a 
number of cases of people who came back to Greece after studying in England or Germany 
with degrees, [finding] jobs in the ministry. With connections. And what did they end up 
doing? They sat and read newspapers all day. They did nothing. We were "argomistoi,"—
getting salary for doing nothing. 
Soon after relating this frank portrait of working in the ministry, Antonios summarized his work 
history during the period with an undisguised reference to his intimate relations with the 
Papandreou family. "My ability to maintain myself in Greece has to do with having a 
relationship with the family, basically," began Antonios. "I mean, when I was in the government 
I was protected more or less... [I was] understood to be "oikoyeniakos," part of the presumed [...] 
family court, so to speak [...] This is what I was. I was part of the family." 
 Although there is a lot to unpack here, for the purpose of my discussion, I'd like to 
highlight two aspects of Antonios' account: first, it gives a name to forms of sociality that were 
otherwise spoken about discreetly; second, rather than avoiding the question of responsibility, it 
draws attention to it. I inquired about the word that Antonios had used—"argomistoi"—in 
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interviews with others. I was usually told that it is a word one would use for someone else and 
never for oneself. When I countered that I had heard the word for the first time used self-
referentially, one interviewee shrugged his shoulders and responded matter-of-factly, "They 
might say 'we', as in, 'We're all to blame,' but never ever 'I.'" And then he added, "Anyway, now 
is different. Everyone is coming out, to release themselves from all the bad things. Even the CIA 
did that many years later, right?" We can probably better understand this position in light of the 
popular discourse of collective blame that has emerged over the last few years, both from 
government and media sources. It is perhaps no better––and no more crudely demonstrated––
than in the remarks of Theodoros Pangalos, a well-known PASOK politician serving since 1981, 
that, "We all ate it together." Statements like these, which construct an ambiguous and non-
specific "we," have been interrogated by left parties in Greece, including SYRIZA and the KKE.  
   Both this ambiguous "we" and the decline of PASOK structured the account of Kristos' 
return and his incorporation into the party almost from the onset of our interview. I met Kristos 
at his home, on a beautiful, tree-lined neighbourhood of northern Athens. Upon my arrival, 
Kristos made me a strong Greek coffee and then showed me a framed declaration from April 
1967. It was called, "The oath of the immigrant," and outlined the responsibility of the Greek 
diaspora to come to the defence of their country's democracy. His closest friend had written this 
in the days after the Junta had come to power as a rallying cry for Greeks to begin mobilizing. 
Since his return to Athens, in 1975, Kristos had been involved on and off in PASOK: 
Well, I didn't come back with the others, after the junta fell. I stayed there. Andreas told me 
to come down, I said "no" [...] But he said, "The party can pay you." "Party pay me?!" He 
said, "Why not?" And I said, "I can't say no to you." Well, many of us said that [...] When 
Andreas was putting his fight here, I felt like I couldn't say no to him.  He is not a guy you 
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say "no" to [...] You know, I was never a politician, I was never elected, never became a 
member of parliament. I was appointed [in] non-parliamentary [posts][...]over a period of 
years. Anytime Andreas asked me to, [I came] and then I left when I thought, "Ok, I've 
done what I should do," and then he would call me back again [...] Anyway, we did a few 
things, especially in tourism [...] I don't regret anything except that we tolerated unhealthy 
situations within the government among people that we worked with [...] But what 
happened in Greece, we are all at fault, but not all the same. Even the last citizen had a 
responsibility by not asking for receipts, by tax evading, by asking for his or her son and 
daughter to be appointed to public service..  
Kristos' discussion of his measured and hesitant return—one requiring a fair bit of persuasion—
is followed immediately by a statement of collective responsibility. In an interview with a long-
time critic of PASOK, the "unhealthy situations" Kristos refers to was recounted through the 
metaphor of "the extended family of PASOK."  
III. Aborted Returns and "Failing" in Papandreou's Greece 
 
Throughout my research, I was frequently told that those who attempted to resettle in Greece 
after the fall of the dictatorship returned to Canada "within a few months." Men who claimed 
they had never made efforts to return permanently to Greece seemed rather fond of recounting 
the failures of others. In fact, they did so with wry grins and, at times, a sardonic laugh. The 
difficult returns of others were rarely narrated matter-of-factly or with sympathy. More than half 
of those I interviewed in Canada had moved to Greece at some point in the late 70s or 80s, but 
ended up going back to Toronto. While some were hesitant to speak about the factors at work 
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here, others were quite forthcoming about their "failed returns." In fact, "failing" was narrated as 
a rather ambivalent experience with surprising connotations. 
 In his extraordinary treatment of the symbolic construction of bureaucracy in Greece, 
Michael Herzfeld (1992) makes the argument that on a daily basis,  people draw upon a standard 
moral fault line that effectively removes the speaker from culpability in his own failures. 
Specifically, he notes that: i) "people attribute the failure of others (or members of other social 
groups) to character flaws"; ii) "one's own failures and those of one's kin and friends [...] are the 
result of bad luck" and iii) that it is "one's successes that one attributes to qualities of character" 
(134). Herzfeld grounds his argument in J.L. Austin's (1975 [1962]) claim that there is a 
conventional quality to excuse-making, one that is well-known and entrenched in everyday 
speech (37). If it is true that "citizens who fail to get what they want may seriously lose standing 
in their home communities," saving-face necessitates "a convincing, or at least socially 
unimpeachable, defence of their actions" (Herzfeld 1992: 46). If it is the task of the ethnographer 
to consider the "social ramifications of failure" (46), it is also necessary to consider the symbolic 
architecture of self-exoneration; not as static social code, but as a challenging aspect of giving an 
account of oneself within contingent social and political relations. Let's consider, then, this 
pronouncement of the unfulfilled return as "failure" in the accounts of those I interviewed and 
ask: Are these failures dismissed as a matter of fate or bad luck? How do men come to terms 
with the disappointment of an aborted return? 
 In September of 2013, I interviewed Kyriakos, who had just retired after many years of 
running a small printing shop. We met at a busy cafe in Toronto, where he had carefully laid out 
some very precious booklets of resistance, handwritten by imprisoned communists during the 
dictatorship. His brother, Michaili, had sent these texts to Toronto at some point after his 
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incarceration in the early 1970s. Our discussion was structured around a kind of dual narrative, 
including both his own experiences in Toronto and those of his brother in Greece; Kyriakos 
would occasionally evaluate his own contributions and losses in relation to those of Michaili: 
I returned in '75, just after the junta collapsed, when my brother was out of prison, of 
course, and his wife began to have serious psychological problems. My brother had started 
to have problems with his feet and hands because they had been broken by officers 
stepping on them [...] So, I went to the party office66 and saw that we were not doing 
anything, that Papandreou had attracted most of our people. You know, he was on the roofs 
saying the revolution is coming! The revolution! He is despicable [...] but respecting the 
memory of the dead, I don't want to go further [...] Then in '85, I tried to go back again, 
intending to stay but I failed [...] I saw that it was a terrible idea to try to stay in Greece. 
The social environment [with] the nouveau riche. That's what I saw. Just consumerism and 
cars [...] I got shocked about ideas and principles, about work and ethics [...] I had the 
experience of modern Greece, if you can call it "modern." The guys at PASOK used to call 
me "comrade." "Come in comrade, have a coffee." I said, "No, it kills my nerves." An old 
classmate was an MP [and] he was trying to recruit me, but I said, "Don't try!" It would 
have meant becoming a member and getting anything I liked; getting money and opening a 
painting shop with a development loan [...] but then, I would already be corrupted [...] 
In his first return narrative, Kyriakos finds his brother a "half person" and his sister-in-law, who 
had also been imprisoned, similarly "broken." Having been very active in Toronto, Kyriakos 
recounts going to the KKE-I office, searching for indication of initiatives that could bring some 
relief to his family and that would lend hope for a radically different political solution in Greece. 
                                               
66 Kyriakos is referring here to the Communist Party of the Interior (KKE-I), the pro-European, anti-
Stalinist party.  
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His brother found employment as a teacher, while Kyriakos, profoundly disappointed, returned 
to Canada. If this first return (in 1975) is narrated through the lens of his broken family, the 
second return (in 1985) is conveyed through a critique of a farcical modern "socialism," 
conspicuous consumption and entrenched clientelism. What is thus implied in Kyriakos' claim to 
failure? There is no reference to fate or chance here, but rather a decidedly political analysis with 
ethical connotations: Failing in Papandreou's modern Greece is actually a failure to become 
corrupted and, in this sense, is a narrative testament to Kyriakos' unwavering principles and, 
perhaps, to his political lineage. 
 Others made similar first and second attempts––sometimes more––to establish themselves 
in Greece. Some described these as false starts that were bound to fail. To the extent that the 
failure could have been foreseen, given "how things are done over there," perhaps there is an 
element of fate here (or at least fatalism), but ultimately, the speaker is constructed as bound to 
fail because he is a good person. It's not a question of chance.  
 The same kind of talk about failure emerges in accounts of those who resettled in Greece, 
but did so at the margins and with the experience of being overlooked, underutilized or pushed 
aside. My conversation with Tasos is illustrative in this regard. I was invited to his village in the 
Peloponnese where he and his wife had retired some years ago and were now living on a limited 
income from a small supply of homemade wine and olive oil. His wife, Eleni, was vocal about 
their difficulties surviving the economic crisis. Reflecting on the decision they made to leave 
good jobs in Toronto and start over in Athens and then to later retire to the isolated village, Tasos 
sighed deeply, "you could say I was a failure." Laughing, he continued: "I was the naive 
Canadian, returning to Greece and thinking I was going to be part of a socialist project." 
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 What we learn from these accounts is that if we are going to fail, it is best to do so in 
circumstances where we were bound to—not by the hands of god or fate—but because of our 
strong characters, principles or ethics, which make it impossible, by definition, to succeed in a 
corrupted system. In these accounts, succeeding in Papandreou's Greece is easy. One fails 
because he took the difficult road of integrity. As one of my interviewees exclaimed, 
sympathizing with his father, "He once said, 'my dignity is to have broken chairs in my house 
and pants with holes!'" For those leftists who did not take the bait––who did not enter the office 
of PASOK "comrades"––continuity of a principled political genealogy is narratively constructed 
against all odds and temptations.  
Invitations and Moral Proximities 
 
Some of those returning in the Metapolitefsi had experienced decades of exclusion and 
marginalization because state actors had declared them dissident by birth, while others were 
deemed so on account of their involvement in Toronto or Athens against the conservative 
regime. As political support in post-junta Greece increasingly turned leftward and as 
Papandreou's PASOK emerged as the hegemonic representative of the left, it became at least 
possible to imagine a kind of social mobility previously inconceivable. What happens when 
someone who has been marginalized for decades is invited to take a place at the center? How is 
this movement negotiated and how is it reflected upon and justified through a subject's ethical 
lens? I pose these questions for both those who resettled in Greece and those who stayed behind. 
The center-periphery binary, of course, has been heavily entrenched in political sociology, as 
well as in political science and international development literatures. Thinking about forms of 
sociality at the political center and at the margins, however, requires a recognition that the binary 
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itself (and the structured relations of power and inequality that it is intended to represent) is 
subject to transformation, ambiguity and reinterpretation.   
 To begin exploring these questions, I quote an excerpt from my interview with Lukas, the 
chef on the Danforth who arrived in Toronto without documents at the age of 19. I met Lukas, a 
tall, broad-chested man with a wide grin and firm handshake, during a mid-day break at his 
restaurant. Still wearing his stained apron, he offered me a cold glass of water and sat down with 
a long sigh. "I'm old but still working!" he began, with a laugh. When we came to the topic of his 
two attempts to resettle and make a life in Greece after the fall of the junta, Lukas offered a very 
detailed and fascinating reflection on questions of sociality and identity in the "here" of Toronto 
and the "there" of Athens. The encounter Lukas describes in the quote below occurred in 1984, 
three years after PASOK had come to power. It is helpful for the reader to know that the 
"George" he refers to is the son of Andreas Papandreou. At the time of the narrated meeting, 
George was an MP in his father's government; at the time of our interview, he was the ex-Prime 
Minister of Greece. As a young man, George Papandreou had been living in Toronto during the 
years of the junta with his family and later, when he was studying in the US, he returned for 
frequent visits. 
George and I had many conversations over the years when he was coming to "Esperides" 
[a boîte on the Danforth] and then after, when the family returned to Greece, George was 
visiting Canada for some reason and he was coming to the "Trojan Horse." The last time I 
saw him there was in 1984 and I mentioned that I was planning to go back to Greece. He 
gives me a few of his phone numbers and says, "For sure, you must call me..." A couple 
months later I went to Greece. I hadn't called him, because, like I said, I wasn't interested 
in participating in the government or taking a position that I didn't deserve, though they 
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were giving positions away to people like me. So, now I was in Greece and I was working 
at a nice taverna in Athens. It was a very famous place, a huge place called "Ama Lahei", 
in Exarcheia. Big names were coming in there––a few politicians, lots of artists and 
musicians, but all leftists. One day [...] who comes in but George Papandreou!  Remember, 
we had been speaking just three months before. He doesn't recognize me! Nothing! I said, 
"OK, no problem," because I didn't need anything. Now, I understand a whole number of 
things:  If you are the son of Andreas Papandreou and your father is in government, there 
are a million people who want to meet you, who want to talk to you, want favours. When 
we are here, in Toronto––I mean him and I––yes, we have something to talk about. But 
over there, what do we have to talk about? [...] I was not a member of PASOK and I didn't 
want any help from them [...] So anyway, I didn't need to talk to George but the thing is, I 
was speaking to him in Toronto like I'm speaking to you now. And he was behaving as if 
we never met! 
I quote Lukas at length here because I think his statement evokes, in a meaningful way, the 
complexities of the returning diaspora and the subtle ambiguities of relations that are in one site 
proximate, frequent, more or less familiar, and in another fraught with implicit inequality, 
suspicion and distance. "They were giving jobs away to people like me," recalled Lukas 
incredulously. And indeed, given that the democratic Greek network was rather small in Toronto 
and other diasporas (referring here to those who were actively involved in the anti-dictatorship 
movement) this meant that many men had ordinary relations with figures that rose to prominence 
or became "very respectable people" in Athens. 
 In Lukas' analysis, a casual exchange in Toronto between two persons of the Greek 
diaspora in a progressive atmosphere of socializing, gets reframed in Athens as "asking for 
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something." If conversation is perceived as a means of acquiring status or favour, through party 
lines, then speaking is itself perilous; it always risks being taken as opportunistic or self-serving. 
In Lukas' account, the meeting in Ama Lahei––which we can imagine being the Athenian 
equivalent to the Trojan Horse in Toronto––is stripped of its sociality; names and faces go 
unrecognized, there is no longer "anything to talk about," and Lukas finds himself in the position 
of being just another guy "going around the king." Of course, this recollection also serves as a 
reminder that whatever relations were created in the diaspora, they were not guaranteed channels 
to benefits upon return. 
 A rather striking comparison emerges from my interview with Nikos, who was working in 
a factory in the "PAK days" and remained in Canada after the fall of the junta. He recalled an 
exchange he had with the new Prime Minister when the latter visited Toronto in 1982. A dinner 
had been prepared for Andreas Papandreou and all the "PAK guys" remaining in Toronto were 
invited: 
We had a dinner  [...] and I was sitting next to him. Every couple of minutes someone 
comes over and tells him what he needs. You know, "My daughter is at the University in 
Ottawa but now she needs to go the University in Athens, because now we are going to 
move to Greece, so I need help..." and Papandreou [would say], "Tell my secretary." And 
then another person comes right away, and I'm sitting there, watching. All kinds of 
requests. You name it! So I go like this [gestures placing a hand on Papandreou's shoulder] 
and I say, "Look man, with me, you're safe. I don't want anything from you. I don't want 
anything!" [...] And, you know, I always believed in my life that it's a big thing if you don't 
want anything. A very big thing. This is what I got from my father. OK? And my father 
didn't speak too much. 
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My conversation with Nikos was interrupted at this point by one of his friends, who I would later 
interview. Makis sat down at the cafe table, asked what we were speaking about and then stated 
matter-of-factly, "It's no good time to be Greek." I asked him what he meant, and he explained 
that he had taken to avoiding his "Canadian" neighbours whenever they greeted him, pretending 
not to hear them. He had been doing this ever since they had started asking about the crisis in 
Greece. Every time they heard a story about Greece on the news––about families who recorded 
low incomes but were found to have luxury homes and swimming pools, about the island where 
"fifty percent of the population pretends to be to crippled in order to get benefits," or the village 
where widows were cashing their dead husbands' state pension cheques even decades after their 
deaths––the neighbours would ask Makis what he thought. "I have nothing to say," Makis said, 
shrugging. "I'm ashamed to be Greek." Nikos, upon hearing this last remark, made a gesture of 
annoyance and cut his friend off, "We got nothing to be ashamed of. Don't forget that." 
 There was something unique about Nikos' approach to my questions and the concern of his 
friend. There was an assuredness to his statements and a confidence that suggested little regrets 
and little need for self-reflection or analysis. This sense of stability is also reflected in his' 
description above. Here we have a second example of one of the "old PAK guys" encountering a 
Papandreou, albeit with very different connotations. If Lukas' story is one of an intimacy 
betrayed by new relations of power, of comradery broken by a performative amnesia in post-
dictatorship Athens, Nikos' version of "dinner with Andreas" maintains all the expressions of 
friendship––the close proximity, an affectionate hand placed supportively on a shoulder, the 
unguarded "listen, man." Just a few moments later, Nikos said simply, "the good people always 
step away"––a statement that sheds direct light on questions of subjectivity, morality and 
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proximity. Note too the claim to continuity of genealogy in Nikos' reference to his father: 
Neither men "want anything" from anyone.  
 Echoing this moral imperative––that the good keep their distance––Kristos (the man who 
was convinced by Papandreou to return to Athens) constructed a very particular profile of those 
who remained in Canada after the fall of the junta: 
And the great and most wonderful thing that makes me very proud, almost emotional [and 
here the speaker tears up a bit] is that [the] group in Toronto, never never cashed in. No 
one came to ask for anything, to take a position. They stayed there in quiet dignity. They 
keep their memories, and they don't talk about it [...] So this separates these people; it 
makes them a distinct social group with special virtues, alright? A lot of [others] came, and 
look what happened.  
What begins here as a rather poetic portrayal of the whole PAK group in Toronto ends up 
demarcating between those who "stayed in their quiet dignity" and those who "came." Kristos 
then provided a comparison between those in Toronto and other diasporic groups from Western 
Europe; those arriving from Germany and Italy did so with expectations of "distribution," he 
said, while many from Canada were invited but couldn't be "persuaded" to come.  
 This equation of those remaining in the Toronto diaspora with dignity, on the one hand, 
and those returning with opportunism, on the other, was a persistent trope in accounts, 
necessitating a series of qualifications for those who returned, but were good guys with good 
intentions. So too was the theme of silence as an antidote to the excessive and public 
manipulation of discourses of resistance in the post-dictatorship years. In fact, next to the 
miming of anti-dictatorship and liberation speak––from "all sides"––silence appears as a virtue 
in Kristos' narrative. As one interviewee pointed out, CVs of many of the older PASOK 
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members and MPs even today include the requisite statement that they were engaged in the anti-
dictatorship struggle. Especially if one looks at the resumes or biographies of the first group of 
governing PASOK ministers back in 1981, "anti-dictatorship resistance" is as common a 
qualification as a degree in Law or Economics.  
 In this way, silence and keeping a distance are narratively constructed as indications of 
integrity in many interviews. Other variations of the trope of proximity are expressed in the 
claims, "I never made a call" and "I never visited anyone." These appear both in accounts of 
failed returns, which I have discussed above, and the resettlement narratives of those who ended 
up staying in Greece. As one interviewee claimed: "I was one of the few guys who had Mikis 
Theodorakis' private number. But when I got to Greece, I never used it. I never made the call." 
Of course, this remark suggests that it was not only former PAK or PASOK members that could 
have benefited from visits and calls. Not making a call was taken to the extreme in Tasos' 
account of adjusting to life under "PASOK hegemony." Despite having been an active member 
of the KKE-I in Toronto, Tasos was employed in a PASOK research institution, established with 
the proclaimed purpose of researching modern Greece in all of its economic and political 
specificities. Tasos explained that in the late 70s and early 80s one would be placed on a list in 
order to acquire a telephone number and, "like many lists in Greece," one's position could be 
elevated dramatically with interventions from the right people. Acknowledging that he could 
have easily asked one of his PASOK colleagues to enlist the help of a Minister, he refused to do 
so. Despite repeated inquiries to the telephone company, Tasos had no luck. Laughing in 
disbelief, he added "I waited more than two years for a fucking phone!" 
 Finally, in the accounts of those who remained in Toronto after the fall of the junta, we 
find confirmation of Kristos' claim that others were invited but could not be convinced to join 
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PASOK's efforts in Greece. For Nikos, the manner in which the party solicited him was 
problematic from the onset. Nikos explained to me why he refused to join PASOK back in 
September 1974: 
 Nikos: Listen, when PASOK was created and I went to the meeting, do you know 
 why I decided not to join? Because they asked me to make an application! 
  Katherine: And? 
  Nikos: An application! To be a member! I was asked to fill out an application! Do  
  you understand? 
  Katherine: Umm...  
  Nikos: I was asked to fill out an application and I resented that.    
  Katherine: And why did you resent that?  
 Nikos: Why?! [and hear the speaker raises his voice] What more did I have to 
 prove?! And to whom? I did my duty, didn't I? I did more than what I was supposed 
 to do! And I told them so. I never joined them. 
When PASOK came to power in 1981, Nikos was solicited by the Prime Minister's office: "The 
letters came for me and two other guys. 'Come and join us,' they said." He declined each time. 
This experience of having been solicited was raised in other accounts––"They called me from 
Greece"; "I received a letter"; "Andreas invited me personally"––as were statements about the 
potential for one's involvement in government or for select public offices. Thanos, who referred 
to himself as "left of the left" (and when asked if he was a communist, replied "it depends who's 
asking") had been actively involved in the PAK movement. Invited "personally once Andreas 
was in power" to be an unelected minister, Thanos refused. "Knowing me," he began, "wanting 
to say what I wished, I hate to think of what would have happened. Because people like me, and 
 184 
I'm going to get personal here [laughing], they don't have many friends. And, of course, Greece 
is not a country to be without friends." Thanos' remark is interesting in so far as it notes both the 
individualized solicitation, as well as the prediction that his return would end in failure. Precisely 
because he could not refrain from speaking his mind and keeping his principles––"as a leftist"––
he anticipated isolation as inevitable.   
 Others speculated on the contours of their fate in Greece had they returned. Noting that 
they could "easily have held a position" or that they "would probably have become an MP," men 
engaged in the imaginary construction of how things could have been. Recall, however, Lukas' 
claim that "they were giving positions away to people like me," a statement that speaks not so 
much to an individualized solicitation but a general sense of benefits and jobs being up for grabs.  
 Between the lines of these accounts, and taken together, we gain insight into how men 
think about political subjectivity. We see that an "ethical subject position" (Faubian 2011: 36) in 
the Metapolitefsi is probably better understood through movement––of retreats, withdrawals and 
"stepping back." Restraint and declinations––both to invitations for coffee at the local PASOK 
office and to formal offers of party positions––are presented as proof of one's integrity. In the 
citing of humble fathers, or appeals to left origins, these refusals and retreats can sometimes be 
read as a commitment to one's political genealogy. 
IV. Left Genealogies in Ashes? 
 
As I have discussed above, when Andreas Papandreou came to power in 1981, he did so as the 
leader of the first governing socialist party in the history of modern Greece. One of the first 
reconciliatory gestures "between left and right" that Papandreou proposed was the destruction of 
citizen files, which had so long been the basis for persecuting leftists. Indeed, what better way to 
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close the files––which Thanos warned us were "made to be kept, not thrown away"––than to 
burn them? However, Papandreou rescinded this directive after protests from the scientific 
community convinced him that these were documents of historical importance. 
 In September of 1989, the great majority of the files (an estimated 30,000,000 documents) 
were nevertheless destroyed in a public incinerator just outside of Athens and in public squares 
throughout Greece.67 The ambiguity of the act and its consequences for those I interviewed is 
complicated by the fact that it was not PASOK, but a short-lived coalition government of KKE, 
KKE-I (the communist parties) and ND (conservatives) who destroyed the files.68 This coalition 
government is understood to be a stain on the history of the Communist Party and one that any 
critic of the party (on the left, right, or center) can easily raise to discredit communists up to the 
present (especially in the current political climate of the KKE's stubborn refusals to work with 
the emerging radical left SYRIZA). This kind of alliance, between left and right, was 
unprecedented in Greek political history, and it was established as an attempt to wipe 
Papandreou off the map after the emergence (quite ironically, perhaps) of public allegations that 
he was engaged in wire-tapping of political opponents (Samatas 2004: 11). 
 The burning of the files was enacted through a law for the "Remedy for the Consequences 
of the Civil War." 69  This law also called for changes in terminology; specifically, the 
replacement of "War against the gangs" (simmoritopolemos) or "Bandit War" with "Civil War" 
(emfiliopolemos) and of "Communist Gangfighters" (koumounistosimorites) with "DSE 
fighters" (Democratic Army of Greece fighters). While the changes of terminology (mostly in 
                                               
67 Manolis Karellis, "The destruction of the political files", Patris, November 26, 2011. 
http://www.patris.gr/articles/211328?PHPSESSID=#.VGN-t_TF8f8 
(Accessed December 22, 2001). 
68 ibid 
69 Law 1863-1989 (Άρση των Συνεπειών των Εµφυλίου Πολέµου 1944-1949)   
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government and educational texts) were welcomed enthusiastically, the destruction of the files 
was not without critics from the left. They argued, as Panourgia (2009) does, that such a move 
would "secure the past in the furnace of the steel mill" (153), removing any accountability from 
the state, paramilitary, or informants. On the eve of the incineration, Harilaos Florakis and and 
Michaili Kyrkos (leaders of the KKE and KKE-I, respectively) raised their objections to the 
destruction of the files. Nevertheless, the public destruction of the files proceeded as planned the 
following day and both men made public statements of support for the decision.70 
 Approximately 2100 files––pertaining to "figures of historical importance"––were kept and 
classified in 1989 with the justification that this decision avoided "scratching at public passions" 
and maintained the "spirit of national reconciliation." It was promised that the files would be 
made open to the public in twenty years.71 Some of the men I interviewed expressed a belief that 
many files (including their own) had not been burned or the opinion that, whether or not the 
actual material file existed, the contents of their file had been digitalized into police computer 
records. One interviewee, who regarded himself as a communist, explained that the burning of 
the files was just another problematic gesture on the part of Andreas Papandreou, made in the 
name of national reconciliation but more indicative of the center's long history of anti-
communism and tolerance for right-wing collaboration. Papandreou, like Karamanlis before him, 
missed the opportunity to bring those responsible to justice because it was never a genuine 
concern, just as many decades prior, George Papandreou (in the words of another interviewee) 
was remarkably "lethargic" at the close of WWII and made little attempt to punish 
                                               
70 Karellis 
71 ibid 
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collaborators.72 Here, Karamanlis (ND), George Papandreou Sr. (Center Union) and his son 
Andreas (PASOK) are all figured as friends of the right, concerned only with the protection of 
"rats" and "informants" and not with the "good people who suffered." 
 Panourgia (2009) renders the dual gesture––of Karamanlis' 1975 legalization of the party 
and PASOK's alleged burning of the files––an act of "enforced amnesia": "The Left was made, at 
once, both legal and forgotten" (153).73 But if we accept Panourgia's suggestion that the burning 
of the files was an "askesis (exercise) in forgetting" (150), what shall we make of the amnesia 
around the left's own involvement in the destruction of the files? And how might we begin to 
reckon this point of silence with the persisting preoccupation of Kyriakos—one of the two 
brothers I discussed who were involved in KKE-I. Reflecting on a conversation he had with his 
brother "just days ago," Kyriakos recounted: "He said to me, when I die, ask your children to 
seek that fakelos because I believe after 10 or 15 years they will be in our hands, god willing." In 
this way, the destruction of the files takes on the additional significance of having precluded 
forms of redress that may have been possible by tracking one’s genealogy against state power, 
even under the changed political imperatives of a leftist government and its attempt to "restore 
justice."74 
                                               
72 On the other hand, Minas Samatas (2004), a scholar of Greek surveillance, writes that Papandreou's 
decision not to burn the files demonstrates both a lack of genuine commitment  to reconciliation and the 
party's populism: "The first PASOK administration (during 1981-1989), despite the end of 
institutionalized anticommunism and the liberation of society from most remnants of the police state 
proved its populist character first by its negligence in fulfilling its promise to ban anticommunist 
surveillance entirely and burn the file of all Greek citizens used to exercise political control" (11). He 
also notes the continued practice of widespread surveillance of political opponents by both the PASOK 
and New Democracy governments (even employed against one's own ministers, in the case of 
Papandreou).  
73 Panourgia herself places the burning of the files among PASOKs "conciliatory gestures" and does not 
indicate that it was actually carried out by the coalition government comprised of the Communist parties 
and the right-wing New Democracy.  
74 I thank Michael Nijhawan for framing this point so articulately.  
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 This conversation, between two brothers of the left who had been persecuted more than 
four decades ago, obviously moved me. It also led me to research parliamentary discussions (or 
lack thereof) concerning the files. No efforts have been made by either PASOK or New 
Democracy governments to make the existing files accessible to the people filed or their 
families. The 20-year period of classification expired in Sept of 2009, at which point the 
government of New Democracy (just a few weeks from elections that were forecasted to bring 
PASOK back to power) decided that, in defense of the "public interest," the files would remain 
closed to all interested parties (including historians and other academics).75 In a much later 
justification of the government's decision, Antonis Liakos, a professor of modern history at the 
University of Athens, stated that, although the persons named in the files were probably dead, 
they had "nonetheless left behind families" and it was out of concern for their family members 
that the files should remain closed.76 One can hardly overlook the fact that Liakos is referring 
here to the family members of informants and collaborators, neglecting entirely the interest 
expressed in the files by the families of the left. The decision was taken at that time to re-classify 
the files until 2029 and, to the best of my understanding, it was taken with little public discussion 
or parliamentary debate. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
75 " Political files extended for another 20 years" (in Greek), TVXS, September 18, 2009 
http://tvxs.gr/news/ελλάδα/παρατείνονται-για-άλλα-20-χρόνια-οι-«φάκελοι-πολιτικών-φρονηµάτων» 
(Accessed July 27, 2011). 
76 Quoted in Sofia Pakalidou,"The political file still divides" (in Greek), Aggelioforos, November 1, 2009 
http://www.agelioforos.gr/default.asp?pid=7&ct=10&artid=9240 
(Accessed June 25, 2011). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to shed light on forms of subjectivity and sociality in the period 
Panourgia (2009) ambiguously refers to as "after history" (150). 77  Considered in light of the 
perspectives of those returning to Greece after the junta with high hopes and a commitment to 
restructuring the country, this is perhaps a telling qualification. "After history" is an obscure 
periodization and one used by Panourgia to note the banishment of memory, traces, 
accountability. In fact, one of my interviewees echoed this impulse with a designation of his 
own: "the never changing present." He told me (albeit misinterpreting my research), "It is good 
you are going to write only about the struggles in Canada during the junta, because after PASOK 
comes to power nothing happens in Greece. It is just the never-changing present." In the "after 
history" of the late 1970s, 80s and 90s, according to Panourgia, the struggle against the junta 
becomes ossified in, for example, names of streets and metro stations––symbolic markers 
without historical or genealogical depth. And yet, I have tried to evoke the sensibilities at work 
in those attempts to "make history" in this period, shedding light on forms of sociality and 
paradoxical expressions of (dis)identification and (mis)recognition. I have considered at length 
the tension emerging from narratives of return––one of proximities and moralities––between 
revealing, naming and claiming, on the one hand, and of retreating (sometimes in silence), on the 
                                               
77 Panourgia’s chronological chapters (bookended by two more personal and ethnographic ones) are 
organized into periods of repression: i) 1936-1944: The Metaxas Dictatorship, the Italian Attack, the 
German Invasion, German Occupation and Resistance; ii) 1944-1945: The Battle of Athens; iii) 1945-
1945: White Terror; iv) 1946-1949 Civil War; v) 1950-1976: Post Civil War; vi) 1967- 1974: 
Dictatorship; viii) 1974-2002: "After History." Of the post-civil war years (my preoccupation in chapter 
3), Panourgia writes very little. In fact, the chapter, despite covering 17 years, is only 7 pages in length, of 
which 4 pages are dedicated to the ideological battle ground in civil war historiography, 1.5 pages are 
used for photos and only 1.5 pages deals specifically with what happened "after the end of the civil war" 
(122).  Similarly, of the period she names "after history"––the post-dictatorship period up to 2002––she 
writes a total of three paragraphs. As a point of contrast, it is precisely these "post" periods that make up 
the focus of this chapter and chapter 2.  
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other. I have argued that these moments of hesitation and withdrawal, and of self-identification 
with the misfit and the marginal, should be read against both the backdrop of the "present" loss 
of PASOK's legitimacy and the state's efforts in the Metapolitefsi to hollow out political 
genealogies through its own rhetorical and bureaucratic processes.  
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Chapter 6 
Political Genealogy in Crisis: Reflections on an Ambiguous Present 
 
 
Athens, September 5, 2013 
 
The crisis in Athens has many faces: It accompanies those in the long lines outside 
unemployment offices and soup kitchens; it weighs on the shoulders of daily commuters, faces 
gazing blankly out of car windows as they idle in the congested centre; it springs up in buses and 
trams in remarks between strangers, "another new tax," "too many immigrants," "he'll go and 
study abroad"; it displays itself colourfully in shop windows––"Crisis Prices!"––and leaves its 
traces in the unopened bills that litter the dusty floors of stores closed indefinitely. The crisis 
folds itself into the foreheads of the old and young alike, causing men to ask, "have you noticed 
something different about the girls these days? Don't they look old?" It is written on the walls, in 
the scrawled graffiti that seems to coat the entire city centre––"Eat your local PASOK 
Politician! He ate your future!" "Nazi or Human?" "Troika = Junta." The crisis reveals itself in 
the whispered stories of elderly parents dying in their homes because there is no money for 
treatment, or in the clanging symphony of early risers scavenging dumpsters for food and metal 
scraps. It stands uniformed, armed and self-assured outside of Alpha Bank and it is performed 
daily in the street arrests of young migrant sellers, with their garlic cloves or Nike shoes still in 
hand. It creeps into the dreams of young people and is expressed in trailing sentences about 
where to study, how to find work, who to call...It circulates between neighbours in the always 
asked but never answered: Ti na kanoume? "What can we do?" The crisis is provocatively 
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evoked through painted swastikas and the black shirts of the Golden Dawn. It is commemorated 
with the wilted flowers at Syntagma, where an old pensioner shot himself publicly78. The crisis is 
embodied in street protest and in the cries of youth and elderly alike––"Freedom. Bread. Work," 
"The dictatorship did not end in 73"––and it incites bitterness in the hearts of those who've 
"worked  [their] whole life for a better Greece."  
 
I wrote these reflections in the fall of 2013 from my apartment in Kato Patissia–– one of the 
poorest and most diverse areas of Athens. I would regularly hear French, Arabic, Bengali and 
English spoken between migrants from Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Morocco, 
Sudan, Somalia and the Ivory Coast. Serifou Street became my home for a year, throwing into 
sharp relief socioeconomic realities and struggles that I had not seen during my stays in the more 
affluent neighbourhoods of Vrilissia and Chalandri and that I had only witnessed momentarily 
passing through areas like Zografou and Kypseli. Looking back at my observations, which I had 
recorded in the first weeks on Serifou Street, my tendency to personify the crisis is very evident, 
but I understand that I was trying to provide a visual scale of the social and economic impacts of 
"these troubled times" in both their most subtle and explicit manifestations. 
 This is by far the most open-ended of chapters, raising more questions than advancing 
arguments. The hesitancy of its ethnographic and theoretical statements is no doubt a reflection 
                                               
78 The note he left behind stated: "The Tsolakoglou occupation government has nullified any chance of 
my survival which was based on a decent salary that for 35 years I alone (without state support) paid for 
[...] Because I am of an age that does not allow me to forcefully react (without, of course, excluding that 
if some Greek took a Kalashnikov first, I would be the second) I see no other solution than a decent 
ending before I start looking in the garbage to feed myself. I believe that youth who have no future will 
one day take up arms and hang the national traitors upside-down in Syntagma square just as the Italians 
did in 1945 to Mussolini" (translated and published by The Guardian)  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/04/greek-man-shoots-himself-debts (Accessed April 10, 
2012) 
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of the volatility of the present. I explore here manifestations of political genealogy––expressed as 
movement, rupture, continuity, contradiction and suspension––in interviewees' attempts to come 
to terms with that cluster of economic and political events, discourses and institutional changes 
that constitute "the crisis." I show how men situate themselves within specific constellations of 
political genealogy and culture. In other words, as they try to give discursive shape to "these 
troubled times" and to weave their own life account into the narrative, they tend to draw––in 
diverse but distinguishable ways––from frames worth identifying and analyzing in some detail 
here. My hope is to translate some of the open-endedness of this volatile period into relevant 
questions for the relationship between contemporary articulations of insecurity and specific 
narrative "fates" of political genealogy. 
 In the next pages, I identify specific constellations of political genealogy and culture that 
are deployed in men's accounts of the crisis. The first, what I call "political genealogy as 
reproduction," primarily narrates continuity. One way it does so is through an adamant adherence 
to the party line of the communist party (KKE). A second constellation holds a disillusioned 
relation to the present, in which a specific political genealogy may have had its merit in the past 
but provides no political or moral direction for the way forward (out of crisis). A third is built 
around a reflexive identification with "the center" and what I tentatively call a "centric 
imaginary." It involves a recognition of the left-right binary (as well, perhaps, as one's own 
position in a left political genealogy), but relegates both to the past and strips the political 
genealogies I have been discussing of their contemporary relevance. While it breaks with 
genealogy in a similar way to that of the disillusioned figure, it is different in so far as it finds 
relief and inventiveness in the center, which it advocates as a sound moral and political project. 
A fourth constellation uses ambiguous auto-essentialist tropes that rest on cultural stereotypes of 
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"the Greeks," on the one hand, and a redemptive depiction of "Canada," on the other. In this 
case, political genealogy of the left and right is obscured completely by a hollowed out cultural 
genealogy––a vague and homogeneous "the Greeks." I conclude with a final constellation––one 
that attempts a creative, reinhabiting of political genealogy. 
 In using the term "crisis,” I am fully aware of its potentially spectacular and apocalyptic 
connotations. But the word itself is fully entrenched in everyday conversation in Greece and, in 
its most general interpretation, carries with it a sense of living in troubled times. I am interested, 
then, in the ways in which political genealogy orbits in the explanations, analyses, anxieties and 
forecasts that are expressed by those I interviewed––both by those who remain in Canada, 
observing the crisis from afar, and by those who resettled in Greece.  
I. The Party and I : Political Genealogy as Reproduction 
 
Toronto, December 10 2010 
Thalia is the oldest of my interviewees and the only woman who has agreed to speak to me until 
now. I met Thalia at her home in Mississauga, a small bungalow that she shares with her 
daughter, son-in-law and adult grandson. Before we begin our interview she tells me to go 
upstairs to see "her wall". She'll wait downstairs. I find myself in her bedroom, in front of a wall 
covered in black and white photographs. One stands out. It is not quite a photo, or perhaps it is 
but some lines and details have been inked in: A young woman is standing in uniform and resting 
on a rifle. She stares straight ahead, determined and very young. "Did you see it?" she asks, 
once I've returned to the basement. "Is that you with the gun?" I ask. "Of course it is!" We begin 
our interview and from time to time her daughter interrupts with comments of her own: "Family 
should come before parties," she says, matter-of-factly, "not the other way around." Thalia 
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herself often loses her place in the narrative she is telling and becomes frustrated. She speaks of 
the "opportunists" in Greece and so-called "leftists" like Mikis Theodorakis, who "is no 
communist." "They called me from the party just a few days ago," insists Thalia, "'Ti kaneis, 
Thalia?[How, are you, Thalia].' You see? They still remember me." She tells her daughter to 
bring her purse. "I want to show you something," Thalia says, as she opens it. "Look!" She holds 
in her hands a small booklet, in which many small stamps indicate she's paid her membership 
fees to the Communist party. The book is a few decades old. She puts it back carefully in a sleeve 
of her purse and sighs. A Greek soap opera has been on for the entire duration of our interview, 
not quite muted. "They called me from the party just last week," she repeats, looking sideways at 
the television, "Ti kaneis, Thalia?" 
 
Given the inherent intimacy between the concepts of genealogy and reproduction, let me clarify 
what aspects of this relation I am interested in exploring here. By "reproduction,” I am referring 
to a continuity in lexicons, (dis)identifications and attachments, but I am also addressing one's 
own reflexive awareness of the problem of reproduction as it emerges in accounts of the current 
crisis. Put more simply: Participants both perform a certain reproductive tendency in their 
accounts, by claiming affinity with the political past that has excluded them, while at the same 
time reflecting on and assessing the challenges in Greece today as stemming from the problem of 
reproduction.  
 Let me begin with an explicit example of the reproduction of genealogy, one emerging at 
the highest level of government and from a set of protagonists with whom we are now well 
familiar: George Papandreou Sr., Andreas Papandreou and George Papandreou Jr. Grandfather. 
Father. Son. In early June of 2013, former Prime Minister George Papandreou appeared on 
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Canadian TVO's The Agenda for what was framed as a frank discussion of "the Greek crisis." 
After Paikin introduced his guest as "the third Papandreou to become prime minister of Greece," 
Mr. Papandreou pointed out that he was also a fellow Torontonian many years ago. He then 
clarified the ways in which his family's history is often misportrayed: 
Sometimes when people say, you know, "He is the third of a family of prime ministers," it 
sounds a little bit like a dynasty. But think about it––it was basically three generations of 
fighting for democracy. My grandfather was in jail six times in his life, and in exile. My 
father, twice was in jail, one of them, of course when I was a kid...I was 14 when the 
dictators arrested my father and, during the arrest, I had a gun pointed to my head... 
In his appeal for the viewer to "think about it," George Papandreou counters what he implies to 
be a rather superficial interpretation of his family's involvement in politics as dynasty and urges a 
second, more nuanced, reading. Reclaiming his genealogy as one of freedom fighters in flight 
(and "Canada" as a site of refuge), he clarifies his roots in politics as not so much about family 
title, but family oppression (or title valiantly achieved through fighting oppression). This 
television interview took place about three years after Papandreou had brought the country into 
the course of debt packages and austerity measures and a year and a half after he had had 
resigned from the office of Prime Minister.  
 George Papandreou had made a similar appeal to genealogy a few years prior in the middle 
of parliamentary proceedings. Having misused a Greek expression, Papandreou evoked a loud 
outpouring of mockery and laughter, to which he responded, "That's enough! Show some 
respect, show some respect! I am a Greek of the diaspora and this was not my decision but 
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because my father was exiled twice!"79 In this moment, Papandreou explicitly evoked his 
family's exile in defense along with the injury done by right-wing regimes (descendants of which 
sit in parliament today).   
 While this is perhaps an overly publicized demonstration of the continuing relevance of 
genealogy, it was commented upon by interviewees in both Greece and Canada. Yet, as Yannis' 
remarks show below, continuities can also be reinvented in the use to which they are put. As an 
old PAK activist, but one "never involved in PASOK," Yannis repositions the Papandreou clan 
as proverbial fish out of water in his explanation of the "state we're in today":  
If you are Prime Minister, you don't go by bicycle to the parliament [referring to George 
Papandreou]. The Greeks are not ready, you Malaka! [You idiot!] You are not in Sweden! 
You  are not in Canada, where the Prime Minister goes with a jacket over his shoulder to a 
movie! You know [laughing], you are not in Toronto! He was unable to understand that. 
For him, it was the most simple thing and I agree with him. But this is not Toronto [...] But 
these are the things that people don't take into consideration when they talk about politics, 
culture [...]  even though these are the main things! These are so important! Everyday 
living details. You know? So obviously, in this way, George Papandreou was totally 
unable to rule Greece. And to some degree, his father. To some degree.  
Yannis' reflections are perceptive in a number of respects. Indeed, they express a sociological 
perspective in their own right: In the foreground of what we typically take to be "political" are a 
host of subtle social and cultural dynamics that matter for those thinking about their politicians 
and assessing their government. I am especially interested in Yannis' emphasis on a very 
                                               
79 Deepa Babington, Dina Kyriakidou, and David Lawder, "Papandreou: The Rise and Fall of a Greek 
Prince," Reuters, November 8, 2011 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/08/us-greece-papandreou-idUSTRE7A74RU20111108 
(accessed December 1, 2001). 
 198 
particular inheritance; Andreas the father, marries an American in exile abroad, and bestows 
upon Georgakis ––or "little George" as he is referred to by many, minimizing at once his 
masculinity, intelligence and authority––the condition of being in exile, a circumstance that 
rendered him unsuitable to govern Greece from the onset. All of this exposes their illegitimate 
genealogy: father and son, raised in foreign lands, coming "home" to roost, generating polices 
and programs for which Greece was never "ready" to adopt. According to some of their critics, 
father and son are rendered not quite kin––not quite Greek enough––for Greek standards. In 
other words, continuities of political genealogy are put to two very different uses: While George 
Papandreou (along with a number of his loyal followers) calls upon a political genealogy of exile 
to legitimate himself (and his father and grandfather) as political actors, Yannis points to the 
problem  of political genealogy as the root cause of PASOK's failures and the "state we're in 
today." In the latter analysis, contemporary predicaments are, in a very roundabout way, the 
consequence of a genealogy that renders one out of place. 
 Such remarks must be analyzed with an awareness that, at the time of PASOK's rise, 
Andreas Papandreou's speeches were experienced by many as "music to the ears." Judging from 
video footage of these events (and, of course, the mass electoral support for Papandreou's 
PASOK) there is no doubt that he was incredibly effective at mobilizing sensitivities and 
loyalties.80 Yannis' remarks must be read in their ambivalence. There is a clear tension between 
casting Papandreou as inherently inappropriate for the political role of Prime Minister and his 
broad appeal, which interviewees expressed variously as the "love of the people," "mass 
support,” "manipulation,” "just words" and "rhetoric." Of course, even their inappropriateness 
can work in the favour of the Papandreou's; they were progressive advocates for a "better 
                                               
80 To get just a sense of the crowds that Papandreou attracted, see video footage of his speech in 
Thessaloniki (1985): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TWdQvng4jI (accessed January 2, 2012)  
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Greece," being "light years ahead of the people." For the purpose of our discussion of political 
genealogy here, I want only to highlight the emphasis on a narrative continuity between 
grandfather, son and grandson that renders the Papandreou "line" il/legitimate. 
 Returning now to my interview with Thalia and the ethnographic note that opens this 
chapter, I want to highlight a distinct manifestation of reproduced genealogy that was narratively 
performed with quite striking consistency by some who maintain a stated attachment to the 
Greek Communist Party (KKE). Thalia was the first person I met during the course of my 
research who avowed an outright identification with the communist party. Her case is 
exceptional for many reasons: at 91, she was by far the oldest person I interviewed; she remains 
one of only three women who agreed to speak with me; she is the only interviewee who 
participated in the civil war as a young partisan; and having been diagnosed with dementia, she 
experienced significant memory loss during our interview. Thalia could not address the current 
economic and political events in Greece and despite having been active in the anti-dictatorship 
movement, she had very little to say about it. For these reasons, I was hesitant to include Thalia 
in this discussion. And yet, the ethnographic note captures so well a certain insistent rhythm of 
reproduction that was identifiable in other interviews with members of the Communist Party. 
Thalia's specific gestures towards inclusion and exclusion (her use of the term "opportunist" for 
dissenting leftists, the prioritization of proof of supporting the party, her desire for continued 
recognition from the party ("they still remember me") were conveyed by other "card carrying" 
members of KKE. In other words, there is a reproductive feature at work in accounts that closely 
aligns the speaker with a specific political position and performs genealogical continuity. 
 I identified this reproductive tendency again in my interviews with Pavlos, a communist of 
the KKE who maintains his membership in the (Canadian) party today. Pavlos is in his mid-70s, 
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with a youthful walk, very alert and inquisitive eyes and a happy disposition. He was probably 
the most enthusiastic interviewee, intent on "setting the record straight" about both the anti-
dictatorship movement in Toronto and the current economic and political realities of Greece. He 
repeatedly offered any help he could give to my project and volunteered to meet with me as often 
as necessary. Within a few moments of our first interview, as we were addressing the most recent 
political polls conducted in Greece, Pavlos exclaimed, "Tsipras and SYRIZA are nothing but 
opportunists! Just like our guy, Mr. Papandreou!" He laughed a little and then stopped himself, 
adding "sorry for my laughter, but come on, these are not serious people, ok?" More than two 
hours into our interview, I was exhausted. Pavlos rarely answered my questions specifically and I 
was beginning to feel like I was in a lecture. He narrated what seemed to me a detailed history of 
the civil war and the years leading up to the dictatorship from the vantage point of the 
Communist Party. He insisted a number of times that what he was telling me was the "real 
story," one that I wouldn't be told by the "other guys" (men he knew I had spoken to who were 
not themselves members of the party). He interrupted himself on occasion to set the frame: 
"Theodorakis? A wonderful composer! But come, on, he's an opportunist!" And then, "What is 
this 'left', Katerina? Everyone can say they are so! Papandreou can say he is left!" These 
statements had the air of being at once profoundly obvious––when paired with laughs of ridicule, 
rolls of the eyes and hand gestures that expressed, "Come on! Get real"–– and top secret and 
privileged information I was unlikely to hear from anyone else––when conveyed in hushed tones 
and a folding of Pavlos' body inward that made it clear others were not meant to overhear. I 
returned home some hours later to transcribe the interview, first downloading and then deleting it 
from my device. To my dismay, I realized I had accidentally deleted the interview completely. 
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Embarrassed, I called Pavlos, apologized profusely, and arranged another meeting for one week 
later. 
 On our second meeting, Pavlos was much more laid back. He was jovial and forgiving of 
my mistake and the need for a "round two." I began asking my specific questions but, once 
again, he digressed and seemed to divert from any attempt on my part to bring the interview back 
to my core themes. Having interviewed him only one week prior, I found that much of what he 
said was already familiar to me. When it was time to transcribe this interview, I discovered, with 
frustration, that the first had been downloaded after all and that I had accidentally misfiled it. I 
decided to listen to both interviews, one after the other, and in doing so, I realized that Pavlos 
had been working along the lines of a script. Of course, it wasn't exact, but the mode of 
developing the narrative was identifiable in both interviews. From this perspective, the 
vocabulary of attachment and identity to the party, distance from the others, mistrust and disdain 
became particularly evident. In a third interview, perhaps feeling that he had set the ground for 
"getting it straight," Pavlos was more accommodating of my specific questions. 
 But what did Pavlo and other KKE supporters have to say about the contemporary 
economic and political circumstances in Greece? Many provided an analysis grounded in 
political economy, devoid of claims that what was happening in Greece today was exceptional or 
that there was a cultural explanation for contemporary problems. There was also a belief that 
what we are seeing today is "just another capitalist crisis"; as a result, much of what the party has 
"always said" is proven to be true and doesn't require revision. 
 This abiding lexicon is precisely the point of reference for those critical of the communist 
party. As one interviewee remarked, "they keep selling the same old cars although the factory's 
closed," impressing that repetition is the marker of redundancy. But the point was also made by 
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leftists and self-affirmed communists who had broken with the party. Kyriakos declared at the 
close of his interview, "No longer will they get me again in the 'dream of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat'"––the latter phrase intoned ironically and with air quotes.  
 I have shown above how Yannis' remarks about the failures of PASOK expose the problem 
of reproduced genealogy. The same interpretive device is used in both critiques and valorizations 
of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left). SYRIZA, led by Alexis Tsipras, was established first 
as a coalition of left-wing parties in 2004 and then as a party in 2012. As a coalition, it attracted 
5% of the popular vote in 2004. As a party, it rose to become the main oppositional force in 
2012, claiming 27% of votes. In narrative terms, dismissing SYRIZA as a viable political 
alternative rests on genealogical references to the party's constituency: After all, who is Tsipras 
but "a product of the student movement," "originating from the communist youth group" and 
how could Greece put its faith in the "old Stalinist guard?" This is a strategy of delegitimization 
focusing on the communist composition of the party (thereby obscuring the other political groups 
that claim to be left, but not communist). And yet, for others, it is precisely the heterogeneity of 
the party and thus the ambiguity of political genealogies that immediately disqualifies SYRIZA 
from being a viable contender in leadership. Originally a coalition of 13 groups, the party 
appears to some interviewees as a mixed bag of political actors whose many past disagreements 
and factions make any "party position" impossible. Said in another way, there is no recognizable, 
singular, shared and continuous genealogy that SYRIZA can claim and, as one interviewee 
explained, "a political party without an extended family" is suspect from the onset.  
 Panayiotis, who never supported PASOK electorally and refers to himself as "left but not 
communist," similarly rejected the viability of a SYRIZA government because, in his view, it is 
simply the contemporary refuge for political orphans––those who have lost their "extended 
 203 
family" and safety networks in the decline of PASOK and who are now seeking to protect 
themselves against additional loss and preparing themselves for "future distributions". For 
Panayioti, SYRIZA is nothing more than an adopted father, beckoning the lost ones to come in 
from the storm and promising, in return, restored public offices, wages and pensions. This is a 
question not so much of reproduced political genealogies, as the capacity of political forces to 
discreetly cover themselves with the intention of reproducing specific privileges and securities.  
 Others supporting SYRIZA sometimes found political genealogy useful for justifying the 
movement of specific persons from PASOK to SYRIZA. This involved recasting those moving 
between parties as the "old guard", "true Pasokers" who had always been fighting for the cause 
of social justice but had been muted by power-hungry leaders set on diverting the party from its 
original goals. The migration of the old guard of Pasokers to SYRIZA is welcomed as a kind of 
return to the noble founding principles of a now corrupted party––one that had long ago 
disappointed its social base in the pursuit of political power.  
 What do these observations have in common for our discussion of the narrative fates of 
political genealogy? I am suggesting here that they either perform a reproduction in political 
genealogy or pose it as a problematic in their assessments and interpretations of the 
contemporary "state we're in." In the first case, we observed Pavlos and Thalia performing a 
commitment to the lexicon of the Communist Party; the very tendency that critics identify as 
proof of the party's contemporary irrelevance. We also saw the play of reproduction between the 
language of George Papandreou to legitimize his place in politics and of Yannis to delegitimize 
the ex-Prime minister. In the second case, I showed how the problematic of reproduction is used 
in diverse ways to ground competing interpretations of Greece's crisis; with the same logic, one 
can (de)legitimize SYRIZA and condemn or sanction the movement of Pasokers to SYRIZA. 
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II. The Disillusioned Leftist: Political Genealogy in Retreat 
 
"That's what my son calls me, a frustrated leftist," remarked Yannis, one evening in his Athens 
home while we were perusing his very extensive personal archive. "I suppose I am a 
disillusioned leftist." While sorting through boxes upon boxes of newspapers, photos, personal 
letters and recordings, Yannis continued, "He's an anarchist. And as you know, the anarchists are 
meeting Golden Dawn every night in the streets..." He sighed, "He does say 'to hell with the 
state' and why shouldn't he?" I asked Yannis to tell me more about this idea of the "disillusioned 
leftist": 
Look Katherine, I know one thing...that when everything is erupting and everything goes 
down, by law of nature, something else has to go. That's the end of this trip. I don't 
understand why they are not reacting violently. The other day we had Merkel here and we 
had no more than maybe 40, 50 thousand people here in the streets. I don't understand why 
there was not more than 2 million. I don't know what they are expecting. Will there be a 
specific drop that is going in the glass of water? To overflow the water? [...] I know in my 
personal life, I used to work from 8 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock [...] I would close 
the shop, go home, eat a little bit, sleep a little bit [and return]. I'd have to do something 
with my son, with my wife [...] Now, the last three years, 2 o’clock either my son or my 
wife will work here and the store will remain open until 11 o’clock at night. Just to keep 
the door open, because when you close the door, there is no way you will open it again. 
That's it. So, from that point of view, I am feeling bitter because I wasn't expecting this! 
After all, I have done my life to see a better Greece, to reach a level, to reach a point where 
I'm like, "Oh shit, do I have money to buy cigarettes today?" Because I don't think 
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personally I deserve something like this. Let alone the rest of the Greeks. And that is my 
bitter lemon. 
 Yannis captures the insecurity––material and existential––of living in "end times," a mood 
that was all the more pronounced in the space of his dusty archives. But he was not alone in 
envisioning a catastrophic conclusion to the crisis; the foreseeing of "everything falling apart" 
emerged often. Angelos' remark, in a dejected tone, that "Greece is like a sinking ship, going 
down, down, down and I guess when it hits bottom, it will start again... the development" was a 
more ambiguously optimistic version of this prediction. Of course, it takes a certain kind of 
distance to call for a whole society, of which you are presumed to be a part, to "hit bottom" and 
"start again".  
 
Figure 7: "And that is my bitter lemon" 
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Thanos, who we met initially in chapter three as one of the "fakelomeni," reflected on the crisis 
in our interview during the fall of 2011. He lodged a severe critique of "the left," one that I read 
as fundamentally imbricated with (but not reducible to) his own political genealogy: "You know, 
today I hear about this situation and I see Papariga [leader of KKE] and Tsipras [leader of 
SYRIZA] and ok, they do an analysis which I like and everything they say is right about the 
crisis. I know the polls, if the two of them get together they will be the number one political 
force in Greece. What’s stopping them?" I posed the question back to Thanos and he continued: 
I don't know! I don’t know! It only enhances my belief that they are useless! You have the 
right analysis and know the reasons why this is happening but you can't make the move. 
You go on endlessly critiquing the two-party system and when you have the chance to give 
it a deadly blow, you kick it away! You don't have the magnanimity to come out and say, 
"We’re together[...] whatever our differences may be!" Listen, I am at the end of my life 
here [...] All this time I am waiting for them to come and embrace me [...]and to say, "We 
are together. To hell with our differences. We don’t care." Can’t they make that choice? Is 
it so difficult? Do you know how many people, not just communists, who would welcome 
such a move? It would be like a resurrection. 
Thanos' comments are compelling. I tentatively interpret his portrayal of the primary splits in the 
left to reflect his own trajectory as a political orphan of sorts; distrusted by party members, but 
aligned ideologically, Thanos is very candidly expressing his own deeply felt and persistent 
longing for recognition and reconciliation. For a man in his late 80s, observing an economic 
crisis that he could "never have predicted," the failure of the left to overcome its own divided 
history stands as the most significant and "unforgivable" aspect of the present moment. The 
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right, explained Thanos, was doing as they always had––protecting elite, securing the interests of 
a few over the many, drawing on racist and xenophobic discourse to disorient the public and 
legitimate critique. Party representatives of the left, however, in failing to overcome their 
differences, "had chosen to be absent of what is going on in Greece. And this, they will pay for, 
as now they are paying for other mistakes that they have done in the past. History does not wait 
or forgive or forget."  
 In chapter three, I briefly discussed the language of sin and condemnation––Christian 
terms, no doubt, that have been incorporated into political discourse. In my discussion of the 
"sons of signers," I explored the ways in which men negotiated a political genealogy in which 
"their own" had turned against them. What is striking in Thanos' narrative is the extent to which 
the Communist Party is held to be responsible for the severity of the crisis, as well as for the 
disillusionment and marginalization of the left. The present is one of negligence, somehow 
familiar to Thanos through historical parallels, but nonetheless impossible to fathom. He was not 
the only interviewee to quote Marx's sentiments on history: "What did he say? First as tragedy, 
then as farce?"  
 This sense of coming to terms with contemporary troubles in the terms of a failed left 
similarly emerged in my conversation with Kyriakos:  
Kyriakos: If I was in Greece today, I would be selling vegetables or [having a] printing 
shop. I wouldn't be involved. If they were to approach me, I would say, "No, no thank you. 
I don't take it no more. I don’t smoke it no more."   
Katherine: You don't take what? Politics, or.... 
Kyriakos: Not politics generally! I am aware of what is going on, but I won't be involved. 
What for? [...] Why did I spend that part of my life—and I am laughing, I am just a little 
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ant in the struggle of the left, I am nothing—but why was my brother tortured and he is 
half a person today? With his feet broken and epilepsy from the trauma [...]? For what? No, 
I remain, a person of the left. I belong to the stream of Marxists. But no way will they get 
me again in the dream of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." That was a fraud, a balloon, 
nothing. In Germany, as Hitler was rising, the communists said, "Do not make an alliance 
with the Social Democrats. They are dogs! They are traitors." And the German communists 
did nothing to stop that monster [...] I'm totally disappointed today. Katherine, I'm 70. I'm 
sad. When I'm thinking that I was there […] when they had the opportunity to make a 
better future for me and my generation... 
While I do not mean to reduce the accounts of Thanos, Yannis and Kyriakos to a static position 
of disillusionment, their frames for understanding the present do share a sense of things falling 
apart. Sometimes this is read alongside a coming to the end of one's life and a moment of 
reflective assessment of one's previous political commitments and struggles. There is, of course, 
a bitterness in the accounts of Yannis and Kyriakos, both of whom, in interpreting the present 
moment of crisis, call into question the value of lives "spent for a better Greece" (in Yannis 
words). In all three accounts there is a strong sense of disillusionment born out of abandonment 
("All this time I am waiting") and deep contempt for a present that seems to mock past struggles 
and sacrifices, casting them as farce or tragedy.   
III. The Centric Imaginary: Political Genealogy Surpassed 
 
What more exemplary figure of the center can one imagine than the "fully-assimilated" Greek 
Canadian...who holds his motherland dear in his heart, who's in frequent contact with his loved 
ones in Greece and visits routinely (perhaps spending the summer months in his native village), 
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who pays his taxes "without being reminded" to the Canadian state, has savings (perhaps a 
small property investment in Greece), who's never missed the opportunity to vote in either 
country, whose bilingual children are well-settled, with good jobs, two passports and bilingual 
(perhaps trilingual!) children of their own? This is a man who feels as comfortable in Toronto as 
he does in his village, who dutifully reminds his friends and family in Greece of the value of hard 
work and the importance of paying taxes. He evaluates his motherland with equal parts romantic 
attachment and disdain. Having moved passed  the "two extremes," the "two bulls of the right 
and left," he has learned to appreciate the quiet tranquility of moderation, of "keeping people in 
a balance," of "having a good name" in the community.  He acknowledges that in his youth he 
was "ideological," but understands now that "with dogmas, you miss the miracle of the new." He 
is familiar with all the new technologies, uses the internet, has an iPhone, and is writing a 
memoir about those early years in Canada, which he terms, "the years of the innocent". When 
asked if he has any regrets, he responds, "Not in the least, I have the best of both worlds!" He 
looks with sadness at the situation of his country today––wondering aloud if he hadn't already 
predicted its fate–– but expresses gratitude that "Europe hasn't abandoned Greece" in these 
difficult times. 
 
This is an excerpt from my ethnographic notes of fall 2012, written in one sitting after the last of 
three consecutive interviews with PASOK supporters in Toronto. As such, they do not represent 
a single interviewee but a kind of caricature of what I tentatively term the "centric imaginary." 
This is not a monolithic mentality, but an assemblage of narrative fragments pulled together 
through the construction of the center as a mode of transcendence. This can take the form of 
having overcome one's own political inheritance, political binaries in general, or "politics" all 
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together. In the accounts of those I interviewed—especially men living in Canada who 
maintained an identification with PASOK— the center is the site of a paradoxical identity: It at 
once affirms a shared lineage of resistance and injury with the left, while having surpassed the 
latter's failings. It affirms, as we will see, rationality over affect, responsibility over 
irresponsibility, innovation and entrepreneurialism over redundancy, moderation over excess and 
autonomy over dogmatism. 
 In some accounts, the centric imaginary is premised on a double-edged injury: the injury 
done by the military regime, one the one hand, and a more enduring injury suffered by "the 
people," having been split since the civil war between the "two bulls" of the right and left. 
Angelos' image is evocative; we can easily imagine two snarling, brutal beasts tearing at the 
flesh and ligaments of the body politic. Indeed, the center is evoked as the site of neutrality and 
the natural place of the people were it not for the stubborn aggressions of the horned extremes. 
Motions to the left or the right are thus the consequence of force or coercion. In speaking about 
his distrust of the Greek Left today, another interviewee began to recall his feeling during the 
"junta years" that the center was inherently vulnerable to the two extremes:  
It is the mystery of people [that a well known Greek Communist] becomes a minister of 
the dictatorship [in 67] [...] [which] was in the same [category] as Franco and the other one 
in Portugal. Unfortunately, there was the feeling at that time that the [dictators] would stay, 
like for 40 years, and there was no end in sight. And there was the feeling...The words 
come to me now of the Greek writer Elytis—whose work impresses me although many 
people like [the poet] Ritsos because he was a member of the political left party. But Elytis 
was strong minded and the first [to receive] the Noble prize for literature for Greece. 
Anyway, he wrote all the time—and I say this now in Greek because it is beautiful [...]—
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"There are no solutions. There is no exit from this crossroad. We can not walk on the street 
because there are people on the left and right that will destroy you." That was the feeling 
that many of us had.  
In Markos' use of Elytis, then, the steadfast democratic line is thus always precarious, while 
those on the right and left use the same tactics of intimidation—and sometimes even switch 
sides! Importantly, my interviews with both Markos and Angelos were conducted at a time when 
the "theory of the two extremes" had been circulating in the Greek media and falling out of the 
mouths of both conservative and PASOK politicians. This "theory" holds that there is an 
equivalence to the left and right to the extent that they both rely on illegal and violent means to 
achieve their political goals. It emerged in the lead-up to the 2012 elections and was seemingly 
given all the more legitimacy after the murder of leftist rapper Pavlos Fissas by a member of the 
neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn, in September of 2013, and the shooting deaths of two young 
supporters of Golden Dawn less than two months after. Yet, this rendering of the left and right as 
extremes that compromise—and reconfirm the need for—the center is well-entrenched in 
contemporary political thought, whether manifested as the ubiquitous "horseshoe theory81" or 
Giddens' "third way." The idea that the center expresses moderation against the two extremes is a 
well-versed reflection of both post cold-war politics and neoliberalism. 
 In the accounts of those I interviewed, the centric imaginary asserts an affinity with the left 
when speaking as "we the left, democratic people" against "the right," while explicitly staking its 
identity against the institutional left at crucial moments by claiming that the latter "has had its 
moment," was "at one point great," "has disappointed the people," and is––in the last instance––
                                               
81 The "horseshoe theory," generally attributed to political sociologists Seymour Martin Lipset and 
Daniele Bell, argues that the extreme left and the extreme right are much more similar to one another than 
they are to the center; something that their supporters would be unlikely to acknowledge.  
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antiquated. Recall the comment made above that the Communist Party "keep[s] selling the same 
old cars although the factory's closed." Part of the pulse of the center, then, lies in its claim to 
overcome redundancy. Its promise is, in the words of one interviewee, "the miracle of the new". 
The center thus stands for innovation. 
 Not surprisingly, the centric imaginary sometimes expresses this innovation as an 
overcoming of all political orthodoxies that have so long imprisoned men's creativity and 
intelligence. Those reflecting on the crisis through some variant of the centric imaginary 
heralded the death tolls of all ideology and the histories from which they come. As Theo put it, 
"things have changed and the isms are out; socialism, communism, even humanism." In this way, 
the center offers the right cure for the crisis precisely because it is the only political form that can 
approach economic problems with a "clear head" The centric imaginary forges a rational path 
without the weighty emotional and ideological dogmas and dramas that have possessed 
populations for generations. Theo reminded me, "This is precisely why the center was created, 
don't forget. To get beyond all this history." 
 Are you still back there? We must evolve. Recall these words from chapter four. They were 
spoken by Andreas Papandreou to Alexis after the latter had waited to shake his hand at Varsity 
Arena and to tell him of his family's losses during the civil war. In other words, collective 
memory is a hindrance to development. In this way, the center is often figured as the product of a 
twofold process: interpretive labour and the natural evolution (adaption) to the imperatives of the 
modern world. In his critique of the Communist Party's "impotency" in responding to the crisis, 
Markos shook his head and said summarily, "Unfortunately, they did not grow up." More 
sympathetically, one PASOK supporter explained, "I too was ideological in my youth but later I 
began to understand." In this reading, one has overcome their own political genealogy, arriving 
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at the mature version of an adolescent idealism long been subjected to learning, time, and the 
discipline of reason. 
 In this way, the centric subject emerges as a reasoned man for all seasons—equipped with 
a set of "sensible" proposals for Greece. Centricity is here equated with moderation, planning 
and fixing. It is self-reflective, self-critical, and learned. As one interviewee insisted, the "best 
solution to the crisis" will come from the "honest people within PASOK" who have "learned 
their lesson." Kristos, who has been working in Athens "for PASOK" for many decades, 
reiterated the need for technocratic solutions and another interviewee agreed that it's time for 
Germany to send its army of 500 tax collectors to "get beyond politics." The center is thus 
announced, not only––or necessarily––as a political position, but as a progressive step that is 
demanded both of history itself to the extent that contemporary conditions are not the same as 
"they were back then" and by a rational, intelligent, non-ideological and flexible subject who can 
adjust to the times and place in which he finds himself. Perhaps it goes without saying that —
flanked by the German army of tax collectors—the centric subject is also impeccably fiscally 
responsible  
 The centric imaginary is sometimes possessed by the entrepreneurial spirit. In the face of 
present austerity it speaks to the promise of greater productivity, new projects, an educated and 
technologically savvy Greek youth that is faced with the challenge of "turning crisis into 
opportunity." Sitting in his living room in Toronto, with enlarged photos of Papandreou and 
other significant political figures framed on the walls, one interviewee described his sound 
investments in new business opportunities after the fall of the Junta. Establishing himself in the 
transportation industry, he recounted with pride his frequent traveling between Canada and 
Greece. "Having the best of both worlds" (as he said) was an indication of his successful 
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business ventures in both countries. Indeed, as a testament to this busy, transnational lifestyle, his 
mobile phone rang constantly throughout our interview and he apologetically noted that he 
received "business calls" from Greece at all hours of the night. 
 As a diasporic modality then, the centric imaginary places a lot of weight on "having the 
best of both worlds." If living amongst Canadians had once felt like "exile," it was now as much 
home as the village or neighbourhood of one's childhood. A comfortable, routine and fluent 
movement between countries reveals the appropriateness of the decision to settle in Toronto and 
the crisis raging in Greece today is greater confirmation still. Wisdom begets nothing lost and 
everything gained. One interviewee took great pride in the fact that both of his adult children 
spoke Greek and spent summers in his home village. He added that they "don't really understand 
what's going on today" or "what happened back then" because they are distant "from all of that." 
In this way, living in Canada was a moderating experience, creating smart and settled kids 
sheltered from the nasty side of politics. 
 This figure of the centric diasporic subject could not be more different than the one 
narrated by Apostolos (in chapter four). Never permitting him to touch "Canada with both feet" 
and suspended "over the Atlantic," the bridge that Apostolos constructs was never functional; it 
never succeeded at rendering diasporic life settled, established, secure or lucrative. Remarking 
on all the trouble he had caused among the "Greeks of Canada," Apostolos cast the common 
concerns with "keeping people in a balance" and "having a good name in the community" as 
sound strategies for  business owners on the Danforth but not part of his own particular story.  
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IV. The Crisis and "the Greeks": Political Genealogy Suspended 
 
Stelios offered to introduce me to Petros during his one-day stopover en route to the island of 
Naxos. Stelios and Petros were close friends in Toronto during the Junta. While Stelios 
emigrated with his family in the early 70s, Petros left Greece to escape political persecution 
through a series of illicit actions (making a false statement to the authorities and buying a 
passport on the black market). Forming an anti-Stalinist communist group in Toronto (a product 
of the '68 split in the Communist party in Greece), Stelios and Petros were active members until 
the fall of the junta. In the years after the junta, Stelios made a few attempts to return to Greece 
but decided, as "a married man and father," that remaining in Canada was the best decision for 
his family. Petros, single and without children, moved to Montreal for some years and then 
permanently to Athens. The two men had not seen each other for many years, and only a few 
times since 1975.  We met in a Kypseli restaurant for lunch. Against Petros' suggestion that we 
eat something light, Stelios insisted that lunch would be his treat and proceeded to order a salad 
and many meat dishes. Petros explained that he rarely ate out these days, while Stelios, 
acknowledging the excess, laughed and said his time in Greece was short. Just a few minutes 
into our meal, we began speaking about the political developments of the last days. The 
conversation became increasingly tense, with Stelios arguing that the only viable answer for 
Greece was DIMAR82 and  Petros insisting that SYRIZA was the more obvious choice, given "our 
past" (meaning, I presume, their shared political ideologies). I was silent but encouraging with 
nods of the head as both men, in turn, pressed their positions. Eventually Petros became 
                                               
82 DIMAR is a small left-of-center political party that is currently the minority partner in the coalition 
government with PASOK and New Democracy.  
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increasingly frustrated and said to me, "You know, Katherine, I have become sick. This same old 
argument puts my stomach in knots. I don't even leave my house, ok? I'm hearing the same 
garbage every day on  the news..." And then, turning to Stelios, he said, "I can’t believe you are 
saying these things! I expect more from you.  You are left! You are educated!" Petros raised 
himself and then sat down, raised himself again and stood. He continued stressing his point, 
addressing alternatively Stelios and myself. Stelios turned to me, and as if to narrate what I was 
seeing said, "Look, Katherine, This is exactly what I have been speaking about! It is this 
fundamentalist attitude! The left checklist, who is left, who is not!" As Petros begins to contest 
this point with, "But you are not here, you don't know what it is like...." Stelios continues: "And 
this [nodding his head in the direction of his friend]...this culture of shouting. We need rational 
arguments! We need to change the entire political culture in Greece!" The reasoned, articulate, 
sensible Greek-Canadian, a veritable anthropologist, observing and translating the irrational, 
affective Greek in his natural habitat.... 
 
I took these notes in the fall of the 2013. The last sentence is rather tongue––in––cheek, of 
course, but it speaks to the sense I had of being complicit––somehow having been solicited––to 
observe and evaluate the "Greek" in real time. Like a narrator in a National Geographic 
documentary, describing the lion's habits of survival against images of mating, hunting and 
eating, Stelios was translating the words and gestures of an old friend into a teaching moment 
about the tendencies of an entire "political culture."  
 In the next pages, I outline the logic at work in culturalist understandings of the crisis. I 
want to stress that the tendency to make sense of the current economic and political crisis 
through cultural assumptions about "the Greeks" and the Greek mentality, was particularly 
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evident in the narratives of those remaining in Toronto. A persisting trope in these accounts 
draws on cultural and historical references that, on the one hand, portrays Greeks in Greece as 
part victim, part assailant and, on the other hand, provide a deficient moral standard that the 
speaker has overcome through hard work and immigration. Like the language of failure, which I 
discussed at length in chapter five, this discourse has both self-degrading and self-exonerating 
elements and it usually functions to valorize the figure of the steadfast, autonomous, 
hardworking democrat. 
 Throughout my research in Toronto, I was reminded, informed or cautioned (depending on 
the tone) that "Greeks think...," "Greeks do...," "Greeks don't...," "Greeks have always....," 
"Greeks have never..."––invitations, it appeared to me,  to consider "the Greeks" en masse, along 
with the peculiarities of their mentality. At times, this took the tone of utter distantiation: 
Discovering that I was on my way to Athens in a few days, one interviewee in Toronto urged me 
to "just look upon them." Nodding his head knowingly, he added, "you will understand."  But 
what was I meant to discover by subjecting "Greeks" to a painstaking analysis––one that was 
foreshadowed to uncover some pretty unpleasant characteristics? "Greeks like to trick you," 
explained one interview, "in any way they can and at every opportunity." "Greeks want to beat 
you, remember that Katherine," another began, "even if it is only to get first in line on the bus or 
in the grocery store." "It's not that they don't want to pay taxes," remarked another, "it's that they 
want to get away with something." "Greeks only respect someone, they only obey someone, if 
they are being oppressed by them," he said later, while offering a justification for the Troika's 
bullying presence in Greece.   
 While statements like these were sometimes made without context, as if it should be 
understood that Greeks simply suffer from a peculiar set of character flaws, others implied an 
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ambiguously defined cultural or historical inheritance. "What we have in Greece today is a 
totally individualistic culture, no sense of the collective" said Vasilis, matter-of-factly. Greek 
parents, suggested Sotiris, are probably to blame for this, imparting as (he claimed) they do 
"individualistic values," a drive for "security," and a weak work ethic.83 Others sought to place 
the alleged mentality of Greeks within "historical perspective." In this reading, it's not that 
Greeks want to avoid paying taxes, nor is it a matter of wanting to trick you; it is instead a 
question of habits of survival learned under occupation––whether this be Ottoman or German––
that persist as cultural inheritance through the generations. "The problems in Greece are not 20 
years old, " explained Vasilis, "They go way back to the years of the liberation from the Ottoman 
Occupation." "The problem in Greece today," echoed another interviewee, "is that people don't 
pay taxes [and] this is a behaviour that goes back to the Ottoman period." This was a sentence 
that I heard, almost verbatim, many times by those living in Toronto. Clientelism and tax 
evasion––the two "sins" of the Greek people––are habits passed down from their ancestors who 
were living under an oppressive occupying regime for many generations: 
Historically, yes, there has come the feeling of deep mistrust of the state, because when 
Greece was liberated from the Turks in 1921… even at that time, I don’t know if you know 
about Kapodistrias...he was the first governor of Greece, sent by the Allies. He was trying 
                                               
83 Similarly, philosopher Stelios Ramfos, who was known in name and thought by a few of my 
interviewees in Toronto, has conveyed a culturalist explanation, par excellence, for the crisis:  Essentially, 
Greeks have a difficult time weaning from their mothers, who are typically overpowering in their parental 
approach and this translates into a tendency toward "milking the state." Echoing, to some extent,  the 
interviewee above who claims that Greeks only respect those who dominate them, Ramfos contends that 
Greeks seek father figures and thus tend towards populist political figures like Papandreou. Children 
inherit the consequences of mothers that are too attached, fathers that are too dominant and, in the long 
run, become self-centered citizens and bad neighbours Indeed, some interviewees stated that he had read 
his blog: 
https://steliosramfosgr.wordpress.com/2013/04/16/homo-economicus-homo-hellenicus/ 
(accessed January 1, 2014). 
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to collect money for the state in order to build the country and he was assassinated [...] by a 
family from the Peloponnese who wanted to keep privilege [...] This story repeated itself 
again and again, so there is a mistrust against the state. And the people who had the power, 
had the government, always used it for their own benefits, so gradually, there developed a 
situation  in which nobody cares about the collective effort, everybody cares about himself. 
In this narrative, Greeks "behave badly" because their ancestors refused to become assimilated 
into a modern state, and they did so, as Vasilis explains, because not paying taxes was an act of 
patriotism against the Ottoman occupiers. These kinds of cultural and historical justifications for 
behaviours said to be the cause of the crisis are expressed in summarizing formulations like 
Sotiris': "How European can we be Katherine? We had to do in 50 years what others had 
hundreds of years to go through. You know modern Greece is younger than Canada! Imagine. 
My grandmother had small crosses tattooed on her knuckles and on her forehead in order not to 
be abducted and placed in harems by the sultan… And you ask me to be European? How to be 
European?" 
 Herzfeld (2001:67) has described Greeks as a people with an "excess of history" and a 
preoccupation with their ancient past, which he attributes to the fact that "the West" has 
associated Greece's cultural worth with that of ancient ancestors. To the extent that Greece is 
conveyed as a backward-looking cultural amalgamation of various habits of survival that work 
against the development of a healthy, well-functioning modern state, it is not surprising that 
Europe is heralded as a benevolent figure to "help Greece along". Evangelos and I had been 
speaking about Greece's dense and complicated bureaucracy, when he stated that: "From the 
Ottoman empire it was the same few families who controlled Greece, through Independence and 
the first and second world war. And the left was always marginalized, no jobs for your children 
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if you were suspected of being a communist. Then, when PASOK came to power, it was time to 
distribute to all the victims, so the structure remains." Evangelos concluded his analysis with a 
summarizing statement: "This is what Europe tries to correct. It is the only way for Greece to go 
ahead, to undergo these changes that Europe is asking for..."  Referring to the "sickness" that is 
the public sphere, Evangelos said despondently that "the situation deteriorates month by month. 
And next year it will be worse than today, but this is the only way." And then he added that 
Greeks are surviving because of another aspect of "their culture": "They are supporting 
themselves through the family, as always. Like if you have a pension, the family will try to 
survive on that. They are supporting their adult kids who do not have work. It is difficult.  For 
many many people, it is difficult. There is no doubt about this [...] But Greece needs support and 
fortunately, Europe at this moment still supports Greece." In this way, Evangelos draws on an 
analogy between the relation of adult children with their pensioned parents or grandparents, on 
the one hand, and of Greece with Europe, on the other. Both the dependent youth and the Greek 
economy are expected, over the next years and perhaps decades, to do no more than survive off 
of the generosity of their benefactors. 
Redemption in the Diaspora/ Canada, the Good  
 
I have identified within narratives of the diaspora just one tendency to observe the Greek crisis 
through cultural stereotyping or auto-essentialism. Portraying those left behind in––or who 
returned to––Greece as cut from the same cloth (whether as a result of history or culture) 
functions as a strategy of distantiation. But how does one avoid implicating oneself in these 
cultural generalizations? I suggest here that a trope of redemption through immigration is drawn 
on liberally with precisely this effect. Dimitris' declared from a Toronto cafe that "Canada 
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shaped me in every respect, especially my bad habits." Another explained that he had "lost [his] 
bad behaviours," a process that "takes scratching...scratching at yourself. Very difficult". Having 
said to me in a sober tone that "in Canada, I was able to change a great deal of my Greek 
mentality," Yannis added, "listen, when I say that, they tell me I'm exaggerating, but I'm not!" 
 Such remarks, of course, require additional "scratching" on the part of the ethnographer. In 
second and third interviews with these men, we revisited their statements. Some came to the later 
conclusion that the most important changes had taken place through studying and in the context 
of mobilizing against the dictatorship. Given the fact that some interviewees were explicitly 
denied access to universities in Greece, comments like the following become very significant: 
"Because Canada offered me things that there is no way I could have imagined in Athens. I was 
able to continue my studies, I was able to meet new people, I was able to become something." 
This "becoming something," out of a history of institutionally-inscribed marginalization brings 
us back to Kostas' comment (quoted in chapter five) that the PAK organization––personified 
through the charismatic leader Professor Andreas Papandreou––had the effect of rendering 
young Greek students "respectable" in the corridors of the university.  
 Perhaps not very surprisingly, interviewees also spoke implicitly of the redemptive powers 
of work. If "Greece" is cursed by a generation who "doesn't want to work," by an unproductive 
base, or by workers who simply "don't know how to make anything," "Canada" provides a site 
for self-valorization through labour. According to Dimitris: 
The worst thing they did was that they spoiled the people so badly that they don't want to 
work. They have come to the point where they think that everything is free! See, I was... I 
am here all these years. You know, I had my own business and I made a lot of money. I 
never bought a brand new car. I thought it was stupid! To spend thousands of dollars to go 
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from here to there. But if you go to Greece, a guy who is making one tenth of what I am 
making was driving two Mercedes, one for the wife, one for the husband. 
Similarly, against the figure of the difficult-to-wean Greek son, Nikos presented his own "Greek-
Canadian boy": 
My oldest boy, when he said he wanted to get a car, I said, "That's a good idea, you better 
start working." And he was flipping hamburgers for two years. Not because I didn't have 
the money to buy one. I didn't want to spoil the guy. He has to know where the money 
comes from. Then he put the money together and bought a used car.  
In this way, "Canada, the good" recurs as the site of cultural redemption for those who stayed in 
Toronto after 1974. Canada, "the civilized,” the "well-ordered,” the "modern," emerged in 
accounts of those who returned as well, but usually with a sense of the institutional differences 
between countries, rather than the differences of "mentalities." Returnees tended to refrain from 
using a culturalist discourse in reference to Canadians; in fact, interviews were almost devoid of 
"Canadians." Instead, the contrast worked something like: Civilized Canada vs. "The Greeks". 
VI. Writing "Against Amnesia": Political Genealogy Reinhabited 
 
It is late and I am lingering in Apostolos' office. We've been discussing his writing over the 
years. He stands and begins to peruse the shelves of his library. He hands me his MA 
dissertation, then a book he has written about [engineering in] Crete––the intellectual labours of 
his life. He shows me the inscription of his dissertation, dedicated to his wife: "To Maria, who 
helped me up when I was on my knees." He comes across Marx's Grundisse and takes it from the 
shelf––an English copy he has had since the 70s, he tells me. He skims through it, finding 
something that makes him stop and smile. He asks me to read aloud an underlined paragraph, 
 223 
where Marx writes "Does not the true character of each epoch come alive in the nature of its 
children?"84  His son has entered the room and is observing us mutely. Apostolos closes the book 
and laughs, "At some point, I was a Marxist!" And then he adds, "Remember what Marx said? 
That history has two options, either it becomes farce or tragedy?" His son interrupts him, 
correcting the quote: "No, it was 'first as farce, then as tragedy,'" he says. They disagree and his 
son disappears, returning moments after with The Eighteenth Brumaire. He reads the passage 
and closes the book with a decisive snap. His father smiles at me and shrugs. He tells me that 
these days, he writes fiction "to fight against amnesia." 
 
I have already written a great deal about Apostolos, whose novel appeared throughout the pages 
of chapter four. I first interviewed him in the winter of  2011, at his home in Northern Athens. 
He picked me up from the metro station and as we drove the short distance to his house, he 
explained that the area had become a wealthy one, but back when he was a child, it was mostly 
just "dust and land." Apostolos returned after the fall of the junta with his wife and two small 
sons to his father's home. Twenty years later, they constructed a large addition. The tiny original 
construction had become two attached properties: a three-story home for his single sons and his 
own two-story home, where he lived with his wife. He explained that one of his sons was 
                                               
84 "A man cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish. But does he not find joy in the child’s 
naivety, and must he himself not strive to reproduce its truth at a higher stage? Does not the true character 
of each epoch come alive in the nature of its children? Why should not the historic childhood of 
humanity, its most beautiful unfolding, as a stage never to return, exercise an eternal charm? There are 
unruly children and precocious children. Many of the old peoples belong in this category. The Greeks 
were normal children. The charm of their art for us is not in contradiction to the undeveloped stage of 
society on which it grew. [It] is its result, rather, and is inextricably bound up, rather, with the fact that the 
unripe social conditions under which it arose, and could alone arise, can never return (from Marx's 
Grundisse, pages 110-111). 
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working in France, because there was no way he could find a good job as a surgeon in Athens. 
His other son, working as a lawyer, was struggling but managing. 
 Once we were settled in his home office, Apostolos explained that he had recently retired 
from the university and had been spending his days writing a historical fiction. He offered me 
cookies and a Greek coffee, and then asked, as others had, "Where should we begin?" Without 
waiting for my response, he added, "You should know, I never stepped with both feet in 
Canada." This became an expression meriting close analysis in chapter four. At the time of our 
interview, however, it was a caution to keep my expectations in check: I would not be hearing 
nostalgic stories about his time in Toronto.  
 Apostolos was one of the few interviewees who had graduated from university when the 
junta took power in April 1967. He had been involved with the  Lambrakis movement, leaving 
Athens when his activities came under the scrutiny of the military authorities. Living, as he 
described it, "like a refugee" in Toronto, Apostolos worked in construction, learned English, and 
eventually entered a graduate program in Toronto. In this period of "collecting degrees" he lost 
his mother and could not return for her funeral—an experience he very painfully rendered in 
writing: "So, she left without a last kiss from her nationally dangerous son." He explained that 
soon after her death, his father also deteriorated dramatically and when he returned to Greece in 
the early 80s, his father was very ill, undernourished, and isolated in his tiny home.  
 I wrote the above reflection after my second meeting with Apostolos, almost a year later. 
Since our first interview, his book had already been published and discussed by reviewers on the 
left. In the next pages, I want to approach this book—part memoire, part fiction and the 600 page 
product of a year's worth of labour––as a creative reinhabiting of political genealogy. In the story 
Apostolos tells, there is no attempt to transcend the political inheritance that was bestowed him 
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as a child growing up in post-civil war Greece. There are no signs of posing reason against 
affect, or moderation against excess—as in the case of the centric imaginary—but nor is the story 
told as mere reproduction: There is no party line and the Left is neither purely abject nor heroic. 
Against these tendencies, which I have now considered at length, Apostolos descends into daily 
life in the decades after the war and paints a dense and detailed narrative of the total intertwining 
of biography and the collective political history of a generation.  
 We meet a young "Dimitris" who is from the first pages trying to make sense of the 
impenetrable drama of politics and the strange language of adults. From the perspective of a 
working class Athenian neighbourhood, we are confronted with the most devastating 
repercussions of civil war: corpses on the street, missing persons, the death of loved ones. But 
more subtly, the narrative develops around the boy's coming to terms with his political 
inheritance. Early on, we discover that his beloved uncle—and sister of Dimitris' mother— is a 
leader of a communist unit in his area. When he is found dead, the boy struggles to accept the 
explanations for his uncle's suicide and the posthumous descriptions of his uncle: melancholic, 
depressed, withdrawn. But a clue comes in the form of a unfamiliar man who attends the funeral. 
Dimitris recalls the "strange words" that the man spoke over the body, "You haven't betrayed 
anyone, but showed how much you believed in the worth and goals of our fight. Do not feel badly 
that none of your comrades came to give a last kiss to your dead body [...] You will be close to 
us—the unburied dead people of our fight. Have a good trip, comrade." 
 Strange words for a child, indeed. Watching his small son puzzle over this last dedication 
and moved by his grieving wife, Dimitris' father reveals to them both a carefully guarded secret: 
Uncle Nikos had taken pity on a right-wing cousin who had been exposed for collaborating with 
the Germans and was wanted by the Communists. When it was discovered that Uncle Nikos had 
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been hiding his cousin in his own home, he was expelled from the party. The shame had 
overwhelmed him, Dimitris' father explains, recalling that their last conversation had ended with 
the uncle's lament: "If this were a people's democracy, they would have executed me; instead, it 
is left up to me." "Now, forget what I've told you," says Dimitris' father, "as he would have 
willed it." In the context of the full narrative, this graveyard scene and the conversation that 
follows, constitute a defining moment in Dimitris' earliest awareness of his political inheritance, 
compelling him towards a journey that cultivates in the Lambrakis Youth—the left movement 
that I discussed in chapter four. 
 A central figure in Dimitris' life is "The Teacher" (O Daskalos)— a man who employs him 
to do odd jobs about the house in exchange for architectural lessons. More importantly, The 
Teacher details for Dimitris, over the course of many conversations, a history of political 
persecution and struggle. His beloved teacher dies a few weeks before the military dictatorship 
claims power. Another funeral, another grave. He promises his teacher he will visit soon but does 
not do so for almost five decades. The dark years of the junta set in and Dimitris and his friends 
try to stay under the radar, while sharing information and helping those more active in the anti-
dictatorship movement by hiding them or planning their escape from the country. The 
protagonists in these pages are a progressive, tight-knit group of young architects who, from their 
office in Athens, share their political analyses and struggles close to––but not quite at the centre–
–of the action. Effectively, the narrative closes with the students' revolt against the dictatorship 
seven years later in 1974.  
 I reflected on a number of specific excerpts from Apostolos' book in chapter four. All of 
these passages were taken from the last 70 pages, which narrate the experiences of Theo, a dear 
friend of Dimitris, who flees Greece and lives out the years of the junta in Toronto. We learn of 
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Theo's initial months of struggle to find work, to learn the language, and to find like-minded 
Greeks with whom to fight the dictatorship from abroad—all of this through the letters he sends 
back to his closest friends in Athens. Deeply invested in how the political situation is developing 
in Toronto, Theo's friends receive his news in earnest. For example, in the fictionalizing of The 
Committee's dissolution in Toronto—in which the movement splits into fractions after the arrival 
of Papandreou—the significance of the news is expressed in the soberest of tones: "This is our 
mess. An independent, autonomous democratic movement converted into groups and little 
fractions. I know I'm breaking your heart. I trust that my next letter will have better news."  
 In pivoting the narrative of the Junta years around Theo's letters, Apostolos is essentially 
rescaling the struggle of the Greek diaspora; he is claiming a place for the "democratic Greeks in 
Canada" in a political genealogy of suffering and resistance that is ordinarily framed in terms of 
what happened to the Greeks in Greece. Apostolos renders the diaspora profoundly relevant; 
indeed, its activities have the power to stir hearts in Athens. This can be compared to another 
attempt to reposition those who lived out the Junta years in Toronto: Recall from the beginning 
of chapter four, Yannis' effort to commemorate his friend's role in the diaspora's struggle at the 
time of his death in Athens. The difference between the two gestures lies in the significance 
given to antagonisms: While Yannis labours to keep these at bay and to "simply honour" his 
friend ("for Christ sake"), Apostolos puts disappointments and betrayals in the diaspora on 
display and in the process subtly "redraws lines of inclusion and exclusion" (Han 2012: 23). The 
diaspora should not be read as an irrelevant margin of Greek culture; it was not a mere refuge 
from Greek politics but nor was it a microcosm of events in Athens. It had its own deeply 
divided and difficult dynamics and these matter in the large narrative of what it was to live out 
the years of the junta abroad. 
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 The decision to write with two "I"s––that of the narrator in Athens and that of the exiled in 
Toronto––can also be interpreted as Apostolos' attempt to give multiple accounts of himself. By 
writing himself (as narrator) into the novel as the one who stays behind and his friend as the one 
who flees with the "junta at his heels," Apostolos, at once, affirms the political genealogy he has 
lived and imagines the parallel life he might have had in the absence of his departure. As an 
exercise in self-positioning along this fork of destiny, Apostolos keeps a distance from both what 
he terms the "horrors of immigratsia"(and the fear of one day being called "Daddy") as well as 
the potential connotations of being one of those who returned from abroad with "titles of 
resistance," well positioned for the new distribution of jobs and benefits in Papandreou's Greece. 
Importantly, he accomplishes this distance while preserving these ambivalent dramas in the 
narrative fold. Precisely for this juxtaposition of self implications, Apostolos' narrative strategy 
can be read as a creative reinhabiting of political genealogy. 
 The last page of Apostolos' novel, however, returns to and belabours the point of 
reproduction. We are suddenly in the present of 2012 and the transition is jarring. Dimitris has 
returned to visit his esteemed Teacher, fulfilling the promise he made decades prior. Standing 
over the grave, Dimitris offers a truncated account of Panourgia's "afterhistory" (the years after 
the Junta): "Teacher," he says "it all happened as you predicted. [Those from the] foreign circles 
[returned to] liquidate their political investments, digging up titles of resistance from the battles 
they gave in the Latin Quarter of Paris, London's Trafalgar square, the Toronto Danforth [...] and 
the villa of King City." We learn too, that Yannis returned to Greece, that he can not find clients 
as an architect and that his son is forced to work in Saudi Arabia. "This life is unbearable," 
Dimitris confesses to his dead teacher. 
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 Though this graveyard monologue might seem an appropriate ending, Apostolos' decision 
to continue the narrative is significant. He does so with a lone paragraph that forces us to 
confront a lack of genealogical closure: 
The other day I [went] to Syntagma square to add myself to the voices of indignation. I'm 
not the same as I was back then––time has done his work well–but I managed to climb the 
stairs and found myself on the sidewalk of Amalias Street. A strange odor cut my breath. 
My son [...] said, "It's the tear gas from yesterday." [...] Holding onto the rail above the 
square, which had become full of the indignants' tents [...] I struggled to read [...] the 
outstretched banners above. My vision isn't like a hawk's anymore [...] but [...] one of them 
caught my eye: " Bread. Education. Freedom. The Junta didn't end in '73." 
With this closing paragraph, Apostolos lays the infuriating reproduction of political genealogy in 
the hands of the reader. What other function could the paragraph accomplish than to remind the 
reader, young or old, that once again personal biography is fundamentally determined by the 
political and that despite the struggles of previous generations, the call of protest remains 
unnervingly identical? 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to bring an analysis of political genealogy into the contemporary 
period of economic, social and political crisis in Greece. I have figured an intersection of 
biography and political history through the interpretations and reflections men offered on these 
troubled times. Framing these in terms of "narrative fates," I outlined five distinguishable frames 
through which men reckon political genealogy with the present: In the first, reproduction is the 
dominant pulse, compelling an adherence to party lines and lexicon. For others working within 
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this interpretive frame, the problem of reproduction is itself blamed as the primary cause of the 
crisis. 
 In the second frame, disillusionment is a dominant theme and men question very frankly 
the value of their personal and collective struggles for a  "better Greece." I interpreted the kinds 
of analyses men provided through this frame as performing a retreat of political genealogy. 
There is no program, no previous experience, no moral or ethical commitment that can minimize 
or contain the repercussions of austerity in Greece. Apocalyptic language of decline and decay is 
mirrored in interviewees' own personal narrative of having come to the end of their life. 
 In a sense, the third frame, which I discuss in terms of a centric imaginary claiming to 
"surpass" political genealogy, can be read as an antidote to the disillusioned leftist. The centric 
imaginary gains its strength and legitimacy precisely by claiming a paradoxical relation to the 
Left; at once identifying with a lineage of injury and persecution and keeping a distance from the 
Left's supposed failures. Announcing moderation against excess, rationality against affect and 
innovation against redundancy, the centric subject is constructed as well-equipped to offer 
solutions to the present crisis. 
 A fourth interpretive frame tends to suspend political genealogy by replacing political 
antagonism with cultural stereotypes. Especially those remaining in Canada after the fall of the 
junta, interviewees offered explanations for the crisis that figured the Greeks en masse as unruly, 
undisciplined and burdened by an excess of history. In some ways, this frame shares tendencies 
with the centric imaginary, as it speaks moderation to excess and often sees the civilizing project 
of European technocrats as the only solution for Greece. 
 The fifth and final narrative constellation attempts a creative reinhabiting of political 
genealogy. I have relied heavily on Apostolos' novel in my discussion above, demonstrating one 
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manifestation of this tendency to affirm one's political genealogy, while finding inventive routes 
out of reproduction, centricity, stereotyping and disillusionment. We might conclude that 
Apostolos accomplishes not a particularly hopeful exit, but a reckoning of political inheritance 
that, at the very least, leaves the future in the hands of the reader.  
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Conclusion 
 
This project was conceived around acts of resistance in the Greek diaspora, from 1967-74, but 
developed almost instantly into a study of political genealogy, as it extends both "back" into 
postwar childhoods and "forward" into speculations on precarious futures under neoliberal 
austerity. The research commenced in 2010, in the early days of the "Greek crisis" and it is 
closing in the winter of 2015, when the political landscape of Greece has been radically redrawn 
precisely on the promise of ending the crisis. As of January, the Radical Left (SYRIZA) has been 
governing Greece in a coalition with a right-wing, anti-austerity party. While the international 
media is once again speculating on a possible "Grexit," there has been enormous post-election 
public support in Greece—and abroad—for the new government's first efforts to negotiate with 
its European partners. Apostolos and his family inform me that they have attended two large pro-
government austerity protests in Syntagma square, remarking on the high-spirits and the 
unprecedented absence of tear gas and police. Another interviewee warns of the historical 
parallels between Tsipras' current popularity and that of Andreas Papandreou in 1981—a thinly-
veiled caution that was expressed many times in the Greek media leading up to the January 
elections. 
 PASOK, for its part, secured just enough votes to remain in parliament. A few weeks 
before the elections, George Papandreou announced the creation of a new party, "Movement of 
Socialist Democrats," a decision that the current leader of PASOK, Venizelos, condemned 
publicly as a kind of family betrayal: "Unfortunately, [Mr Papandreou] is behaving like an heir 
who wants to destroy the PASOK that his father founded, the same party that honoured him by 
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electing him its president and helping him become prime minister."85 It's not the new party's 
manifesto that has left Venizelos cold, but the break in political lineage and the impertinence Mr. 
Papandreou has shown to his father and the rest of his extended family. Political patricide, then, 
marks a powerful—but not quite final—blow to PASOK. Papandreou's new party did not 
succeed in entering parliament. 
  The horizon upon which this dissertation closes, then, could not be more different than its 
opening scene. Rather than trying to assess the "new," however, let me provide a brief overview 
of the main contributions made in this dissertation. I divide this conclusion into two main parts; 
the first reflects on how my empirical findings reclaim the political in studies of the Greek 
Diaspora; the second outlines the ethnographic and theoretical insights gained by this 
dissertation's novel method of approaching the political through its dynamic "social lives."  
I. Reclaiming the Political in the Greek Diaspora 
 
Greek migrants have long been figured as a kind of ideal or model immigrant (Anagnostou 2009; 
Laliotou 2004)—a tendency that has been reproduced in the literature claiming to represent them 
sociologically, historically or anthropologically. With very few exceptions, "the Greeks in 
Canada" were incorporated into the positivist and assimilationist discourse that oriented the field 
of immigration studies in the 70s and 80s. Through this dominant lens, Greek migrants were 
reproduced in the following decades as a successfully-integrated migrant group, albeit with 
unique cultural characteristics and contributions worth studying. In generating this homogenizing 
scholarship, the political inheritance of newcomers was ignored, along with the political 
                                               
85 "Papandreou to Launch New Party," Kathimerini, January 2nd, 2015 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_02/01/2015_545898 
(accessed January 10, 2015) 
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activities within the diaspora and the significant antagonisms that defined everyday life for 
young Greeks living in Canada during the years of the dictatorship. Importantly, my dissertation 
is the first sociological study of Greek migrants in Canada to focus on i) the legacy of their 
political inheritance; ii) their political activities generally (and during the years of the Junta, 
specifically); and iii) the experiences of the returning diaspora in the years after the fall of the 
Junta. In other words, my research has been an attempt to reclaim the political in our academic 
discussions of the Greek diaspora. 
 My focus on a group of young, politicized Greeks in the diaspora rubs up against the kinds 
of hegemonic stories of migration that have typically centered on "exemplary" migrations and 
which, as Laliotou argues, serves to "regulate the ways in which one [is] expected to be a 
migrant" (149). Indeed, the narratives that I have treated at length are much more appropriately 
read as, "alternative and marginalized ways of being a migrant" (ibid). Concerned with revealing 
not just the presence of antagonisms and the problematic framing of Greeks in Toronto as a 
"community," I have explored ethnographically how these conflicts both reflected and animated 
political inheritance. Importantly, I also have shown that what happened in Toronto can not 
simply be reduced to a microcosm of "Greek politics"; rather, forms of sociality in the diaspora 
and expressions of migrant subjectivities were uniquely forged around generational disparities 
and a sense of having arrived to a "little Greece" nearly a generation "behind," a marked cultural 
and political distance from settled "Greek Canadians" of the same age, a painful feeling of 
suspension and dislocation, new forms of political activity, encounters with a more-or-less 
tolerant or apathetic "Canadian" public and an ambivalent sense of new opportunities (for 
example, being able to "collect degrees").  
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 My analysis of the emergence of PAK in Toronto and the involvement of returnees in the 
establishment of PASOK may also be of interest to scholars of Modern Greece. Like Dimitris' 
letters from Toronto, this dissertation has unintentionally placed the Greek diaspora in Toronto 
"back" into Greek political history. Such an endeavour might be better appreciated in light of the 
frequent biographical descriptions of Papandreou's exile in "North America," or even the 
discovery of photos of protests taken from Toronto but published as having taken place in Italy 
or the UK! Indeed, even in Spourdalakis' account of PAK and PASOK, which I relied on 
extensively in chapter five, the fact that activities took place in Toronto, is not once 
acknowledged. His political science orientation focuses on founding documents, official 
publications and meetings, electoral campaigns and Papandreou's statements; in this sense, there 
is no sign of the ethnographic landscape (or even "place") in which these events and formal 
positions occur.  
II. The Dynamic Social Life of the Political 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have stayed closely attuned to the minute in men's accounts of 
living in and through politically turbulent periods. Whether discussing the post-civil war 
politico-legal regimes that shaped their youth, the emergence of an organized anti-dictatorship 
movement in the diaspora, or the establishment of a new political party in a period of tremendous 
transformation, the focus has remained on how these institutional and discursive developments 
have been experienced by interviewees at various scales: from their subtle anxieties about 
(mis)recognition in everyday relations to their great hopes and disappointments about a shattered 
political movement and a failed socialist project; from their gestures of withdrawal and refusal, 
to their embracing of positions at the center of "Papandreou's Greece." All along, I have 
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documented forms of sociality as they take on, give up, or rescale specific significations, risks 
and opportunities. By tracking what I call "the social life of the political," I arrive at three sites 
for rethinking the relations between state, kin, party and political subjectivity. 
Social Life I: Living with "the State" 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have examined the ways in which interviewees articulate 
encounters with "the state"—its agents, practices of documentation and politico-legal measures 
of marginalization. Of course, this research was not conducted at a specific institutional site 
where encounters with the state are typically forged; rather it relied on narratives that men 
deemed worth sharing about their moments of shifting proximities to the state. There is nothing 
new about my concern for the ways in which state power permeates everyday life, but my 
interviews do yield rich ethnographic insight into how permeations can take many forms over a 
single biography. Precisely because my interviews evoked experiences over many decades, the 
state is constructed in these accounts as a constellation of contradictory manifestations and 
scales. Some of the political subjects at the heart of this dissertation have undergone the 
profound experience of negotiating both institutionalized exclusion by the Greek state and 
significant opportunities for inclusion in the Metapolitefsi. They know very well the effects of 
being categorized and filed by state agents, but they are also familiar with life at the "center" of 
ministries, and government-led research and financial institutions. Their perspectives on are thus 
particularly compelling. 
 In relations between state and subject, interviews revealed the central role of documents: 
the paper file and its bold red ink at a port authority, but also the document signed by fathers to 
"cleanse" them of their communist sympathies and the legacy these signatures leave behind for 
sons and nephews. I am thinking about the official letters from the PASOK office, after the party 
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had come to power in 1981, that solicited the receiver to "come and join us" in Athens, but also 
that missing stamp in election booklets of 1946 that sealed the fate of men and their children as 
evidence that they were communist threats to the regime. Remarkably, this "political economy of 
papers" is narrated at length in men's accounts, having very real implications for interviewees' 
everyday life, their opportunities and exclusions. 
 Thinking about relations with the state over the course of many decades and in terms of 
social proximities allows a thread to be woven between these and many other ethnographic 
encounters that may otherwise be overlooked as trivial, "anecdotal" or irrelevant. From the angry 
lieutenant who slams down a dusty file and announces a condemned genealogy ("You, your 
father, and your papers will stay on this shelf until they are eaten by insects!"), to the gestures of 
intimacy over dinner with Prime Minister "Andreas," forms of sociality are narrated here that 
give us a much greater sense of moving between very different scales and proximities to the 
state—both in terms of the latter's undeniable capacity to render a subject abject and its ability to 
render "country boys" "very respectable people." Without falling into a trap of finding "the state" 
everywhere, it is worthwhile paying close attention to how these encounters are narrated and the 
manner in which the speaker is positioned as a particular kind of ethnical and political subject. 
Both for those who returned to Greece and those who stayed in Canada, demonstrating one's 
marginalization or withdrawal from circuits of power—whether this be expressed as refusals (to 
join the struggle in Athens, for example, or even to drink a coffee with "comrades" at the 
PASOK office) or outright failure—can affirm the speaker's political commitment and his 
integrity or "quiet dignity."  
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Social Life II: "Living in the File" as Political Inheritance 
 
A great part of this dissertation has concentrated on building a theoretical and ethnographic 
vocabulary for what I have called "the politics of kinship," referring to both the practice of 
ascribing political identities based on kinship and the forms of sociality that take shape around 
this practice. "Political inheritance" refers to bestowed ascriptions and their consequences 
(including forms of denial and marginalization). Finally, "political genealogy" refers to 
identifiable narrative frames in which political subjectivities are constructed in relation to one's 
political inheritance. Chapter three demonstrated most explicitly the usefulness of this conceptual 
language for understanding the narratives of growing up in post-civil war Greece. I showed how 
young people were "filed" based on authorities' perceptions of the actions and thoughts of family 
member. More than this, I demonstrated how the family is figured as an integral—albeit 
precarious— political unit. Nuanced terms for Greek families of the left, creative narrative 
attempts to neutralize right-wing relatives, the drawing on patrilines in the articulation of 
political identities, and the citizen file as site of confirmation, discovery and contestation of 
family history: all of these are ethnographic exposures indicating how the political was heavily 
coded and constructed through kin relations and vocabularies.  
 While the politics of kinship is demonstrated most concretely in chapter three, it remained 
relevant for understanding men's experiences in Toronto during the Junta (in chapter four). I 
argued that the file—and the politics of kinship up on which it rests— is given a second life of 
sorts on the streets of Toronto: Sons concerned over the consequences of their political activities 
for relatives in Greece and one's family background was sometimes used to (de)legitimize 
activists in Toronto. In chapter five, we saw how framing oneself in the Metapolitefsi as a 
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failure, as being marginalized, or as having withdrawn performs a speaker's commitment to their 
political inheritance of principled exclusion. In the context of PASOK's ascent, I also document 
how the destruction and classification of citizen files can be read as a hollowed-out act of state 
reconciliation that denies "the filed" to track their political inheritance against powers that had 
persecuted families for decades. Finally, political genealogy emerged as an interpretive frame (in 
chapter six) for working through—often in parallel—one's own political inheritance aside 
reflections on Greece's contemporary crisis. There is quite a bit at stake in analyses of 
contemporary political and economic troubles—whether framed in terms of the disappointed 
leftist and apocalyptic futures of austerity, the promise of the center, the attachment to the 
traditional party line, or auto-essentializing stereotypes of "the Greeks"—precisely because these 
analyses rest on—or imply-assessment of one's own political inheritance. 
Social Life III: The Social Life of Political Categories 
 
Through the lens of political kinship, we initially discovered that "being left" was often 
experienced as an ascription bestowed or inherited; in other words, as a kind of significant  
"structuring experience" traceable throughout childhood and young adulthood. While 
sociologists are accustomed to thinking about the "socially structured relations" of gender, class 
and race, for example, we don't tend to think about political categories in analogous terms. The 
ethnographic material I have discussed at length here calls for new ways of thinking through 
political categories as they structure everyday life. Rather than taking the "the left" as a political 
formation known in advance, or a specific group of people easily identified by their voting 
practices or ideologies, I have shown how the terms convey relational sites requiring interpretive 
labour and negotiation.  
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 In chapter three, I discussed a number of explicit institutional marginalizations that men 
experienced as a result of "being left," as well as the more subtle forms of everyday interpellation 
that occurred on the streets, at school and in the playground, by teachers and priests, as well as 
peers. What it means to inhabit these categories as grown men, however, remained a persistent 
question circulating throughout accounts. Of course, some of these narratives took shape around 
instances of significant change, where traditional categories were resignified and new modes of 
acting and relating emerged alongside new political actors and forces. This is true of descriptions 
in chapter four, where men (sometimes for the first time) acted—and identified themselves—
politically in the anti-junta movement. Statements like, "I was called many names in Canada, but 
'communist' bothered me the least," read alongside struggles to "stamp" the movement as 
"communist" indicate that negotiating these categories—heavy in signification and affect—was a 
difficult and rather risky labour in the diaspora. Similarly, I illustrated (in chapter five) how 
those returning in the Metapolitefsi did so amidst transforming significations and political forces. 
The political categories of the left were no longer signs of abjection; quite oppositely, they 
afforded the bearer cultural capital (expressed in statements like "if you weren't left, you couldn't 
get laid," and "they were digging up titles of resistance from the battles [..] of the Danforth of 
Toronto"). 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that tracking "the social life of the political" 
reveals unique narrative constructions of political subjectivity and I identified how specific forms 
of sociality are narrated through a distinct set of tropes: visibility, (mis)recognition, proximity 
and naming. The accounts of those I interviewed presented subjects at once straining to 
understand and to be understood; to come to terms with over-determining political categories and 
the (mis)recognitions that had occurred in their name; and to negotiate both their attachment and 
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their measured distance from political genealogies. These are subjects suffering their 
disappointments and defeats and telling stories that are at once self-aggrandizing and self-
blaming. Throughout my analysis I engaged in the interpretative labour of isolating even the 
most subtle expressions of exclusion, betrayal and dislocation. How else might we reckon with 
the four simple words recalled by Alexis ––"are you still back there?–– more than 45 years later, 
Yannis' exclamation that "by the time we arrived they had all changed their names!" or Pantelis' 
frustration that "they asked me to fill out an application!" 
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